1. It has been a while since I did a #thread on #Brexit but as baby Janina is napping I thought I would offer my two cents. The IMB has naturally undermined the trust that the deal can be reached and has a potential of derailing the talks.
2. Whereas the EU is naturally frustrated with UK's move some folks I have talked to think that the deal is still possible... under condition that the IMB is revised respectively.
3. Some of the involved in the talks think that Johnson is believed to prefer a deal from a no-deal scenario but they acknowledge that there are mounting challenges ahead of the negotiators.
Having read both mandates I can say with full confidence: governance will be one of the most contentious points in #brexit talks. Short #thread
First of all, ‘the coherent structure and overall governance framework’ are already listed in the chapter called ‘purpose of the envisaged relationship’ suggesting that the EU treats this issue v. seriously.
Why is it important for the EU? There are at least 3 reasons: a) an umbrella governance gives the parties greater flexibility to add on new elements to the partnership in the future, b) it helps to avoid the Swiss saga related to dealing with a number of bilateral agreements
@Radio_TOK_FM 2. Rozporządzenie, o którym mowa nie wymaga jednomyślności - jest to tzw. akt towarzyszący, który wypełni ramy WRF o których zdecydują liderzy. ALE...ale...
@Radio_TOK_FM 3. liderzy zdecydowali, że w ramach głównych negocjacji dot. WRF (jednomyslność) zajmą się min. kontrowersyjnym zapisem dot. tzw. odwroconej większości kwalifikowanej według którego KE mogłaby zadecydować o zamrożeniu środków CHYBA, ŻE Rada zdecyduje inaczej.
I think the commentariat is exaggerating the tensions between the EU member-states in the phase TWO of the #Brexit talks. #thread
1. If Tories win (and if they win big) the Council could agree a negotiating mandate already in February. It is no secret that the Commission has already drafted the negotiating directives.
2. The baseline scenario for the EU will be that Johnson does not want an extension of the transition and hence that both sides have eleven months to strike a future FTA. What the officials and politicians privately think and hope is a totally different matter.
A #thread on how the EU is preparing for the second phase of the #Brexit negotiations based on my latest bulletin piece. @CER_EU
@CER_EU 1. The latest polls show that Tories might not only emerge as the biggest party after elections but also have a comfortable majority in the Commons. If this is the case the UK will probably leave the EU by the end of January 31st.
@CER_EU 2. As you will know Johnson has argued that 11 months is enough to negotiate a future partnership with the EU. The EU-27 thinks it is a tall order but it is already establishing new negotiating structures to be able to start the talks as soon as possible.
I have to disagree with @anandMenon1 here. The 'EU unity mantra' was well thought through, boosted its negotiating hand and will most likely be maintained in the second phase. I will dwell on several Anand's points in the below #thread.
@anandMenon1 1. I would challenge the notion that EU has been inflexible. Yes, it has stuck to its guiding negotiating principles (recipe for its success) but it also showed some flexibility in the process itself. The final text of the NI protocol is clear indication of it.
@anandMenon1 2. EU member-states made a strategic decision to put the Commission in a driving seat- it represents EU's general interests and even the MS which have recently resented the influence of the community institutions (eg. Poland) were from day one in favour of the EC' s lead.
A #thread on Johnson's yesterday's proposal. Disclaimer- I am in bed with a flu so if something does not sound 100% convincing or if you see any typos you will know why.
1. UK's gov. narrative has significantly changed. Whereas May was committed to objectives of the backstop - particularly all-island economy and no hardening of a border Johnson is recognising that there will be customs checks even though he wants to do them away from the border.
2. His proposals are effectively creating 2 borders: one on the Island of Ireland &another between NI and the rest of UK. That is leaving NI business in a worse position than it would have been under initial version of the backstop. For all the details follow @SamuelMarcLowe
My belated #thread about the new European Commission College Structure.
1. The Commission president-elect followed Juncker's example and organised her team commissioners in 'commissioners groups' (previously called project teams') which will work towards delivering her 6 priorities.
2. Her college, however, has extra layer: 3 executive vice-pres. This was in a way imposed by EUCO which, in my view, (though very few noticed) exceeded its competences when it instructed von der Leyen to give a prominent role to both Timmermans and Vestager.
I have finished reading von der Leyen's political guidelines for the next Commission. A short #thread which I will build on in the next weeks or so.
1. I like the way she grouped individual policy fields under 6 policy priorities. I would not be surprised if they constituted the core principles for building her college 'team projects' or whatever she decides to call them.
