(THREAD) BREAKING: The NYT has published a bombshell report on George Papadopoulos—the biggest Trump-Russia news since Flynn's plea. This thread dissects the new revelations—as well as some major implications for the Trump-Russia collusion narrative. I hope you'll read and share. 
1/ First, here's the article. The NYT foregrounds the story's significance as a rebuttal of Trump's claims the Russia investigation began with the Steele Dossier. But in fact, anyone who knows criminal investigations knew long ago Trump's claim was untrue. nytimes.com/2017/12/30/us/…
2/ As has been discussed by @AshaRangappa_, the Steele Dossier alone would never have been enough to earn the FBI the July 2016 FISA warrant it was granted to monitor Carter Page. So attorneys and those in intelligence long ago knew the Dossier didn't launch the probe by itself.
3/ The NYT story gives us—it appears—an additional piece of the warrant application the FBI filed to get a FISA warrant in July '16. But again, this is merely a piece—as was the Dossier. We know multiple intelligence agencies, not just Australia's, provided the FBI with evidence.
4/ So Trump's claim that the FBI grabbed a dossier of raw intelligence it hadn't yet confirmed and ran to the FISA court to secure a warrant to wiretap Americans connected to the Trump campaign has been laughably false from Day 1. And media has not done enough to underscore that.
5/ What we learn from the NYT (though again it's not—contrary to what the NYT seems to believe from its headline—what makes today's breaking news significant) is that the Australians informed U.S. law enforcement in July 2016 that Papadopoulos had made covert contact with Russia.
6/ In fact, while today's NYT story is indeed this month's second-biggest Trump-Russia revelation—after the December 1 guilty plea by Mike Flynn—what makes it significant isn't that it rebuts Trump's false claims but that it may have *sealed the Trump-Russia collusion narrative*.
7/ If the NYT understood this, it would've led with it. But one must know the *prior* reporting on Papadopoulos to understand why today's news constitutes one of the biggest revelations in the 18-monthy history of the Trump-Russia probe. So I'll *briefly* summarize what we know.
8/ On September 22—40 days before we learned Papadopoulos was cooperating with the Mueller probe—I said that he had directly identified himself to Trump as a Kremlin agent in March 2016. This led to major-media coverage of the now-infamous "TIHDC meeting."
9/ It hadn't previously been discussed that Papadopoulos was at the first meeting of Trump's national security (NatSec) team at the Trump International Hotel in DC (TIHDC) on March 31, 2016. But he was there—a *week* after revealing himself as a Kremlin agent to the NatSec team.
10/ So when (per the NYT) Papadopoulos revealed in May '16 to an Australian diplomat that he knew Russia had committed major federal crimes against the U.S.—via computer theft and fraud—it was two months after he told Trump's NatSec team *and Trump* he was in contact with Russia.
11/ The nature of the contact that Papadopoulos revealed in March 2016 to Trump and his team was that he was a *legal* agent—in the law we'd say "special agent"—of the Kremlin. He was authorized to represent the Kremlin's interests in setting up a clandestine Trump-Putin meeting.
12/ That authority came to Papadopoulos—from Kremlin officials—through another Kremlin agent, Joseph Mifsud. This is why Papadopoulos, per public reporting by WP, identified himself to Trump on March 31, 2017 as a Kremlin "intermediary" designated not by Trump but by the Kremlin.
13/ As has been exhaustively detailed by WaPo (WP), Trump's NatSec team spent *two months*—from March to May of 2016—discussing how to handle Papadopoulos' "offer" of acting as an intermediary between Trump and Putin. They did *not* dismiss the offer in March, whatever some say.
14/ It was in the *middle* of this deliberation by the NatSec team that Papadopoulos, in April 2016, was told the Kremlin had committed federal computer crimes by stealing emails from a presidential candidate. Papadopoulos *knew* his team was then deliberating a Trump-Putin meet.
15/ During this period, Papadopoulos was *personally* hounding top Trump officials—per the WP—to give him more authority and allow him to travel abroad to arrange a Trump-Putin meeting. His April intelligence on the Clinton emails was *without a doubt* a card he would've played.
