Thread by @MikeBlack114

I’m a couple weeks (plus a year) late on this, but I just finished re-reading One Day Too Long so tonight we’re going to look at the first (and only) E-9 in history to be awarded the MoH, and along the way learn about one of the most shameful episodes in the history of the USAF

(This will crib a lot of information from One Day Too Long,
Timothy Castle’s definitive history on Lima Site 85. He also wrote a history on
the Secret War in Laos, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam. I encourage you to
read/buy both)

During the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign, the AF faced a problem: the Thuds it was using as the backbone of the campaign were not capable of bombing in all weather conditions. Unfortunately, it is frequently cloudy/rainy in SEA

(That's a picture of an EB-66 leading a flight of Thuds on a radar guided bombing strike; the tight formation is indicative of what would be required of the Combat Skyspot guided strikes described later)

There were two aircraft deployed at that time which were capable of operating in those conditions. One, the B-52, was not an option over the North for political reasons. The second, the A-6, was also not an option…for different political reasons

(You’ll notice the big “NAVY” on the Intruder…the only thing worse for the AF than not being able to utilize their BUFFs to drop large amounts of iron through the clouds would be allowing the Navy to utilize their planes to do so)

This drove AF leadership to begin looking for a solution. As I alluded to during my Strategic Air Command thread, SAC had units that went around the country and scored mock bombing runs, using radar to calculate the bomb trajectory based on release position

The decision was made to reverse the process, and Combat Skyspot was born. SAC radar scoring personnel deployed to a variety of locations in South Vietnam and began controlling strikes in the South and along the DMZ

While the sites in the South were capable of controlling strikes in those regions, and were very successful in doing so, the line of sight requirement associated with the AN/MSQ-77 equipment meant they could not control strikes against Hanoi

While the subject of the Secret War in Laos is well beyond this thread it sets the backdrop for this portion of the story. Laos was nominally neutral territory per the Geneva Declaration of July 1962, signed between the US, North Vietnam, Laos, the USSR, and other countries

Within days the Declaration was violated, and within a year the US would be waging a full-blown covert war against the North Vietnamese and their Pathet Lao allies in Laos. As mentioned earlier, Castle’s book on this subject is *excellent* and I highly recommend it

Air America was the aviation arm of the CIA in Laos. Comprised of contract aircrew, they were arguably the finest aviators in SEA. They pulled off many feats, but their bread and butter was providing resupply to the teams of CIA officers operating in Laos and their Hmong allies

The Hmong were/are an ethnic group who live in SEA and were recruited by the CIA to be the force behind the Secret War in Laos, propping up the otherwise largely incompetent Royal Lao forces

Air America developed a series of landing sites in Laos to supply these forces, which were known as “Lima Sites.” Many of these were nothing more than a dirt strip scratched into the side of a mountain. As I said, Air America aircrew were arguably the best aviators in SEA

(As an aside, the CIA in Laos went by the euphemism “CAS”…“Controlled American Source.” Those of you who have worked with “OGA” will be amused to see the practice predates the current wars)

Due to the covert nature of the Secret War, Ambassador William Sullivan had the sole responsibility for all military operations in Laos. This led to tension with the military leadership responsible for the rest of the war in SEA

While the military leadership was solely focused on the fight in Vietnam (both North and South), Sullivan had to walk the tightrope between maintaining overt neutrality while waging a fight against the North Vietnamese forces operating in large swaths of Laos

Prior to the radar controlled bombing discussion, the USAF began an effort to deploy TACAN (Tactical Air Navigation system) antennas across the LS’s in Laos. This was done to provide navigational aids to aircraft bombing the North out of Thailand, as well as operating in Laos

This deployment of TACAN in mid-’66 provided an opportunity: it could provide cover for the deployment of a modified AN/MSQ-77 Combat Skyspot set to provide guidance for aircraft striking Hanoi

The military brass immediately began pressing for this, and quickly identified a likely candidate: Lima Site 85, near Phou Pha Thi, a high point close to the border with Vietnam, which already had a TACAN. This would provide line of sight for a Combat Skyspot radar to Hanoi

The military leadership started a campaign to override Sullivan’s objections. They based their argument on the (ludicrous) idea that the emplacement
of 150 tons of equipment and 15+ Americans less than 15 miles from the
Vietnamese border would attract no attention

Furthermore, they blithely waved away concerns about site security and evacuation plan, basically saying “well the CIA will figure something out and anyway it’s unlikely the site would ever be attacked.”

