NEW: The #Kremlin is meanwhile likely attempting to reintroduce yet another #Russian information operation aimed at falsely portraying #Russia as being open to negotiations regarding #Ukraine while the collective West refuses to negotiate. isw.pub/UkrWar022823
2/ #Kremlin spox Dmitry #Peskov stated on 28 FEB that Russian officials are open to negotiations to end the war in #Ukraine but that Ukraine and the West must recognize new “territorial realities” associated with #Russia’s illegal annexation of occupied territories in Ukraine.
3/ #Peskov added that #Ukraine also needs to consider #Russia’s specific goals in the war in Ukraine to reach a negotiated settlement.
4/ These goals include regime change of the #Ukrainian government under the rubric of “denazification“ and the elimination of #Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against future #Russian attacks under the rubric of “demilitarization.” isw.pub/UkrWar022823
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2/ ...and demonstrating the international economic and informational costs imposed on #Putin by his invasion of #Ukraine. isw.pub/UkrWar03012023
3/ @POLITICOEurope reported on March 1 that Vučić seeks to appeal to both #Russia and western institutions by continuing #Serbia’s #EuropeanUnion membership bid while refusing to impose sanctions against Russia, but Vučić said that Serbia must make "difficult choices" soon.
Having expended its utility as a recruitment tool, the #Kremlin likely seeks to mitigate further pushback from the #Russian pro-war ultranationalist community which looks up to #Putin as the facilitator of the war despite their criticisms of its conduct. isw.pub/UkrWar03012023
2/ @TheStudyofWar assessed on 26 FEB that #Putin has allowed the ultranationalist community to expand its influence at the expense of the #Russian MoD so the #Kremlin can leverage the community’s pre-established networks to recruit volunteers. More here: isw.pub/UkrWar022623
3/ The #Kremlin could seek to use these new amendments to promote self-censorship among select milbloggers whose constituencies are no longer needed for its force generation or crowdfunding campaigns, or whose criticisms have exceeded the Kremlin’s tolerance for open criticism.
Ukrainian officials continue to report potential Russian preparations for renewed offensive operations in #Zaporizhia & #Kherson oblasts, though ISW has not observed indicators that Russian forces plan to renew offensive operations in these directions. (1/7)
2/ The #Ukrainian General Staff reported that #Russian forces are defending in #Zaporizhia and #Kherson oblasts but are trying to create conditions that will allow Russian forces to conduct offensives in some unspecified areas of this part of the front. isw.pub/UkrWar022823
3/ #Russian forces have conducted infrequent localized attacks in #Zaporizhia Oblast in recent months but have not conducted any meaningful offensive activity in #Kherson Oblast since withdrawing from the west (right) bank of the #Dnipro River in November 2022.
Russian forces made tactical gains in northern #Bakhmut and continued ground attacks around Bakhmut and in the #Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on February 28. 🧵(1/7) isw.pub/UkrWar022823
2/ #Russian forces continued ground attacks near Bakhmut and made tactical gains within Bakhmut.
Russian milbloggers claimed that #Wagner forces are trying to advance on central Bakhmut from the north near the Stupky station and from positions on the city's eastern outskirts.
3/ #Wagner Group-affiliated media outlet RIAFAN posted footage on February 27 and 28 showing Wagner fighters walking around northern #Bakhmut near the Stupky railway station and “Sady Bakhmuta” garden store, indicating that Wagner has advanced in northern Bakhmut.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near #Svatove & #Kreminna and likely made limited advances north of Kreminna on 28 FEB.
Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian concentration areas in the rear of Luhansk. isw.pub/UkrWar022823
2/ A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are engaged in fierce fighting near Novoselivske, NW of #Svatove; another claimed that elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division pushed Ukrainian forces out of unspecified high-ground positions on the Svatove-#Kreminna line.
3/ Further south, #Russian forces reportedly conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near #Kreminna itself, Makiivka (22km NW of Kreminna), Nevske (18km NW of Kreminna), Ploshchanka (17km NW of Kreminna), Dibrova (6km SW of Kreminna), & Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).
The recent resurgence of several standard Russian information operations in the form of false flag warnings & tired nuclear threats suggests that Russian officials are increasingly trying to mitigate the informational impacts of an ongoing lack of Russian battlefield successes...
2/ ...as well as to slow down the provision of Western tanks and other equipment in advance of expected Ukrainian counteroffensives. isw.pub/UkrWar022823
3/ @TheStudyofWar has previously reported on the correlation between #Russian information operations and battlefield realities, particularly when Russian forces are failing to take significant ground in offensive operations in #Ukraine.