16/ So while Australian law enforcement knew of the stolen Clinton emails in May 2016, and the FBI knew by July 2016 (via Australia), it's a *lock* that Papadopoulos gave this intel to Trump and his campaign—from whom he wanted present authority *and* a future job—in April 2016.
17/ So when Trump said, in July 2016, "Russia, if you're listening..." let's be clear—he a) knew they were listening, b) knew they'd stolen the emails he was urging them to release, and c)—this is key—had already promised, *via Papadopoulos*, to reward them for being good to him.
18/ This is the first real bombshell from the NYT: we now know Papadopoulos helped write the April 27, 2016 speech in which Trump promised Russia a "good deal" if they'd be his "friend," and that Trump *knew* Papadopoulos would transmit to Russia that that speech was a *message*.
19/ In March 2017, I was the first to argue that Trump's Mayflower Speech was the orchestrated beginning of a negotiation with the Russians—a negotiation about unilaterally dropping Russian sanctions. That thread essentially launched this feed (see link). storify.com/loriaustex/set… 
20/ The NYT has just confirmed the crux of that March 2017 thread: that Trump had—by April 27, 2016—established sufficient means to send a message to Russia that the careful placement of Kislyak at the event (violating diplomatic protocol) signaled the beginning of a negotiation.
21/ Per the NYT, Papadopoulos was that means. Papadopoulos told Trump he was a Kremlin agent; Trump put Papadopoulos on his campaign's Russia beat (not Papadopoulos' specialization); he let him help with the Mayflower Speech; he knew Papadopoulos would communicate that to Russia.
22/ Per the NYT, Papadopoulos working on the Mayflower Speech was a signal to Russia negotiations had begun. So: Papadopoulos tells Russia he's helping with Trump's foreign policy; Russia tells him of the emails; Papadopoulos tells the campaign; Trump offers Russia a "good deal."
23/ All of this happens in April 2016, which is why Papadopoulos was feeling pretty damn good about himself in May 2016 when he let slip about the emails to an Australian diplomat.
It also explains why Trump was so frustrated when the Kremlin didn't give Don the emails in June.
It also explains why Trump was so frustrated when the Kremlin didn't give Don the emails in June.
24/ Don was excited to meet Kremlin agents in June 2016 to get Clinton "dirt" because Papadopoulos told the campaign in April Russia had that dirt. When Veselnitskaya left only a slim file with Don, the campaign was dissatisfied. They thought Russia would then release the emails.
25/ That didn't happen—other hacked info was released instead—which is why Trump made the appeal himself, on TV, in July 2016.
He'd already promised Russia a "good deal" on sanctions if they'd be a "friend"—he said he'd "reward" friends—but he felt they hadn't delivered enough.
He'd already promised Russia a "good deal" on sanctions if they'd be a "friend"—he said he'd "reward" friends—but he felt they hadn't delivered enough.
26/ I've been arguing on this feed for over six months now that Trump-Russia collusion is *already known*: Trump negotiated sanctions relief for Russia in exchange for continued assistance with leaks—which constitutes *Aiding and Abetting Computer Crimes*.
27/ In October, I made this case in even greater detail.
28/ There is much, much more to say here about the NYT story and everything we know about Papadopoulos that makes this NYT story *much* bigger than the NYT thinks. But I have to take a break for a couple hours for an important event.
I will return *immediately* after with more.
I will return *immediately* after with more.
29/ Correction on Tweet #12: it should read March 31, 2016.
Next topic up in this thread: whether Papadopoulos interfaced directly with Trump (spoiler: he *did*, multiple times), and what level of authority he was given. The NYT story contains major breaking news on both fronts.
Next topic up in this thread: whether Papadopoulos interfaced directly with Trump (spoiler: he *did*, multiple times), and what level of authority he was given. The NYT story contains major breaking news on both fronts.