It should be noted this was strenuously objected to by both Sullivan as well as other CIA and State Department officials, but ultimately the military carried the day and LBJ ordered the site to go in

After a survey by experienced Combat Skyspot personnel, LS85 was ID’d as a suitable location, although it had one problem: the surface was too rocky to level the radar. The solution was to bring in a Seabee demo expert, who used explosives to create a sufficiently flat surface

A valid question to ask would have been, what did the locals (and North Vietnamese in the vicinity) think of all these helicopter events, American surveys, and explosions taking place at a previously remote and relatively quiet Lima Site?

Meanwhile, the USAF got underway with the tasking. The individuals deployed could not go in uniform due to the restriction on overt US military presence in Laos. Initially it was suggested that they just go under “shallow” cover, wearing civvies and carrying USAID ID cards

JAG raised the objection that in this scenario they would not be provided Geneva Conventions protection. I reserve comment on the idea of preserving Geneva Conventions protections in an operation explicitly intended to violate the Geneva Declaration of Lao neutrality

Regardless, this issue removed the option of shallow cover. Instead, Air Staff directed this project be brought into the world of Special Plans (SAPs in the modern terminology), and was given the project name of Heavy Green

The introduction into the covert world allowed this scheme: the AF personnel who volunteered for Heavy Green would be “sheep-dipped” and fully removed (on paper) from the AF, now showing as civilian employees of Lockheed

The deal offered this individuals was that upon the end of the program or their request for withdrawal, they would be reinstated to the AF like nothing happened, including promotions as applicable

In the event of their death, they would also eventually be reinstated and their next of kin would receive both death benefits from Lockheed as well as standard AF death benefits as if they had died in the line of duty while in uniform

While a separate team began assembling the AN/TSQ-81 (modified MSQ-77) and TACAN equipment at LS85, a group of ~50 experienced Combat Skyspot and TACAN qualified individuals gathered at Barksdale for a brief on Heavy Green

Under tight security, these men were given a quick overview of the program, being told that it had a likely possibility of ending the war by bringing the fight to Hanoi (this statement will be important later)

48 of the men subsequently effectively signed their lives away by putting their signature on a memorandum outlining all of the conditions stated above

Due to the extremely unusual conditions of this assignment, the CSAF directed that the men's wives be given a briefing on the subject and that if any wife did not sign off on it, the man would be removed from the program

The brief stated that the location was "secure" (a lie), that "friendly forces were defending the area" (an exaggeration), and that "nothing would happen" (we see how that panned out)

While all the wives signed off (some under considerable duress from their husbands, like Ann Holland), there were two that were not given the brief. One was pregnant and her presence was waived. However, the other is more complicated

SSgt Herb Kirk's wife was a German national, and due to security concerns she was not cleared to receive the (technically classified) brief that the other wives got. One would think the same arrangement given to the other men would have been in place. However...

Special Plans officers swore under oath after the fact that SSgt Kirk has *verbally* assented to not being reinstated in the AF in the event of his death due to the fact that his wife could not be briefed

This directly conflicts with statements that SSgt Kirk made to his family, and flies in the face of his status as an individual with close to 20 years time in service. This would be the first of many betrayals of the men of Heavy Green by US military officials

Family issues aside, the men of Heavy Green deployed to SEA and prepared to take the site over from the installation crew. In the interim, there was some angst about the idea of radar guided bombing over Hanoi

Col John Giraudo, the commander of the 355th TFW, expressed concern over the idea. It required the Thuds to fly in close formation (as outlined above), and exposed them to a variety of enemy threats

After one mission over North Vietnam, where Col Giraudo expressed that his flight "looked like the Thunderbirds over Las Vegas," the 355th was excused from Commando Club (the name for missions guided out of LS85) sorties

Despite Col Giraudo's objections that no Wing should be tasked for such missions, the 388th TFW (the sister Thud wing flying missions over North Vietnam) continued to be tasked on these missions by 7th Air Force

However, after an especially costly mission, they were retasked from specific bombing targets to broader area targets outside the Hanoi area that allowed the Thuds to engage in more evasive maneuvers against the AAA and SAMs prior to bomb release

While understandable given losses, this flies in the face of the premise that Heavy Green was supposed to "end the war" by allowing precise all weather strikes directly against Hanoi

In the meantime, enemy forces were not waiting. In Dec of '67, a TACAN site in central Laos was attacked, resulting in the death of the two Heavy Green personnel there to maintain the TACAN equipment