2. Listing 'European Green Deal' as no. 1 out of 6 'ambitions' isn't accidental. She seems 2 understand what drove many voters in European elections. She is aware that bold actions must be accompanied with 'transition plans' to avoid 'yellow vests' protests in coal reliant areas
In half an hour @vonderleyen will make a last ditch effort to convince MEPs to back her candidacy for the European Commission. The vote- unless the EP president puts the last minute amendment- will take place in the evening. #Thread
1. There are various controversies around her candidacy. Some say that she has had bad track record as a defense minister in Germany and that she has limited knowledge about other important EU dossiers.
2. Others simply don't like the fact that that she was not a lead candidate and that she is a compromise candidate and acceptable to CEE countries- they even imply that this already disqualifies her.
On June 24th @EUCourtPress ruled that the decision of the PL gov to lower retirement age for Supreme Court's judges breach the principles of the irremovability of judges & judicial independence. Although gov. revised rules since EC opened the case the ruling matters. #Thread
1. It effectively undermines the gov narrative that the EU, let alone ECJ, has no right to intervene in what PiS sees as domestic issues.
2. The Court argues that whereas it is up to MS themselves to determine the organisation of their courts they have to abide with the EU law while doing so.
Why is there in principle low interest in #EP2019 across member-states? A short #thread before I dash for Saturday barbecue.
1. You might often hear that the turnout in the EP elections has been falling (to reach record low -42.6 per cent) due to a growing disconnect between average EU citizens and 'far away Brussels'. But take such a response -likely coming from eurosceptics- with a pinch of salt.
2. Indeed, EU is far from perfect& could perhaps listen to citizens better. But national politicians from mainstream parties are particularly to blame. They used to spend little time and energy on EP elections&contributed to the general feeling that these are 'second order elect'
1. As lead candidates are gearing up for the #telleurope debate tonight I thought I would do a mini #thread on how I see the @Europarl_EN elections playing out.
2. One of the problems with these elections is that they are seen as 'second-order' elections and attract little public interest. Ever since 1979 the turnout has been decreasing and in 2014 reached record low 43 %.
3. It is unclear if turnout will be higher this time. But there are reasons to believe that this will be the case at least in some MS. According to @PolitykaInsight 38 % voters could go to the polls in PL whereas in 2014 only 24 % voted. UK turnout could also be a bit higher
Second, whereas EU officials follow Westminster's dynamics and understand that that there is no parliamentary majority for a no-deal scenario they are also speeding up preparation for this outcome - as it could happen even by accident
1. Academic research by @ConUnit_UCL suggests that one needs around 6 M to hold referendum; the preparations to hold a vote include eg. pushing through legislation, assessing intelligibility of the Q on the ballot, preparing polling stations and securing the time for the campaign
2. The first possibility to instruct GOV to hold a vote would be when MPs vote on withdrawal agreement. Looking at the pace of the talks the deal (if it is reached at all) could be presented to Parliament the earliest in DEC; this means that the REF could be held around June/July
President Macron gave an interview to PL, CZ, SK & HU newspapers. He carefully avoided patronizing EU's newer member-states -perhaps someone has finally advised him that this does little to boost his leadership in the EU; The full interview in PL is here: rp.pl/Unia-Europejsk…
2. In the interview, Macron has tried to calm down euro-outs' nervousness that they would be left out in the cold if French vision for the #eurozone reform went ahead. He reminded that eurozone is open for new members.
3. Macron argues that some elements of the #eurozone architecture should be open to no-euro area members. He also reminds that the euro summits have been conducted in an inclussive format of 27.
The discussion in the EU about how to address the problem of the rule of law in PL has mainly focused on deploying punitive measures. This inspired me to write a paper for @Carnegie_Europe within its #Europeandemocracy project which calls on a more comprehensive strategy. #Thread
1.Don't get me wrong. The EU cannot turn a blind eye on democratic backsliding in its own members. EU treaties provide EC with legal instruments 2 address the problem&EC has been doing its job vis-à-vis. But it will fail to restore #ruleoflaw if it only sticks 2 punitive measures
2.The EC needs to ensure that the Polish public understands the EU’s motives for intervening. Poles are pro-European but they are vulnerable to the PiS narrative that Brussels has no right to tell Warsaw what to do ( I refer to some polling in the piece)
1. As media had previously reported #Juncker decided not to focus on what his Commission achieved but on what still needs to be done to convince European citizens to say 'Yes' to the EU when they go to the polls next year.
2. I agree that it is not a good moment for pats on the back and I agree with #Juncker that member-states have in many respects held the Commission up from delivering on Commission's promises.