But here’s the general pattern, using this EdChoice table as an example (there are many more): 1/ 🧵
First is the absence of abysmal negative OH, and IN results by teams led by Figlio and Berends, respectively.
Those studies use panel data and methods and find terrible statewide at-scale voucher effects—hugely relevant to legislation today. 2/ chalkbeat.org/2018/8/9/21107…
But #schoolvouchers advocates drop them from tables like the 👆 because they’re not lottery-based studies. It’s true that lotteries are gold standard evaluation tool—but have well-known limitations re: scale and generalizability—key issues today.
Any case, you don’t drop them
3/
What’s more, both Berends and Figlio are National Academy members with vast research track records in other areas too.
Their research on #education policy across the board is taken far more seriously than the #schoolvouchers churn-out factories at…other places.
4/
But let’s just take the table 👆as is…several other problems.
First note the P vs V: the first are privately funded demonstration trials. The V are studies of actual voucher programs.
Both should be included, but V is more relevant to current legislation.
5/
But let’s take those tiny “P” studies in the table above 👆 shall we? Well.
First, Howell et al (2002) are not separate studies. They are three tiny pilot data collections in the *same study.*
Presenting them this way has the intentional effect of overstating each alone.
6/
But for the sake of argument let’s separate them as EdChoice does here.
Again, well. Let’s look at those NYC studies 🤔
Krueger and Zhu isn’t just a separate null NYC study offset by other positive studies, they showed the + results went away with simple robustness checks!
7/
That’s…a problem for the NYC data. The phrase today is “broken experiment,” coined by the Jin et al authors also cited by the table 👆, and who also find NYC results to be highly dependent on researcher choices.
Again, a problem.
8/
Oh and just for good measure, note that problems with the NYC #schoolvouchers data on which the table 👆so heavily leans have been present *from the beginning*, more than 20 years ago.
It’s not just that they’re almost all for-profit. They are but #OhioEd has for-profit charters for example and much greater 🔎. #mileg#mipol#migov@Network4pubEd
1/
For-profit #charterschools run on small profit margins for students—as far as we can tell. So it gives charters like those in MI every incentive to cut corners. That’s one problem. #mipol#migov#mileg
2/
But here’s something I’m guessing MI charters really don’t want #mileg members or #miched journalists looking into: property holdings.
The real profit is in various property bought and maintained with tax support. @NPEaction
3/
There’s a #schoolvouchers link to the #January6thReport. It centers around attorney Cleta Mitchell who led Trump’s GA pressure efforts after the vote. #BigLie
Mitchell is also Board Secretary for the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, a huge #schoolvouchers backer out of Wisconsin that’s given $millions to voucher research and advocacy.
First: a win’s a win. It’s good to see #schoolvouchers stopped anywhere. The push to privatize is so relentless, so well-funded by such a narrow swath of backers, it can feel like swinging in the dark against it.
2/
But more concretely: the KY Court found that #schoolvouchers tax credit shell game was a budget commitment even though it’s not a direct appropriation. Reducing revenue by $10 is the same as spending $10.
3/
The actual researchers clearly say their results are due to changes in student composition—with #schoolvouchers by design drawing more lower income students (ie also lower ave test scores) away from districts.
So districts didn’t actually improve #education due to vouchers 2/
They just lost lower scoring kids.
“But wait!” #schoolvouchers activists may say, “that shows vouchers are admitting poorer kids!”
True enough but there’s no evidence voucher programs know how to *serve* those kids.