30/ Because Mueller has in his back pocket every action Papadopoulos ever took for Trump's campaign and anything Trump ever said to Papadopoulos—as Papadopoulos is a cooperating witness—of *key* importance is whether Papadopoulos spoke directly to Trump and what authority he had.
31/ Today's news in the NYT gives us new information on both questions.
But first, consider the contact we *know* Papadopoulos had with Trump at the TIHDC meeting on March 31, 2016. Here's the second of three threads I did on that subject many weeks ago:
But first, consider the contact we *know* Papadopoulos had with Trump at the TIHDC meeting on March 31, 2016. Here's the second of three threads I did on that subject many weeks ago:
32/ And here's the third thread I did on this subject, back in November. Together, these threads—and the major-media reports they cite—confirm that Trump's aides *lied* about what happened at the TIHDC to *hide* Trump's level of contact with Papadopoulos.
33/ Trump wants us to think he only spoke with Papadopoulos on March 31, 2016—calling him a "low-level volunteer few people knew." But in early November, five days after we learned of Papadopoulos' plea, I decided to hunt through Greek media to see what they said of Papadopoulos.
34/ Of those who follow this feed, about 100,000 chose to follow immediately after I began writing threads about Papadopoulos—including *Papadopoulos himself*.
This feed is 1 of 92 Papadopoulos follows—1 of 58 political journalists or media organizations—and I think I know why.
This feed is 1 of 92 Papadopoulos follows—1 of 58 political journalists or media organizations—and I think I know why.
35/ By reading through all Greek media articles about Papadopoulos in early November—research I worked with POLITICO to help it pick up—I discovered things unknown about the Trump-Papadopoulos connection in the United States. Beginning with this bombshell:
36/ That's right—after his success initiating Trump-Kremlin sanctions negotiations in April, Papadopoulos wanted to move to the next stage, which was arranging a meeting. The question is whether he had authority from Trump to do so. American media largely bought Trump's line: no.
37/ What Greek media was reporting was entirely different because Papadopoulos had been *very* chatty in Greek-language interviews with Kathimerini, a New York Times-equivalent publication in Greece. Perhaps Papadopoulos thought his interviews wouldn't make it back to the States.
38/ What Papadopoulos revealed was a) by December '16, he could tell Greek officials that Trump had personally offered him a "blank check" to choose any job in the Trump Administration; b) he was still on the campaign as of the inauguration; c) he'd spoken to Trump several times.
39/ He could also reveal he went to Greece twice in May 2016, both times to make contacts. Greek media found out who he'd met—a list of Greek power-brokers that included Panos Kammenos, a man in an MoU with the Putin think-tank that orchestrated the Russian propaganda campaign.
40/ I then did some hunting around myself, and discovered that during his second May 2016 trip, Papadopoulos was in Athens *the same time Putin was*—Putin's *only* trip to an EU nation during the campaign, and a trip Russian media said Putin was taking to *get sanctions dropped*.
41/ But wait! There's much more. Papadopoulos was in Athens in May as part of Trump's Russia policy team (which he joined April 1) and met with Kammenos—the Putin pal—the same week Putin did. Trump's Russia policy is focused on sanctions—and Putin was in Athens to talk sanctions.
42/ Moreover, Greek media reported that Papadopoulos took his second trip "incognito" and "in secret"—and averred to Greek media that he was meeting with important people, not all of whom he could disclose.
And this was a time he was working on setting up a Trump-Putin meeting.
And this was a time he was working on setting up a Trump-Putin meeting.
43/ More in an hour. Much more.
I apologize, but I'm a huge Wisconsin Badgers fan (PhD, 2016) and I'm watching the Orange Bowl.
I apologize, but I'm a huge Wisconsin Badgers fan (PhD, 2016) and I'm watching the Orange Bowl.
44/ The NYT confirms what I wrote about here when I first started discussing Papadopoulos: he was—and is—a Middle East oil expert who Trump reassigned to Russia policy (by sending him to Israel to discuss Russia policy) within *48 hours* of learning he was a Kremlin intermediary.
