Thread by @ArveloaMert

Here is the new and third thread 🧵 for the Strategic Assessment of Russo-Ukrainian War that started after the fell of Soledar and defense of Bakhmut. This is the fourth thread on overall strategic assessment of war. #Svatove #Kreminna #Vuhledar #Ukraine #Russia #Soledar

1) Please take a look for understanding how a counter-offensive should be conducted, what are the goals and requirements and for the events that occured between September to November.

2) You can take a look to this thread for the first part of the Ukrainian Winter Counter Offensive which includes the situation and events between November to January.

3) For the events between January to February and more issues like Wood Warfare, Riverine Warfare and etc you can look to this thread.

4) For other threads on the Russo-Ukrainian War, you can navigate through this thread;

5) You could realize that I increasingly started to use the term micro-offensive in previous thread. It is not an actual term that is in use in military terminology. So I want to clarify it. Usually offensives are charecterized as major or minor. Major Offensive is a planned...

6) ... one where a belligerent state allocate significant men and resources to achieve a strategic or long desired goal. #Russia’s offensive against #Kyiv and one in Bakhmut is a major offensive. Losses in a major offensives are hard to recover and could turn the tables in war.

7) While minor offensives are usually conducted around for operational goals for limited purposes or asymmetric warfare. #Kharkiv was started as a major offensive and turned as a minor one which eventually again failed due to the costs of previous major failure.

8) But as #Russian forces achieved to hold in #Svatove and #Kreminna for a while losing minor offensives could be handled by taking operational measures. While offensives in tactical level is usually called as assault. Than what is micro-offensive? I borrowed the term...

9) ... from behavioral sciences when an offender use constant but limited offenses against the victim to psychologically demoralize and exhaust the victim’s life quality and use this limited manner for a plausible deniability to avoid taking his or her responsibilities.

10) For war, micro-offensives could be conducted under or spontaneously with major and minor offensives. For example, #Soledar was started as a micro-offensive and turned to a minor one. Micro-Offensives conduct around human wave tactics where small infantry groups constantly...

11) ... attack and disturb Ukrainian lines. These micro-offensives could be conducted without a proper tactic or preperation with small number of troops as happened in #Vuhledar and #Orihiv. The main goal is to weaken the 🇺🇦 position, create a morale and PR boost while support...

12) the major offensive and prevent possible counter offensive as a subordinate effort. Micro-Offensives are costly in men power manner but still less costlier than major offensives in short term. But in long term, they are not sustainable but their plausible deniable nature...

13) ... put Russian command in comfort vis-a-vis Kremlin. Micro-offensives are easily defeatable by #Ukraine but it requires iron clad nerves, plenty amount of resources, deep strike and dire power capacity and a well-planned and balanced counter offense and defensive strategy.

14) Rise of Micro-Offensives in the 🇷🇺 strategy also indicate other underlying causations. #Russia's C3 structure is excessively paralyzed. Different units with different levels of professionalization and type of organizational structures makes C2 by the High Command harder.

15) For this multifaced Command problem, #Russia started to use a weird combination of asymmetrical warfare. Micro-Offensives shows a possible return to 'active defence' in worst possible manner where there is established strong positional fronts. This means Moscow uses...

16) ... guerilla tactics via conventional military. Different from Western strategy thinkers, Mao Zedong underlined a 'third phase of war' where neither side is in offensive but rather prepare for an offensive. In this period, Mao Zedong emphasized the use of micro-offensives...

17) ... to weaken the enemy via excessive use of micro-offensives. His Comman. Xiao Jingluang defined this process as 'protactred war' or sabotage warfare. But different from 🇨🇳 perspective
🇷🇺 perspective is much more different. But use and goal of micro-offensives are same.

18) Russian active defence means use of 'preventive means to locate weak points of the enemy and inflict unbearable cost'. But different from the Chinese point, initial 🇷🇺 strategy focused on protecting scarce men power which failed in this war. Even though a shift to active...

