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@jacklgoldsmith takes a very Executive Branch friendly view here.
I take a more Congress-centric view on this problem, as someone who spent most of my career in the Article I branch.
I will explain.
I take a more Congress-centric view on this problem, as someone who spent most of my career in the Article I branch.
I will explain.
@jacklgoldsmith The United States Constitution, Article II, Section 4, lays out the terms for which a President may be removed from office, including: "treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors."
It also gives Congress the power to impeach and convict, thus removing a President.
It also gives Congress the power to impeach and convict, thus removing a President.
@jacklgoldsmith While the intelligence community takes very seriously the possibility of treason or bribery of lower level executive branch officials, we have never previously seriously faced questions of whether the President could be credibly accused of same.
@jacklgoldsmith If a member of the intelligence community were to to see information that would suggest the President had engaged in activity that, had it been done by a lower level employee would raise counterintelligence compromise concerns, that would be an "urgent concern."
@jacklgoldsmith If such information were gathered through classified means, then the President would have the power to determine the release of same.
But that gives the President authority to hide information on impeachable offenses the only Constitutional body that can hold him accountable.
But that gives the President authority to hide information on impeachable offenses the only Constitutional body that can hold him accountable.
Elevating the prerogatives of the President, as @jacklgoldsmith suggests, is to subvert the entire Constitutional process to hold a President accountable.
@jacklgoldsmith This is why Congress created whistleblower protections, because the institutions have a tendency to shield themselves from scrutiny, and Congress wanted people inside to come forward without fear of reprisals.
And while the ICWPA establishes procedures that IC employees can go through before going to Congress, it is unclear whether those are the exclusive means of reaching Congress, or that there's penalty for not complying.
I would argue there are stronger constitutional interests.
I would argue there are stronger constitutional interests.
And further the Constitutional protections around Congress' speech and debate clause in the national security context means that there are limits to the President's ability to control classified information, when it comes to the executive branch.
See for example, Congress reading the Pentagon Papers into the record.
Anyhoo, that's a quick response to @jacklgoldsmith for whom I have enormous respect, but with whom I disagree on the expansiveness of Presidential power.
Anyhoo, that's a quick response to @jacklgoldsmith for whom I have enormous respect, but with whom I disagree on the expansiveness of Presidential power.
