Russian Def. Minister Sergey #Shoigu announced that the Russian MoD intends to increase the size of #Russia’s air defense forces at a Russian MoD collegium on March 22, though the Russian military is unlikely to generate such forces within several years. isw.pub/UkrWar032223
2/ #Shoigu also likely signaled to #Japan that it should not attempt to exploit #Russia’s current military vulnerability in the Kuril Islands and to #China that Russia remains a worthwhile military partner. isw.pub/UkrWar032223
3/ On the topic of #Ukraine, when asked by a #Russian journalist how the war will end, #Shoigu responded by saying all wars end in peace. The journalist followed up by asking when peace would come, but Shoigu didn’t answer and walked away. isw.pub/UkrWar032223
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2/ #Prigozhin stated that #Russia is fighting “exclusively with #Ukrainians” who are equipped with #NATO-provided equipment and some “russophobic” mercenaries who voluntarily support #Ukraine - but not NATO itself.
3/ #Prigozhin also noted that #Russian officials most likely knew that #NATO would offer #Ukraine military aid, because “it is ridiculous to think that when [#Russia] decided to conduct this special military operation it did not account for NATO’s help to Ukraine.”
NEW: #Wagner Group financier Yevgeny #Prigozhin has softened his rhetoric towards the #Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely out of fear of completely losing his mercenary force in #Bakhmut.
2/ #Prigozhin voiced his concerns about a possible Ukrainian counteroffensive in eastern UKR during a 23-minute interview on March 23 in which he claimed that UKR has 200,000 reserves concentrating to attack along the entire eastern frontline, into Belgorod Oblast, & in Bakhmut.
3/ #Prigozhin also claimed that the Ukrainians currently have 80,000 troops in #Bakhmut, Slovyansk, and Kostyantynivka to counterattack Bakhmut – a claim that former Russian officer Igor #Girkin observed was dubious.
2/ "It is possible that Russian forces are [focusing on #Avdiivka] at the expense of their operations around #Bakhmut and the stalled offensive around #Vuhledar," we wrote last night.
3/ "Russian forces appear to be drawing more combat power to the #Avdiivka area which may allow them to increase their rate of advance, although there were no confirmed Russian advances in the area on March 22."
#Russian forces may be deploying significantly outdated T-54 and T-55 tanks from long-term storage to #Ukraine to compensate for significant armored vehicle losses. (1/4) isw.pub/UkrWar032223
2/ The deployment of inferior equipment to replenish the #Russian military's ability to conduct mechanized maneuver warfare may prompt a further degradation of Russian manpower in #Ukraine.
3/ #Russian forces are unlikely to achieve preferable resource attrition rates on the grounds that T-54/55 are cheaper than anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) ammunition, as some have argued. isw.pub/UkrWar032223
The tempo of #Russian operations around #Bakhmut appears to be slowing amid Western reporting that Russian forces may be attempting to launch offensives in other directions. (1/5) isw.pub/UkrWar032223
2/ #Russian forces made additional marginal advances in southern #Bakhmut, and Ukrainian forces conducted counterattacks on the southwestern and northwestern outskirts of the city on March 21 and 22.
3/ #Russian forces are currently increasing the tempo of their offensive operations around #Avdiivka aiming to encircle the settlement - possibly at the expense of their operations around #Bakhmut and the stalled offensive around #Vuhledar. isw.pub/UkrWar032223
#Xi’s refusal to explicitly align #China with #Russia in #Putin’s envisioned geopolitical conflict with the West is a notable departure from China’s declared “no limits partnership” with Russia preceding the start of the Russian invasion of #Ukraine. isw.pub/UkrWar032023
2/ #Xi’s rhetoric suggests that he is not inclined to fully give #Russia the economic and political support that Russia needs to reverse setbacks in #Ukraine.
3/ #Putin and #Xi offered somewhat similar visions for increased Chinese-Russian economic partnership, and it is likely that the two will sign bilateral trade and economic agreements during Xi’s visit, some of which will likely aim to facilitate schemes for sanctions evasion.