By Feb '68, the noose had tightened around Pha Thi. The North Vietnamese had deployed 4 battalions in the area, and were obviously making a play to take out the TSQ-81 site. AF leadership insisted that the site remain online to continue to enable strikes

However, by this time the vast majority of strikes controlled by Heavy Green were not over North Vietnam, but were instead in Laos, operating effectively in defense of their own position at LS85

In effect, within a few months of operation the Heavy Green operation at LS85 had become a self-licking ice-cream cone, placing men in harm's way for no other purpose than to control strikes defending themselves from attack

While the CIA, at Sullivan's direction, continued to prepare (accurate) risk assessments and attempt to develop a realistic evacuation plan, AF leadership continued to insist that the site remain in place until the last possible moment to continue to enable strikes

Throughout the entire effort the CIA and Sullivan had been blunt: LS85 could not be defended by the Hmong defense forces as a static position, instead needing to be evacuated in time to allow a fighting withdrawal, in accordance with standard TTPs in the Secret War

AF leadership completely ignored these statements, continuing to insist that Heavy Green continue to remain in operation until the last possible instant, despite the fact that by this time it was controlling very few strikes against Hanoi, its supposed original purpose

As evidence of the North Vietnamese attention given the site, in Jan '68 the North Vietnamese sent a flight of An-2 aircraft to attempt to bomb LS85 using modified mortar shells as bombs and strafing

As you can see, the An-2 is not exactly a sophisticated strike aircraft, and this attack involved significant effort from the North Vietnamese, indicating their strong desire to attempt to take out the bombing radar atop Pha Thi

During the attack, an Air American Huey was at the site. Ted Moore took off in pursuit, and with FE Glen Woods wielding an AK-47, commenced an attack and downed 1 of the Colts, accomplishing the only rotary wing kill of a fixed wing aircraft in SEA

Despite this clear effort and the closing enemy ground forces, USAF leadership in theater continued to pressure Sullivan to allow the site to remain open. CIA assessments were increasingly bleak, explicitly stating that the site's security could not be guaranteed past 10 March

By early March the site was within range of enemy artillery, which placed evacuation plans at risk. Yet AF leadership still continued to insist that the site remain in operation until absolutely necessary to evacuate

On the evening of the 10th, the CIA officers at the site briefed the Heavy Green personnel on the tactical situation which was..."not good." The Heavy Green leadership worked schedules to guarantee 24 hrs of coverage while arranging for evacuation of some personnel the next day

Later that evening, all hell broke loose as the North Vietnamese began shelling the site in earnest. Off-duty personnel fled off the site of the mountain to a sheltered spot while the on-duty shift continued directing strikes against the enemy forces in the immediate vicinity

Despite this very clear indication that the jig was up, AF leadership continued to drag their feet in okaying an evacuation. Despite CIA officers and the on-site Combat Controller stating the precariousness of the situation, they delayed evacuation until the following morning

The Heavy Green personnel were armed with M16 rifles, which they had recently been given/"acquired" without any particular training. They were not in any way intended to be combat personnel, unlike the CIA officers and Combat Controller

After midnight, the on-shift teletype operator sent a final SITREP to Heavy Green leadership in Udorn, signing off with a "See you soon, I hope." This would be the final written message from Heavy Green

Around 0300L, the North Vietnamese sapper team that had been skirting the perimeter of the mountain finally scaled the heights after bypassing the mines and concertina wire defense the CIA officers had deployed

Upon reaching the top of the mountain, they immediately proceeded to their objective and fired several RPGs into the control cab of the radar along with automatic small arms fire

As the Heavy Green personnel in the cab attempted to flee, the North Vietnamese sappers began cutting them down with AK fire. Within minutes the sappers had gunned down or grenaded almost all of the on-duty team

During this slaughter the off-shift personnel were awakened; Chief Etchberger wielded a M16 as he attempted to defend his team against the sappers' assault. After several grenades most of the off-shift personnel were also either dead or incapacitated

In less than an hour a small team of sappers had effectively wiped out Heavy Green

While this assault was going on, MSgt James Calfee, who was part of the on-duty team, attempted to flee the control cab and was shot multiple times. Despite his wounds, he crawled under the cab and returned fire

His efforts likely drew attention and fire away from the off-duty individuals sheltered off the side of the mountain. For his efforts he earned a BSM w/V, which was recently upgraded to a Silver Star. His remains have not been recovered

By this time, Chief Etchberger was the only unwounded individual on the mountain. He activated a rescue radio, which is the only reason an Air America Huey showed up at daylight

