Select Russian nationalist voices continued to express skepticism towards #Russia’s ability to launch a successful offensive in #Ukraine past late February. isw.pub/UkrWar020623
3/ German Chancellor Olaf Scholz undermined Russian President Vladimir #Putin’s false narrative that the provision of German tanks to #Ukraine threatens Russian security.
4/ Kremlin-appointed Russian and occupation officials continue to implement social benefit schemes that target children and teenagers in occupied areas of #Ukraine to consolidate social control and integration of these territories into #Russia.
5/ Kremlin-appointed Russian and occupation officials continue to implement social benefit schemes that target children and teenagers in occupied areas of Ukraine to consolidate social control and integration of these territories into Russia. isw.pub/UkrWar020623
6/ Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights, Maria Lvova-Belova (appointed by #Putin) is likely working directly on Putin’s orders to institute several social institutions and programs in occupied areas of #Ukraine to collect personal data on children...
7/ ...carry out various social programming functions aimed at integrating occupied areas using pseudo-humanitarian organizations, and set conditions to legitimize and institutionalize the deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children into Russian families.
8/ Russian President Vladimir #Putin continues to open the door for further institutionalized corruption in Russia through legislative manipulations. isw.pub/UkrWar020623
9/ The Kremlin continues to deny Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin legitimacy and authority in #Russia. Prigozhin’s appeal in the Russian nationalist information space may also be declining as he continues to overcompensate for the culmination of Wagner’s attack around Bakhmut.
10/ Failures of Western sanctions efforts against the provision of arms components to Iran have likely contributed to #Russia’s ability to bypass Western sanctions to acquire components for combat drones through military cooperation with #Iran. isw.pub/UkrWar020623
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2/ The pace of Russian operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line in western #Luhansk Oblast has increased markedly over the past week...
3/ ...and Russian sources are widely reporting that conventional Russian troops are attacking Ukrainian defensive lines and making marginal advances along the #Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border, particularly northwest of #Svatove near #Kupyansk and west of #Kreminna.
2/ Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian concentration areas in #Kherson Oblast on February 7. isw.pub/UkrWar020723
3/ Geolocated footage published on February 7 showed a Ukrainian State Border Guard Service drone and artillery strike on Russian positions in Kardashynka (13km south of #Kherson City on the east bank of the Dnipro) in Kherson Oblast.
#Donetsk: Russian forces continued ground attacks around #Bakhmut on February 7. Geolocated footage published on February 6 confirms Russian tactical advances north of Bakhmut near Blahodatne (7km north of Bakhmut) and Krasna Hora (7km north of Bakhmut). isw.pub/UkrWar020723
2/ Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group forces are continuing efforts to take Krasna Hora and Paraskoviivka (5km north of #Bakhmut) but that Ukrainian troops still hold these two settlements.
3/ Several Russian sources also claimed that Wagner Group forces reached the T0504 Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway but did not offer a specific location. Russian milbloggers report that Ukrainian troops maintain control of Ivanivske, a critical settlement on the T0504.
#Putin’s decisions regarding #Ukraine since his initial flawed invasion on February 24, 2022, indicate a likely disconnect between his maximalist objectives and his willingness to take the high-risk decisions necessary to achieve them. 🧵of key takeaways:
2/ Putin has consistently ignored, delayed, or only partially implemented several likely necessary pragmatic decisions concerning his invasion. Putin continued to select comparatively less risky options even when faced with spiraling military failures in the fall of 2022.
3/ ISW assesses the Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) are belatedly implementing large-scale-military reforms and treating Ukraine as a protracted and major war—yet Putin is continuing a similar pattern of reserved decision-making.
2/ Russian milbloggers are conflicted on whether Ukrainian forces are withdrawing from #Bakhmut, and #Wagner Group financier Yevgeny #Prigozhin denied claims of a Ukrainian withdrawal.
3/ @TheStudyofWar continues to assess that Russian forces are likely unable to force an imminent Ukrainian withdrawal from #Bakhmut.
Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian military assets in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. 1/ isw.pub/UkrWar020423
Geolocated footage shows #Ukrainian forces striking a #Russian Tor M2DT air defense system 12km southwest of Nova Kakhovka, #Kherson Oblast and 8km from the east (left) bank of the #Dnipro River on February 3, the second instance in two days. 2/
The presence of these short-range air defense systems optimized for Arctic warfare near the riverbank suggests that the #Russian 80th Separate Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade of the Northern Fleet is operating close to the riverbank and has brought its own air defense systems. 3/