45/ So when Papadopoulos boasted in December 2016—apparently accurately—that Trump had offered him a "blank check" for a job (a job he *only* lost after Flynn was caught lying about Russian contacts in late January 2017), he was presumably being rewarded for his work on *Russia*.
46/ Just as Papadopoulos talked Russia policy in Israel, he went to Greece—while Putin was there to meet Kammenos and talk sanctions—for the very same reason as Putin: to meet Kammenos and talk sanctions.
Either Kammenos passed messages or Papadopoulos met Putin's aides/Putin.
Either Kammenos passed messages or Papadopoulos met Putin's aides/Putin.
47/ But before today, it was an open question whether Papadopoulos was ever granted the authority he'd long asked for—to set up a meeting between Trump and a foreign leader. The NYT confirms that Papadopoulos was authorized to set up a meeting between Trump and Egypt's President.
48/ It's no longer possible to think Trump made Papadopoulos a Russia advisor, and offered him a "blank check" job offer, and kept him on his NatSec team for 10 months while firing almost everyone else, *just* because Papadopoulos passed a message on Clinton emails in April 2016.
49/ Papadopoulos announced his goal was to bring a world leader—Putin—and Trump together; he was given authority to set up meetings between Trump and world leaders; he went to Athens "incognito" in late May 2016, while Putin was there, to meet the same people on the same subject.
50/ Thereafter he was kept on the NatSec team—despite some high-profile blunders and even, by his own admission, being involuntarily separated from the campaign in October, as he told Greek media—and offered any job he wanted. So he delivered something. Mueller knows what it was.
51/ The question is whether Papadopoulos had any one-on-one contact with Trump in which such offers were made, and such instructions given—whatever Sessions claims he "forbade" Papadopoulos from doing—and here my research into Greek media found some *critical* answers once again.
52/ As the thread below details, Papadopoulos told Greek media—at a time he was still expecting a job with Trump and Flynn's December crimes hadn't occurred yet—he had a call *and* a one-on-one meeting with Trump before the TIHDC meeting on March 31, 2016.
53/ So there's a *reason* that—when Trump announced Papadopoulos as a member of his NatSec team—Papadopoulos was the *only* member announced at that time who Trump *personally vouched for*—something mainstream media never caught. He vouched for Papadopoulous because he'd met him.
54/ That call and one-on-one meeting—the latter happening, per Papadopoulos, at the then-unfinished TIHDC—both occurred *after* Russia had made its first contact with Papadopoulos. Does anyone think Papadopoulos ignored his Kremlin instructions and didn't pass a message to Trump?
55/ So when Rep. Lieu (House Intel Committee) wrote, today, that Mueller knows much more than we do, this is just what he means: Mueller knows the content of Papadopoulos' personal conversations with Trump, and what steps Trump let Papadopoulos take to negotiate with the Kremlin.
56/ Moreover, Mueller knows what the NYT reported today establishes *Papadopoulos* as the linchpin of Trump's sometimes private, sometimes public—always illegal and collusive—sanctions-for-aid negotiation and deal with the Russians. Papadopoulos can and has established collusion.
57/ With all that established, let's return to the NYT story inexplicably billed as no more than a retort to the millionth lie Trump has told on his ties to Russia and the Steele Dossier. We knew *in November* Papadopoulos helped edit the Mayflower Speech:
58/ Readers of this feed knew in September—and readers of major media by November—that Trump had lied about Papadopoulos being a low-level volunteer Trump campaign staff hardly knew, given the trips he took abroad as a Trump rep to meet foreign officials:
59/ We even knew, 3 weeks ago, that Papadopoulos had had contacts with Flynn (Trump's top foreign policy/NatSec advisor) and Bannon (Trump's top domestic advisor) Trump hid, and that his trips (e.g. Greece) were *pre-authorized* by the campaign—a key fact.