Near daylight, Howie Freeman, one of the CIA officers at the site, mounted a reconnaissance of the top of the mountain with a team of Hmong personnel

Despite their heroic efforts to identify and recover any US personnel, they were unable to identify any friendlies due to the limited visibility and were forced to withdraw due to enemy fire, which wounded Freeman

To give some idea of the confined spaces of the control cab, here's a couple pictures of the exteriors and interiors...not ideal for trying to engage an enemy force from

And to give some idea of the tightness of the top of Pha Thi, here's an aerial image of the Heavy Green site

Saying it was close combat would be an understatement

Based on the rescue radio beeper initiated by Chief Etchberger, an Air America Huey piloted by Ken Woods with FE Rusty Irons was going to attempt one of the most daring rescue missions in SEA

While Sandy A-1s attempted to suppress enemy fire, Woods worked his Huey into the side of the mountain to allow the hoist to pick up the surviving off-duty personnel. As Irons dropped the hoist, Etchberger helped personnel onto it

Bill Husband, who was sheltering with Jack Starling (critically wounded)elsewhere on the mountain, ran towards the rescue helo, promising Starling he'd send someone back for him

Husband and Etchberger were hoisted up together, as enemy fire increased. Unfortunately, as the helo pulled away Etchberger was hit and bled out during the flight to safety

In the meantime, a Super Jolly had dropped a PJ (Sgt JJ Rogers, who would later take part in the Son Tay Raid) onto the top of the site to try and recover Starling, who had been identified by Husband and who was signaling with a flashlight

Rogers was able to successfully rescue Starling, and with the withdrawal of the remaining CIA officers, CCT, and Hmong, the fight for Site 85 was effectively over. The cover-up was just beginning

Within hours of the fall of the site, Spike Momyer (7th AF Commander) and Bill Sullivan (Ambassador in Laos) were trading accusations via message traffic of who was to blame for the loss of the site and personnel

To me it is pretty clear who is to blame (AF leadership insisted on keeping the site open well past its "expiration" date, for no real reason) but the allegations continued flying, including one by Sullivan that the site personnel were to blame for failing to follow instructions

This was, to be blunt, bullshit given that there had been little discussion with site personnel of evacuation procedures and that the assumption had been they would evac in an orderly fashion prior to the enemy arriving vs under fire as it turned out to be

In order to preserve the fiction of US neutrality, and based on (likely flawed) information regarding the implausible survivability of any US personnel on site, Sullivan ordered massive airstrikes against the site to destroy any evidence of US presence

(There had been thermite charges installed for demolition, but due to concern about them being inadvertently set off from the enemy shelling they were removed prior to the sapper attack. There's evidence Etchberger intended to reinstall them prior to his evacuation/death)

While understandable, this action further compounded the later efforts to account for the missing

Special Plans briefed the next of kin of the missing (soon to be presumed dead) about their status and benefits. Special Plans emphasized the importance of secrecy, and tied future benefits to the possibility that their loved ones may still be alive

This was an incredibly cruel and manipulative action given that Special Plans was well aware, as was the rest of the US govt, that there was zero possibility of any of the missing men to be returned alive

Adding to the cruelty, Special Plans instructed the next of kind that they were not to contact anyone else, even the fellow Heavy Green families. This denied them of any sort of kinship, even with the individuals who had suffered the same loss

Finally, Special Plans attempted a bait and switch with Herb Kirk's family, by refusing to contact them and persisting with the (likely) fiction that he had signed away his ability to be restored to the USAF upon death, leaving his family to only have the Lockheed death benefits

The Heavy Green leadership recommended Chief Etchberger for the MoH given his heroism on the side of the mountain in defending his team, but AF leadership downgraded it to an AF Cross due to classification concerns

It was given to his wife in a secret ceremony in the Pentagon, without the full facts of his death, attended by a small group of generals who offered meaningless platitudes. She shoved the medal in a shoebox in a closet

In the meantime Heavy Green was shut down; Rolling Thunder had paused, and regardless the idea of a radar site in close proximity to the Vietnamese border was seen as a folly

However, this woman proved to be the worst enemy of the USAF Special Plans office

That's Ann Holland (a few years advanced), Mel Holland's wife. She refused to accept the half-assed official USAF explanation she received from the Special Plans office. Her efforts were driven in part by press reports hinting at what had happened at LS85

She persisted in attempting to find out what really happened to her husband, but was stymied both by untruths from Senators and a less than honest presentation from USAF personnel after her further inquiries