19) ... defense is much more compatible with #Russia's current military strategy, it is highly unlikely to deliver a result since #Ukraine achieved to disrupt it via continous and fortified frontline. Failure of maneuver defence and non-contact warfare push 🇷🇺 to combine with...

20) ... the 🇨🇳 system of human wave attacks which is completely disadvantaged for 🇷🇺. As both countries uses 'active defence' approach, Ukraine and the West should move to seize manuevre and dictate unfavourable battlefield conditions which will attack the strategy of the rival.

21) Active Defence requires favourable conditions on battlefield and a trust enemies' unfamiliarity with the territory, excessive support from the public and unification of different warfare efforts to a single operational or strategic goal. Which also requires high level of...

22) ... operational autonomy for the Commanders. As both Russia and China is authoritarian states, strong operational autonomy is harder to give for both states. While things for #Russia is even harder as its military consists #Wagner and other minority-menned battalions.

23) Increased dissatisfaction among the elite troops of #Russia. Soldiers from 155th Naval Infantry, who suffered significant casualties in Pavlivka, protested the High Command after failed and ill-prepared micro-offensive in #Vuhledar. Such a bad way to use naval infantry.

24) Signs shows #Wagner is trying to push north to #Siversk from Soledar and took Mykolaivka. It could just be for securing Soledar or to pressurize 🇺🇦 efforts around #Kreminna. Siversk is well-fortified and defended by 🇺🇦, I don’t expect that Wagner could take it by its own.

25) British MoD underlines that #Wagner fell-short in convicts that used in human wave tactics. With this #Russia will probably return to use artillery, recon and assault tactics which is costlier in ammunition, men and equipment. So highly unlikely for Wagner to move on #Siversk

26) Suddenly #Russia started to consecutively lost Arctic-use purposed TOR M2DT in #Ukraine. The system is either as bad as other versions or have some problems due to conditions. Increased use of them could indicate an increased stress of AD numbers or concern over 🇺🇦 air power.

27) British MoD underlined that Ukrainian soldiers adapted and learned the controls of #Challenger2 main battle tanks in trainings. This could significantly speed up the actual combat deployment process of these tanks to #Ukraine.

28) Russia kick-started series of frontal minor-offensives (not micro) from #Kreminna to #Bakhmut and increasing its troop build-up around Mariupol which is related with #Vuhledar and #Orikhiv. Some of them have already failed or to be so.

29) Tough times and battles are in front of 🇺🇦soldiers on the battlegrounds in coming weeks but surely these offensives could again detoriate limitedly stabilized Russian logistics, increase men+resource loss and could create the breeding ground for further 🇺🇦 counter-offensives

30) More reports from #Bakhmut indicate that #Russia is contesting the supply roads from Krasna Hora and Ivanivske. Things are extremely hard and #Ukraine, now, holds the town with true heroism of soldiers. Kind a hard thing to decide whether surrendering the town or not.

31) Another two offensive efforts were undertaken by #Russia in #Kreminna and Makiivka. The main operational goal looks like attempting to retake Dibrova woods and threaten #Svatove-Kreminna supply route. Ukrainians defended the region hard until now and will continue to do so.

32) #Gerasimov tries to restructure Russian military before the offensive in #Kreminna. He tries to restore the High Command’s control on fractionalized C2 structure of #Wagner, LNR/DNR forces, Kadyrovites and mobilized soldiers. A crucial but hard attempt to achieve.

33) Attempt to align these three levels of 🇷🇺 military is hard as High Command lacks skilled officers and prestige, paralyzed Communication, monetary and political autonomy of Wagner, enmities and rivalries within these groups and divided war motivations among them.

The main problem is simply detoriated organizational culture of 🇷🇺 military before the war and ill-planned war efforts that led to resource disparities among 🇷🇺 military. Failed supplies to mobilized and LNR/DNR strengthened the Wagner and other self-financers like Kadyrovites.

35) Several reports claim that #Ukraine's Defence Minister Oleksii #Reznikov will be replaced by Head of Defence Intelligence Kyrylo Budanov. Reznikov will probably relocatewith in the Cabinet. His change is not related with performance but with rotation.
thedrive.com/the-war-zone/b…

36) General Major Budanov is a hard veteran who wounded twice when fighting against #Russia since 2014. He took part in the defence of #Donbass which make him familiar with the region, troops and defence intel. Head of SBU will also changed while Khlymenko will be the new MoI.