60/ We know the early bits of the Dossier went to the FBI—not CIA—in July 2016, as did (that same month) news of an Australian diplomat's run-in with Papadopoulos. But it was the *CIA*—who we now know had Kislyak bugged—who raised the alarm in August 2016. nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/…
61/ We know when Brennan raised an alarm in mid-2016 he knew of "multiple" Trump camp-Russia contacts, and we know from other reports multiple European intel agencies offered the CIA such intel. So the idea it was all the Dossier the FBI had is *nonsense*. washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-lin…
62/ So if the "It wasn't the Dossier that started the Russia probe, Mr. Trump!" angle the NYT took isn't actually a scoop, and if much else in today's NYT article was already known as of last month, why is this article such a big, breaking-news deal? Well, here's why, in summary:
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1. Papadopoulos' boasts were *true*. True when made to an Australian, *and* true when made to Greeks. That's now accepted.
2. At least one foreign intel agency knew of the Russia plot in April 2016—two months before Christopher Steele sent (pro bono) *anything* to the FBI.
1. Papadopoulos' boasts were *true*. True when made to an Australian, *and* true when made to Greeks. That's now accepted.
2. At least one foreign intel agency knew of the Russia plot in April 2016—two months before Christopher Steele sent (pro bono) *anything* to the FBI.
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3. Media is finally conceding what attorneys have been saying for months now: because stealing Clinton's emails was a federal crime, the Trump campaign was unable to reward—or negotiate any unilateral benefit with—Russia once it had that knowledge without it being collusion.
3. Media is finally conceding what attorneys have been saying for months now: because stealing Clinton's emails was a federal crime, the Trump campaign was unable to reward—or negotiate any unilateral benefit with—Russia once it had that knowledge without it being collusion.
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4. Media now concedes Trump himself—not merely Trump aides—lied about Papadopoulos' role with his campaign after it was revealed Papadopoulos told Mueller everything he knows. And Trump specifically lied to hide that Papadopoulos was authorized to set up high-level meetings.
4. Media now concedes Trump himself—not merely Trump aides—lied about Papadopoulos' role with his campaign after it was revealed Papadopoulos told Mueller everything he knows. And Trump specifically lied to hide that Papadopoulos was authorized to set up high-level meetings.
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5. Media now concedes what independent journalists have previously noted—Papadopoulos was switched to Trump's Russia team *immediately* after he told Trump he was a Kremlin intermediary, though it wasn't his area of expertise.
And this was intended as a *signal* to Russia.
5. Media now concedes what independent journalists have previously noted—Papadopoulos was switched to Trump's Russia team *immediately* after he told Trump he was a Kremlin intermediary, though it wasn't his area of expertise.
And this was intended as a *signal* to Russia.
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6. We now know Papadopoulos' "goal" was to set a meeting between Trump and Putin or Trump aides—like himself—and Putin aides. We know he was authorized to set up a high-level meet of the former sort and had the opportunity for the latter sort of meeting in Athens in May '16.
6. We now know Papadopoulos' "goal" was to set a meeting between Trump and Putin or Trump aides—like himself—and Putin aides. We know he was authorized to set up a high-level meet of the former sort and had the opportunity for the latter sort of meeting in Athens in May '16.
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7. We know Papadopoulos—who had nearly no experience—somehow got an interview with *Trump National Co-Chair Sam Clovis* within days of his old boss Ben Carson conceding during the primary. We now know he had sufficient ties with Sergei Millian that could've facilitated this.
7. We know Papadopoulos—who had nearly no experience—somehow got an interview with *Trump National Co-Chair Sam Clovis* within days of his old boss Ben Carson conceding during the primary. We now know he had sufficient ties with Sergei Millian that could've facilitated this.
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8. We know from this March '17 article in The Independent (UK) that Millian was not only close to Papadopoulos but told a source of Christopher Steele's that stolen Russian information *was* given to Papadopoulos and it *was* given to Donald Trump himself and it *was* used.
8. We know from this March '17 article in The Independent (UK) that Millian was not only close to Papadopoulos but told a source of Christopher Steele's that stolen Russian information *was* given to Papadopoulos and it *was* given to Donald Trump himself and it *was* used.
