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Lots to say on Bolton's remarks, but ask yourself why Pompeo spent months after Singapore touting that the "final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea," a phrase that did not appear in the US-DPRK Singapore declaration, was "agreed to by Chairman Kim in Singapore."
The administration knew all along that this gulf between definitions existed. There’s no way to rationalize the “FFVD, as agreed to by Chairman Kim in Singapore” language than it being an attempt at gaslighting Kim Jong Un to come around on the US position.
The idea being that if US officials repeatedly and publicly hit home a definition of denuclearization, that it would change the terms on which North Korea had walked out of Singapore.
All of this was the reason too that on December 20, KCNA featured a ‘Jong Hyon’ commentary reiterating North Korea’s definition of denuclearization. North Korea isn’t stupid—the U.S. attempt was called an “optical illusion.” 
Illusions don’t last forever and the bill came due in Hanoi. In an attempt to push back on the illusion, many North Korea-watching folks were broken records between Singapore and Hanoi, pointing out every time Pompeo et al. said this that it wasn’t what Kim had agreed to.
If you listened carefully, you could see the ice cracking in the lead-up to Hanoi. (I tweeted the below after a SAO background briefing before Hanoi.)
To make this thread more useful for the future: how do we know what ‘Chairman Kim’ has ‘agreed’ to—and what his beliefs are?
There are 3 2018 public declarations (two inter-Korean and one US-DPRK) that bear his name. He’s agreed to what those say. He’s also delivered speeches.
There are 3 2018 public declarations (two inter-Korean and one US-DPRK) that bear his name. He’s agreed to what those say. He’s also delivered speeches.
The most recent authoritative North Korean view of the ongoing process was delivered by Kim during his New Year’s Day address. I broke that down for @POLITICOMag here: politico.com/magazine/story…
In the genre of "does not have Kim's signature and did not literally come out of his mouth," we have authoritative state media commentaries on the ongoing process. Given the nature of outward-facing propaganda in North Korea, these are useful.
The least credible indicators of what North Korea has agreed to throughout this process have been the words of US officials themselves. Treat these as more a statement of how the administration might like the world to be than a statement of how it actually is.
One notable exception to the above is the US intelligence community. (Pompeo massaged their assessments when he was DCIA.) See pages 27-29 of the recent ODNI Worldwide Threat Assessment & compare it to the administration’s views. dni.gov/files/ODNI/doc…
To make this thread less of a giant “I told you so,” here are some ideas that @jkwarden and I think the administration could use as a template for a series of agreements that would make the world and Northeast Asia safer: thebulletin.org/2019/02/goals-…