37) #Russian forces continues its minor offensives around #Kreminna and #Kupyansk. Major offensive also continues around #Bakhmut. Ukraine achieved the hold the lines around Luhansk while the situation in Bakhmut is still hard.

38) #Russian forces continue to suffer excessive losses of armoured columns and naval infantry in the vicinity of #Vuhledar. These losses increasingly resembles earlier losses of Russian military in the war.

39) #Wagner made a renewed push towards #Ivanivske in #Bakhmut. Ukrainian forces repelled the attack with tanks and precision artillery. Attempts continue towards the town. Ukraine continues to resist these micro-offensives with everything they have.

40) Even there are risks, #Ukraine could take the urban warfare way of Mariupol via defending #Bakhmut meter-by-meter to slowdown 🇷🇺 offensives to relieve the Ukrainian forces operating in Siversk and #Kreminna direction or for trying to hold on the town.

41) Another flash point in #Bakhmut front is #Blahodatne. Russian forces tries a double envelopment that targets #Ukraine’s interior+exterior Ground lines of Communication. Ukrainian forces either could conduct a limited counter-offensive vs that bulge or need to plan a retreat.

42) #Russia increased its troop build-up+grouping in #Kupyansk and #Zaporizhzhia fronts. 🇷🇺 tried to move from #Kreminna towards Torske direction which failed. #Bakhmut increasingly become hard as 🇷🇺advanced from Blahodatne and contested Slovyansk route.

43) Brilliant map that shows frontline in #Bakhmut since the last month. You can see how #Russia achieved an envelopment after breaking the frontal defence in Soledar. Costly but delivered a limited mobility. 🇺🇦 can withdrew or stay to defend vs a siege and wait armoured support.

44) Weather conditions play a tricky role in this war. Winter literally arrived late to warzone. But as expected it did not speed-up both sides. #Russia achieved some breakthroughs in #Bakhmut and this is related with use of human wave attacks with less armour-use.

45) Infantry is less prone to mud but lack of armour created huge menpower loss among #Wagner. While 🇷🇺 Command, now, wants to use winter conditions for offensives around #Kreminna, #Svatove/Kupyansk and #Zaporizhzhya. A risky move since time is ticking and these offensives..

46) ... could spill-over to Spring which can again turn the use of armoured vehicles and logistics to a nightmare. While late and possibly short winter is another nightmare for #Kreminna and #Svatove for both sides. Since clashes concentrated around Dibrova woods and ...

47) vertical to Svatove-Kreminna Road or P-66. These regions are excessively hard to move due to mud and low visibility. Short winter would mean a highly contested process where both sides will take heavy casulties and the side with the best training and equipment could prevail.

48) #UK will train 🇺🇦 pilots for possible future shipment of fighters. But 🇬🇧 promise to train 🇺🇦 Marines is also important and could mean realignment of them for their special purposes. Specialized Marines in riverine war could change tide around Dnipro, especially in #Kherson.

49) #Russia’s tank and heavy armour stocks increasingly become scarce. Current offensive attempts in #Kreminna, #Svatove, #Orikhiv and #Vuhledar could be the last struggle for heavy armour. This scarcity could force Russian Army to use scarce infantry more, more light MPCs...

50) ... which are prone to Ukrainian fire or could be forced to frontal defence in Spring when #Ukraine will receive new and advanced Western armour. Production increse is much more hard for Moscow due to sanctions, worker loss. Or Russia could try to take tanks from NK.

51) Another impact of this scarcity is rumours on possible Russian deployment of protottype UGVs and T-14 Armata tanks. The move is significantly risky as even some bureaucrat cycles in #Russia oppose this. Deploying these prototypes could turn to a nightmare if...