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9. We know Papadopoulos was in touch with RIAC head Ivan Timofeev by April 2016, and the RIAC appears to be known to the CNI, which hosted the Mayflower Speech Papadopoulos helped write and invited Kislyak (breaching diplomatic protocol) to hear it. russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-a…
9. We know Papadopoulos was in touch with RIAC head Ivan Timofeev by April 2016, and the RIAC appears to be known to the CNI, which hosted the Mayflower Speech Papadopoulos helped write and invited Kislyak (breaching diplomatic protocol) to hear it. russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-a…
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10. We know the NYT inexplicably cites participants in the TIHDC meeting for the proposition that Trump "deferred" to Sessions on a meeting with Putin, though those participants the NYT trusts are known—see The Daily Beast—to have lied about what occurred during the meeting.
10. We know the NYT inexplicably cites participants in the TIHDC meeting for the proposition that Trump "deferred" to Sessions on a meeting with Putin, though those participants the NYT trusts are known—see The Daily Beast—to have lied about what occurred during the meeting.
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11. We know Sessions' claim the campaign thought Papadopoulos "too unqualified" to set up a key foreign meeting is bunk, as within 48 hours it sent him to Israel to meet important foreign leaders, then Greece, then let him set up Trump's meeting with the Egyptian President.
11. We know Sessions' claim the campaign thought Papadopoulos "too unqualified" to set up a key foreign meeting is bunk, as within 48 hours it sent him to Israel to meet important foreign leaders, then Greece, then let him set up Trump's meeting with the Egyptian President.
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12. We know, from the NYT, Trump's National Co-Chair Clovis "encouraged" a known Kremlin intermediary he'd inexplicably kept on the NatSec team to go to Moscow *post-hacking* to negotiate sanctions with the Russians, which fact alone—if we knew *nothing else*—*is* collusion.
12. We know, from the NYT, Trump's National Co-Chair Clovis "encouraged" a known Kremlin intermediary he'd inexplicably kept on the NatSec team to go to Moscow *post-hacking* to negotiate sanctions with the Russians, which fact alone—if we knew *nothing else*—*is* collusion.
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13. We know Trump asked multiple agents of the Russians—not just Papadopoulos but Burt—to craft the Russia policy he unveiled at the Mayflower. It seems clear the campaign orchestrated Kislyak hearing that speech *and* meeting Trump as a VIP before it.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/j…
13. We know Trump asked multiple agents of the Russians—not just Papadopoulos but Burt—to craft the Russia policy he unveiled at the Mayflower. It seems clear the campaign orchestrated Kislyak hearing that speech *and* meeting Trump as a VIP before it.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/j…
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14. And we know Jeff Sessions lied under oath about his contacts with *both* George Papadopoulos and Richard Burt, which is why I've said for months now that Sessions is a "LVL2" target for Mueller along with Kushner, Trump Jr., Manafort, and Flynn.politico.com/story/2016/10/…
14. And we know Jeff Sessions lied under oath about his contacts with *both* George Papadopoulos and Richard Burt, which is why I've said for months now that Sessions is a "LVL2" target for Mueller along with Kushner, Trump Jr., Manafort, and Flynn.politico.com/story/2016/10/…
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15. We know, from the NYT, that Stephen Miller—who helped orchestrate Comey's firing, obstructing the Russia probe—was instrumental in promoting Papadopoulos as a Russia surrogate. It's *wildly* implausible those two facts aren't related. Miller becomes a key Russia witness.
15. We know, from the NYT, that Stephen Miller—who helped orchestrate Comey's firing, obstructing the Russia probe—was instrumental in promoting Papadopoulos as a Russia surrogate. It's *wildly* implausible those two facts aren't related. Miller becomes a key Russia witness.
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16. We know Papadopoulos committed a firing offense in causing an international firestorm with England entirely of his own making, and it seems Trump's staff would've wanted the young, inexperienced Papadopoulos fired right then—but someone *above Clovis' level* blocked it.
16. We know Papadopoulos committed a firing offense in causing an international firestorm with England entirely of his own making, and it seems Trump's staff would've wanted the young, inexperienced Papadopoulos fired right then—but someone *above Clovis' level* blocked it.
