Thread by @eisenschadel

An amazing analysis of the current #Ukraine️ #war
@kamilkazani takes us back to Cold War and evolution of Russian war machine based on those weapons/tactics.
Question: Will this op prove to be as much a watershed for #Russianarmy as it was for #UkrainianArmedForces in 2014?

In addition, the entire situation raises further questions
1-As mentioned in the tweet above, would this stimulate transformation of military affairs in the #RussianArmy in particular and #RussianArmedForces forces in general?
Especially considering the points @kamilkazani made?

2-Actually, and retrospectively, this raises more questions. And these questions are based on President #Putin own past career in particular and the post #SovietUnion combat experience of the #RussianArmedForces in general

3-Arguments have been made that current Russian army is continuation in weapons/tactics of #Soviet army & little more.
Secondly, there is a dearth of feedback to higher echelons, all the way up to the big man himself, about shortcomings.
Bureaucracy with lots of red tape.

4-This viewpoint does seem to overlook that President #Putin himself has long and deep rooted links with the Russian armed forces and a deep insight into both western society, its views and NATO: all by virtue of his KGB and political career.

5-It may seem erroneous to simply say that President #Putin (and the Russian leadership at large) didn’t understand/expect/foresee the western covert and overt war machine, their intelligentsia, their economic and diplomatic weapons.
It was his #Career & #Job to study this.

6-#espionage & #counterespionage between Russian & Western powers is stuff of legend. And extremely deep links established by virtue of businesses, trade & diplomacy all underline that there simply was no way that “they didn’t know or expect” whether it’s sanctions or resistance

7-There’s immense business, investment/residence/academic tourism
This may not be a fuel for espionage
But this does allow deeper socioeconomic understanding of global mindset. Again, making argument of being in a bubble, weak.
eg Mr #Lavrov daughter is #Columbia University grad

8-The #RussianArmy has been in combat operations including high intensity urban combat since the breakup of #SovietUnion in #Chechnya & Dagestan. Add to it the 2014 Ukraine war. Then #Syria and #Libya.
And lest not forget pre breakup #Afghanistan either.

9-#Afghanistan gave a taste of guerrilla opposition in occupied territory against a motivated and (reasonably in later stages) adversary (why the #Mujahideen never got ATGMs is strange).
This created officer corps with experience in land and combined air-land ops.

10-#Chechnya wars & #Dagestan war again reinforced the lessons of going up against well motivated, trained and equipped guerrilla forces, but different from Afghanistan in being #urbanwarfare, something that were 50 yr old chapters on Leningrad/Stalingrad in Russian army syllabus

11-#Syria and #Libya opened new dishes on the menu: namely modern #drone combat, coupled with #specialforces being lynchpin of combined air, land (and sea launched weapon) strikes against well trained & equipped forces. With drone vs land system combat a frequent occurrence.

12-In 2014 invasion of #Ukraine, the lessons went back to urban combat, previously having had a “picnic” to the countryside in Libya and Syria.
In terms of equipment, the Ukrainians were orders of magnitude better equipped than anything the Russians had faced since Barbarossa

13-All above conflicts had an important constant: the #RussianAirForce and Army aviation.
Since Afghanistan, these units have been baptised with blood. Providing close air support in face of AAA & SAMs. In rural and urban battlefields, continuously adapting tactics & aircraft

14-So simply saying #Russians weren’t ready for economic/diplomatic/military resistance May not be entirely correct
An army experiencing war since 1979
Intelligentsia that’s seen #coldwar since 1945 & diplomatic corps/businessmen closely interacting with west since 1991

15- To conclude, there’s more to the entire situation than meets the eye. Many senior analysts seem to be skimming the surface of entire tactical/strategic scenario, individual battles and the whole war as it’s the more convenient thing to do. Image👇credit @AJEnglish @BBCWorld