52) If 🇷🇺 starts to lost them. From possible technology transfer about the latest 🇷🇺 military tech to the West to further crumbling of 🇷🇺 defence industry’s capabilities of deterrence and to possible ethical problems of UGVs (some claim they have full-autonomy) this is risky.

53) 🇷🇺 claimed that it achieved some success in recapturing a logistical town on the way to Kupyansk+pushing 🇺🇦 back from Dibrovna woods and Bilhorovka to Torske. 🇷🇺 focuses on harming 🇺🇦 logistics around #Svatove and #Kreminna. No confirmations yet but a sign for an offensive

54) Ukrainian military continues to repel Russian attacks on #Vuhledar by inflicting heavy losses on Naval Infantry, #Ukraine is highly capable to hold the town via pos. defence. But I have concerns about #Kupyansk and #Kreminna as 🇷🇺 tries to attack 🇺🇦 from their rear logistics.

55) #Russia drastically released water resorvoirs in #NovaKahkovka Dam. The move brings risks of water scarcity for Dnipro region, risks for cooling systems of #Zaporizhzhia NPP and to increase the length of river.
npr.org/2023/02/10/115…

56) Crucial warning from #Poland’s Andrzej Duda. Ukrainian men power and resources are in great risk of attrition. This ‘win’ will still be limited but unrolling these gains will still be resource and men consuming. Western help should be speeded-up.

57) #Ukraine heroicly defend against intensfying Russian assaults around #Kreminna and Bilohorivka. While defense of #Bakhmut is also continuing. But Russia captured Krasna Hora and further threatening Ivanivske. No further reports from Vuhledar, #Svatove and Kupyansk.

58) A race against time is started by 🇺🇦 forces to master #Leopard 2 and Challenger tanks. Ukraine needs them as 🇷🇺 increased their offensives around #Kreminna and #Bakhmut. For now, Ukranian soldiers looks like motivated and undestand the urgency of need.

59) Infos from #Russian sources on #Bakhmut is much more concerning. (Although there are some doubts over their accuracy.) #Wagner aims to take high ground around the town and supply routes. Their concentration point could be shifted from Ivanivske to Chasiv Yar (border of raion)

60) #Ukraine repelled 🇷🇺 in Chasiv Yar and achieved some limited counterattacks around #Bakhmut. Situation is still hard. In #Kreminna, 🇷🇺 forces continues to try to move on Torske and recapture Dibrova woods. So far Russian assaults are hard but fragmented due to wide front.

61) Both #Ukraine and #Russia increasingly started to use their already scarce artillery ammunution. Russia use flanking artillery method from Kupyansk to #Svatove and #Kreminna to create fields of fire. While in #Bakhmut they take a concentrated approach.

62) In #Kherson, both #Ukraine and #Russia continue to engage in artillery duels. 🇺🇦 is improving its counter-battery capacity. 🇷🇺 logistics were slightly improved before offensives, the pace of ops. would determine the amount of munitions that consumed.

63) In modern warfare, role of artillery is changed. Generally, artillery targets two things; mass and maneuver. Mass is concentrating the fire on the enemy and maneuver is the ability to project this fire against enemy. The main risk is detection or going bingo in ammunution.

64) U.S. Military approaches the artillery from this perspective where Economy of Scale became the key determinor of this success. Use of tripwire deterrence make this even more important. But Russia and Ukraine is different case as both sides lack sufficient airpower.

65) Since the start of the war what challenged Russia is this problem with economy of scale where Russia used them to attrit, deny and counter the Ukrainian forces. With this Russia distanced itself from the main goal of artillery which is creating a surprise.

66) Russia had enormous post-Soviet ammunution stocks. While Ukraine take Western artillery and HIMARS which is designed for creating a surprise to use the scarce ammunution efficiently. As in Bakhmut and Kreminna, Ukraine uses its artillery to support the defensive operations.

67) Supporting defence requires active targeting and intelligence (fed by reconing and partisans) of weak points of Russians to deny their movements towards a stable 🇺🇦 position. Dispersed human wave tactics turned as nightmare for this which doubled the need for munitions.