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17. We know Papadopoulos told Greek media he thought he was temporarily thrown off the campaign—but again, critically, *not fired*—because of an interview he gave with Russian media in September without permission. We know he was asked back—by whom?—days before the election.
17. We know Papadopoulos told Greek media he thought he was temporarily thrown off the campaign—but again, critically, *not fired*—because of an interview he gave with Russian media in September without permission. We know he was asked back—by whom?—days before the election.
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18. We know Papadopoulos was a) impervious to firing, b) the beneficiary of Trump's only "blank check" job offer and c) the *one* person on Team Trump who knew for *certain* Russia had committed crimes and was told this *before* the Mayflower Speech.
Three *related facts*.
18. We know Papadopoulos was a) impervious to firing, b) the beneficiary of Trump's only "blank check" job offer and c) the *one* person on Team Trump who knew for *certain* Russia had committed crimes and was told this *before* the Mayflower Speech.
Three *related facts*.
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19. Papadopoulos helped edit Trump's "good deal for Russia" speech *after* he knew Russia had committed crimes against America. Assuming Papadopoulos passed that key information on to his boss—and *every indication* is he did and Trump *appreciated* it—that's your collusion.
19. Papadopoulos helped edit Trump's "good deal for Russia" speech *after* he knew Russia had committed crimes against America. Assuming Papadopoulos passed that key information on to his boss—and *every indication* is he did and Trump *appreciated* it—that's your collusion.
81/ I want to be clear on this: Trump *could not legally authorize* language in the Mayflower Speech offering a "good deal for Russia" and "rewards for our friends" if Papadopoulos had told him Russia had committed federal crimes against America—to do so would be a criminal act.
82/ If Papadopoulos confirmed for Mueller what the circumstantial evidence makes clear—that he told Trump Russia had committed crimes, and told Trump this *prior* to Trump delivering his infamous Mayflower Speech—Mueller has evidence of the president committing a collusive crime.
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20. We know within 24 hours of learning Russia had committed crimes, Papadopoulos wrote Miller—his Trump liaison—that he had "interesting messages" from Russia. Of *course* he didn't say what they were over email—the "messages" were knowledge of a crime. Did they chat later?
20. We know within 24 hours of learning Russia had committed crimes, Papadopoulos wrote Miller—his Trump liaison—that he had "interesting messages" from Russia. Of *course* he didn't say what they were over email—the "messages" were knowledge of a crime. Did they chat later?
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21. Miller was at the Mayflower Speech and *helped Papadopoulos write it*. Does *anyone* believe that—while working together on the biggest speech of Trump's life, a speech in big part about Russia—Miller never asked what the "messages" were, and Papadopoulos never told him?
21. Miller was at the Mayflower Speech and *helped Papadopoulos write it*. Does *anyone* believe that—while working together on the biggest speech of Trump's life, a speech in big part about Russia—Miller never asked what the "messages" were, and Papadopoulos never told him?
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22. We know—from the NYT—there was an administrative bias at the FBI with a pro-Trump effect: the FBI consciously deviated from investigative protocols to ensure its investigation of Trump didn't harm his chances of victory. Clinton got no such consideration in October 2016.
22. We know—from the NYT—there was an administrative bias at the FBI with a pro-Trump effect: the FBI consciously deviated from investigative protocols to ensure its investigation of Trump didn't harm his chances of victory. Clinton got no such consideration in October 2016.
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23. We know—from the NYT's worst buried lede here, given its headline—that "Steele had shown some of his findings to an FBI agent in Rome [in July 2016], but that information was not part of the justification to start an counterintelligence inquiry, American officials said."
23. We know—from the NYT's worst buried lede here, given its headline—that "Steele had shown some of his findings to an FBI agent in Rome [in July 2016], but that information was not part of the justification to start an counterintelligence inquiry, American officials said."
87/ So it's not just that the Australian revelation gave the FBI other grounds to launch a probe, and it's not just that we know the Dossier wasn't enough for a FISA, and it's not just that we know the CIA had other grounds and sources—it's that US officials *say* Trump is wrong.
