Thread by @S_R_Anders

A "constraint on U.S. policy" in that leaving U.S. diplomats in a deteriorating security situation with a hostile host government was a terrible idea.

A few thoughts from this former U.S. Embassy lawyer, building on my related @lawfareblog piece (lawfareblog.com/what-does-it-m…) . . .

https://twitter.com/SecPompeo/status/1105314978393923586

Few realize the extent to which foreign embassies rely on host governments. They don't just secure supply, communication, and transportation routes, but generally also provide the bulk of each embassy's outward-facing security (with a few exceptions, like Afghanistan and Iraq).

The Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations obligate host states to do this as a matter of international law. And most do it faithfully, even where their capacity might be limited (and may therefore be supplemented by U.S. capabilities).

A situation where a host government is actively hostile to a diplomatic presence, like the situation in Venezuela, is rare.

Usually host governments will order a disfavored diplomatic presence to depart the country.

Maduro did that—but the United States refused to comply.

Why? Because it recognizes Guaidó, Maduro's rival, as Venezuela's head of state.

There are several good arguments for doing this. But leaving U.S. diplomats in Caracas on these grounds puts them in a very difficult position, as Maduro remains in control there.

By staying without Maduro's consent, these diplomats are, in his eyes, no longer eligible for Vienna Convention protections.

This means he has no obligation to help sustain their operations, or may even be able to arrest, detain, and prosecute them for their illegal presence.

The U.S. plan seemed to be to hunker down in the Embassy, rely on stockpiled supplies, and leverage the threat of U.S. intervention to maintain some operations in Caracas. It worked for a bit.

But it was never a well-thought out or long-term solution.

As the de facto host government, Maduro can undercut U.S. operations in a million indirect ways.

And a simple accident or crisis—a health emergency among remaining U.S. personnel, for example—could suddenly give Maduro immense leverage over the United States.

Further, as he grows more isolated, Maduro may be more willing to act directly against the U.S. Embassy, or let others do the same.

Or it may be more willing to resist if the United States were, for instance, to have to enter Venezuelan airspace to evacuate its personnel.

These factors essentially make diplomats stationed in Caracas pre-baked hostages for the Maduro regime if it gets pushed that far.

And as the Maduro regime becomes more isolated and comes under increasing pressure, that moment gets closer every day.

The Trump administration appeared to have acted on the assumption that Maduro would feel compelled to cede power to Guaidó quickly.

Now that this hasn't happened, it's good for the State Department to cut its losses by leaving, even if a bit embarrassing.

Note that this is NOT an argument that diplomats should never be put in dangerous situations.

To the contrary, I'm a big supporter of forward diplomacy, which would have diplomats and civilians play a leading role in conflicted and unstable areas (often instead of the military).

But a country being dangerous is fundamentally different from there being a hostile host government.

The latter is a far bigger threat to diplomats and diplomatic activities, and shouldn't be taken lightly.

And I'm glad to see the Trump administration has reached the same conclusion, even if a bit late.