68) As 🇺🇦 need for economy of scale is important due to Western limitations, counter-battery increasingly become more crucial. 🇺🇦 could turn tables with improved CB and airpower to level down 🇷🇺 artillery tactics. Targeting weapons, logistics and infantry is the best way of CB.

69) #NATO underlined the importance of increasing artillery ammunition production for #Ukraine. Ukraine needs immense amount of ammunition and approaching Russian offensive would require more. For this, NATO states are planning to exceed 2% of GDP.

70) #Ukraine use active counter battery tactics to target Russian artillery to prevent any loss of expensive equipment and valuable men power. In addition to CB, Ukraine use artillery for destruction fires (destroy enemy equipment), neutralization fires (anti-personel)...

71) ... harassing fires to deny Russian movements and interdiction points to repel human wave tactics around towns. Destruction fire requires huge amount of ammunution as it needs pinpoint strike on equipment. Undertaking all these roles+counter battery fire is unsustainable.

72) Increasing ammunition production capacity needs time to achieve. Until achieving it, NATO could think two additional tactics. First one is making, Ukrainian military a combined arms military which uses air power to support land operations. Dividing desctruction and...

73) neutralization fires with tanks, infantry use weapons, mines and fighter jets. This could help Ukraine to shift to a semi-active counter battery tactics. This could help Ukraine to allocate more ammunition for barrages to support defence via harassing and interdiction fires.

74) Another option is to speed up the transfer of longer range weapons to #Ukraine to focus on counter-preparation tactics. Via this Ukraine could target Russian logistics and offensive efforts to slow-down offensives while preserving its standard artillery ammunition capacity.

75) Another minimal option is to improve 🇺🇦 counter-battery fire and accuracy via improving 🇺🇦's reconnaissance and targeting capacity. NATO could provide more vision and aerial reconing drones but different from previous two, the success of this is tied with current 🇺🇦 capacity.

76) Friendly-fire incidents become a chronical problem of modus vivendi of Russian offensives. Friendly fire incidents generally ties with weather and terrain problems, visibility, fire control, lack of knowledge and training, exhaustion and C3 problems.

77) Another problem with friendly fires is with type, pace and size of operations. The front in #Ukraine is really long in addition to partialized 🇷🇺 command structure who tries to move via dispersed+repeated+fast offensives through different routes as in #Kreminna and #Bakhmut.

78) Increased complaints from #Wagner soldiers over logistical constraints in artillery shells. Looks like PR and authority struggle within Russian military and Kremlin circles with Prigozhin increasingly become visible. The result is a fault in logistics.

79) #Russia lost 40 to 60.000 personel in #Ukraine. While the number increase to 175 to 200.000 with WIA+POWs. 🇷🇺 has no means+resources to take care of that much war veterans after the war. Lack of medical assistance and weak rehabilitation capacity is a danger for post-war 🇷🇺.

80) Taking care of war veterans is a highly hard, costly and long process. Ill-administrated veterans affairs could led to an increase of suicide and crime rates among these mentally or physically disabled people. This year US allocated 371 billion for Department of Veterans.

81) Reports claimed that #Russia lost one of its novel and ‘state of art high-tech’ BMP Terminator in #Ukraine. BMPT was equipped with sensors that can detect, track and kill targets. Here some important factors and warnings about these sensing machines;
businessinsider.com/ukraine-claims…

82) Firstly, Russian conventional missile program showed us that Russian sensors were not well-programmed and calibrated. This means most of these sensors are part of military suasion. Secondly, battlefield in Ukraine and especially #Kreminna (where the loss was claimed)...

83) ... is an hard topography. Wood conditions with possible ambushes, mud, dust, moist, extreme cold and connection problems could hamper sensors real quick. Remember how a billion worth B-2 was crashed due to sensor error caused by moisture.
aviationpros.com/home/press-rel…

84) Battlefield in #Ukraine witnessed high and frequent use of barely detectable commercial drones which use high-drop munitions that can easily harm sensors. As US also works on sensor-equipped AbramsXs and possible unmanned Bradleys two thing is crucial.