88/ If the NYT is right—Papadopoulos didn't hear from Trump pal Millian until mid-2016—he met Clovis sans introduction. So to get a job he either played his Russia chit in his Clovis interview or his Trump interview. Which gives him no reason to withhold Russia intel from either.
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24. We now know, from today's NYT article, that there was a *third* pre-inauguration overture to Trump—from Russian agents—about building a "Trump Tower Moscow": the first, from Agalarov in 2013; the second, from IC Expert (Rozov) in 2015; now the third, by Millian, in 2016.
24. We now know, from today's NYT article, that there was a *third* pre-inauguration overture to Trump—from Russian agents—about building a "Trump Tower Moscow": the first, from Agalarov in 2013; the second, from IC Expert (Rozov) in 2015; now the third, by Millian, in 2016.
90/ This last NYT scoop—yet another piece of key Russia intel Papadopoulos would have tried to communicate to Trump—gives Trump yet another reason to offer Papadopoulos the reward of a "blank check" job offer and yet another reason to have clandestine one-on-one contact with him.
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25. Finally, the NYT reveals Papadopoulos—a member of the public NatSec team Trump let American voters know about—did indeed have multiple contacts with the head of the "private" NatSec team Trump relied on during the campaign, whose key members were Flynn and Erik Prince.
25. Finally, the NYT reveals Papadopoulos—a member of the public NatSec team Trump let American voters know about—did indeed have multiple contacts with the head of the "private" NatSec team Trump relied on during the campaign, whose key members were Flynn and Erik Prince.
92/ Remember that, though he began advising Trump in Summer of 2015—Trump aides lie in talking about Flynn only being with Trump for 25 days—Flynn wasn't part of Trump's first *three* "public" NatSec teams (March-July 2016; July 2016-Election Day; Election Day-Christie's firing).
93/ Remember, the NYT didn't see *all* Papadopoulos' emails—just a tiny sampler. Whoever leaked them was trying to preserve the Mueller investigation by giving America just a *taste* of what Mueller has. That taste is enough for experts to see that Mueller has Trump on collusion.
94/ The NYT has confirmed (or brought into higher relief) previously known or—in some cases—previously unknown Russia lies by Trump, Clovis and Sessions. And it strongly suggests that Trump *did* know Don was meeting in Trump Tower with Kremlin agents in June 2016—and about what.
95/ So Papadopoulos can now be seen as potentially sufficient—by himself—to establish Trump's criminal collusion (in the law we'd use the terms "Aiding and Abetting" or "Conspiracy," depending on the statute) and enough circumstantial evidence exists to strongly indicate he *is*.
96/ Moreover, we now have a pattern of lies from Trump, Sessions, and Clovis that *specifically* revolves around the very same presumed (and strongly supported) narrative of what Papadopoulos was to Trump that would explain him being a witness "sufficient" to establish collusion.
NOTE: This thread continues at the link below, if it's disappeared for you at this point (after Tweet 90).
97/ The problem we have now is that the New York Times—while doing very good work here—nevertheless buried its lede, credited discredited sources, failed to contextualize its most important contributions, and altogether missed key connections with prior reporting on Papadopoulos.
98/ And the NYT article still misses verifiable independent reporting—for instance, on Papadopoulos going to Athens while Putin was there, or on how Trump campaign explanations for how the Mayflower event came together are provable lies, or on what Papadopoulos told Greek media.
99/ Given today's NYT report, claims there was no collusion between Trump and Russia need to stop—they're irresponsible and deceitful, based on the information we have. You can claim—wrongly—that collusion isn't clear yet, but *no one* can assert a *lack* of collusion is evident.
100/ My estimation, as a legal expert, is that the chances Mueller refers an impeachable offense to DOJ in mid-2018 or thereafter are 90%+.
Feel free to check back in with me on that prediction, as it's based on a year of research into all that is now known on this topic. {end}
Feel free to check back in with me on that prediction, as it's based on a year of research into all that is now known on this topic. {end}