She acquieseced after a couple years, but when she received word in 1975 from a reliable source that contradicted what she'd been told by the USAF regarding the bombing of the site after the assault, she requested more information

Upon being given another bullshit answer, she realized she'd exhausted her options and retained a lawyer to begin a legal battle against the US government

In the subsequent court battle USAF personnel provided multiple statements under oath that were demonstrably untrue, including the misspelling of individuals' names (as well as many other issues of more significance)

Due to the lies from USAF personnel of the circumstances of her husband's death as well as the time lapse between the recognition of the first set of lies and her suit, the suit was dismissed. However, the rulings in this case had a silver lining

Namely, Herb Kirk's son had also filed a suit. Due to Holland's efforts, which uncovered the first set of US government deceptions, the mental suffering and loss of benefits portion of his suit was able to fit within the statute of limitations and was able to go forward

Holland's efforts also resulted in the (partial) declassification of Heavy Green, which started to open the floodgates for the discussion of the overall case of the MIAs from the operation

While Kirk's son's suit returned limited damages due to the inability of the judge to calculate them (the judge fired a blowtorch at the govt stating if he had been able he'd have awarded the whole farm), the declassification opened a door

Until 1980 (12 YEARS AFTER the incident) the men of LS85 were not even on the official roster of MIAs from SEA. This meant that even if someone had provided info involving one of their names during the 1970s, it likely would have been discarded due to not matching with the list

This is a great indicator of how the total US effort into accounting for the MIAs went for the first couple decades after the war. I'll abbreviate the discussion, but if you read One Day Too Long you'll see just how incompetent and corrupt the accounting effort has been

The BLUF is because of the extended deliberate cover up from US government personnel combined with the lack of desire to pressure the Lao and Vietnamese governments to provide information, we'll likely never definitively determine what happened to all the men lost at LS85

FWIW, the latest of several recovery expeditions to Pha Thi recovered the remains of TSgt Patrick Shannon and Col Clarence Blanton (site commander on the night of the assault) have been identified, as have been Capt Donald Westbrook, a Sandy pilot who was lost near the site

My gripe (nor Castle's, I'd bet) is not with the recovery expedition personnel, who perform great work in difficult circumstances. It's with those in leadership who refused to engage in serious archival research and who allowed misconduct to happen among investigative personnel

Through the efforts of Vietnam vets and AF leadership at the time, Dick Etchberger's AF Cross was finally upgraded to a MOH in 2010. His sons were on hand to receive the medal

As an example of how fucked up this entire situation was, his AF Cross was not placed in his records or fully publicly acknowledged until '97, and only then because of the efforts of Castle, Etchberger's family, and a Chief at the Enlisted Heritage Research Institute at Gunter

I'll give Castle the last words..."This is a shameful episode in US history which all Americans, particularly but not exclusively those who have worn the uniform or watched their loved ones go off to fight our wars, should find especially appalling"

"There is no pleasure in recounting the story of Site 85. From the beginning of the Heavy Green program until the present, there is an unseemly pattern of US government duplicity."

"It is understating the obvious to say this is a case where the American public has not been well served by its government. The ultimate betrayal, of course, is the long-term and continuing breach of trust between the government and families of Americans who...

...proudly left home intent on helping to end a terrible war from a faraway Lao mountain top"

"Perhaps an understanding of this ugly chapter of US history will encourage greater accountability and responsibility from those who are involved in sending our most precious resource into harm's way"

I can't say it better than that. Everyone (but particularly USAF personnel) should be well aware of what went down at LS85 and the subsequent aftermath

I'll be honest, the thought that got me started on this Vietnam memorialization thing was LS85 and Chief Etchberger. The story of this entire saga has stuck with me ever since I read Castle's book 9 years ago after snagging it at ASBC. Hopefully it sticks with you the same

I neglected to include the following elsewhere in the thread; first, the names of the Heavy Green personnel lost at LS85 (as well as the 2 lost at the TACAN site in Laos earlier) are inscribed at the Courts of the Missing at the Punchbowl in Honolulu

I'd be a little curious to determine the circumstances of all these names being added, as while they were obviously added later both Dick Etchberger and the earlier TACAN losses are listed, neither of which were MIA past the point of death

Finally, in addition to the Combat Skyspot memorial on Guam there is one here at Barksdale, which I've visited a few times

One of my goals here is before I leave to robust out the small section of the Global Power Museum devoted to this topic

Quick addendum regarding the issues in the MIA accounting effort. BL is the US govt had good reason to suspect evidence existed detailing the disposition of some/all of the missing, but chose not to attempt to pursue it

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