85) The first one is logistics. Russian logistics have a serious problem with spare parts. Any military that wants to use these vehicles should have to ensure spare sensors. The other is technician NCOs and dual-capable tank officers who can take care of these sensor problems.

86) Until now, Command and Control was usually attributed with human side. A Commander was a human resources figure who is expected to be inspirational, creative, fast-thinking with immense Communication and leading skills. While in Commanding Autonomy dialogue is advocated.

87) But now, we are moving to a time where militaries increasingly divide in two components; human and machines. This Commanding Officer figure is still in need but we will see a rise of Officer Technicians who can inspire the machines, communicate with them and program the...

88) ... mission plans. In C2 Autonomy, dialogue between Officers and Officer Technicians would be a requirement but not an advocation. Or other option is unifying these two roles and expect humans to handle this as whole. These star officers would be the future of High Command.

89) So for Russo-Ukrainian War where are these Technician Officers? Ukraine, now, has a conscript military who mobilized engineers from different branches. Behind the camera lenses these cadres are having enormous impact on war and equipment adaptation which lacks in Russia.

90) Intense clashes continues for #Bakhmut between Russia and #Ukraine. 🇺🇦 soldiers are writing another story of outstanding heroism against a possible encirclement after Mariupol. 🇺🇦 also continues to defend Mar’inka, #Kreminna and #Vuhledar front. No clear picture for Kupyansk.

91) A railway equipment producing factory in the #US refitted its production line to produce ammunition for #Ukraine. Refirbushing some industries in the West could share the burden on defence industry and could met #Russia’s quantitative challenge.

92) UK MoD underlined that #Russia was focusing on a shift to a full-scale attrition warfare against #Ukraine rather than territorial advances. This is true but 🇷🇺 political command still eye significant breakthrough in #Vuhledar and via Wagner in #Bakhmut

93) 🇷🇺 offensive operations in #Kreminna, #Svatove and Kupyansk looks like attritional as Command has no real mean to seize territory. In Kherson and Zaporizhzia attritional goals are present with artillery duels. But Donetsk shows that Command is not acting in a unified manner.

94) Here is a thread about #Transnistria, #Moldova and war in #Ukraine. Even though operational outlook is feasible on operational level against Transnistria, there are huge uncertainties on strategic level. So this news were more like a false-flag op.

95) There are serious claims on fall of Yahidne in the northern of #Bakhmut while also reports of Russian storming of #Ivanivske. Both districts are crucial for 🇺🇦 logistics. The outcome in Ivanivske is not decided yet but looks like Ukrainians will continue to defend the town.

96) #Bakhmut is under a high risk by the assaults of Russia. Ukrainian soldiers are showing continous courage but operational outlook is not really bright. But no result is guaranteed in a war, so no place for early talks on this issue as people put their lives for this defence.

97) But here, there are few points to talk on both #Bakhmut and #Soledar. Both British MoD’s and ISW intelligence reports neglected any operational breakthrough im both towns. What made these assesments problematic? This war is really hard to make predictions as info-environment

98) ... is complex and misleading and Russia is a fragmented command and different units that behave differently.
1) The result in these two towns are not related with the performance of Ukraine. They protected city in an outstanding and right way.

99) 2) The predictions failed to consider Wagner’s arbitrary command and style of war that gave the freedom of action to fight at the outside of the law of wars with arbitrary kills and others unethical means.
3) Predictions calculated Wagner’s capabilities from the rational...

100) actor model which considered that Wagner would indeed try to protect its forces. Their organizational culture of sacrifice and coercion changed this factor.
4) Quality is not always enough against quantity if the enemy is willing to break the laws and rationality of war.

101) So this shows us that the incomplete and complex picture of the 🇷🇺 Command requires much more attention and research. Rather than degrading 🇷🇺 Command totally, we need to understand it further. Organizational fault lines are still there and we would asses them later.

102) #Bakhmut is the most irrational battle of this war. This irrationality is tightly connected w/ Prigozhin’s search for fame in 🇷🇺, composition of and treatment within Wagner and neglected cost-benefit analysis. For 🇺🇦 it is much more understandable as it is the defending side