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A thread on French military strategist André Beaufre. (w/ bonus rant about Afghanistan). 1/n
Beaufre is really good, and I think really important at least in the context of French military thinking. He's basically a bridge between pre-1940 French doctrine (think Napoleon to Foch and, alas, Pétain)...2/n
He came up in 30s, served in '40, Indochina, Algeria, and commanded French forces in Suez, all the while trying to get his head around the succession of defeats. 3/n
His "Introduction to Strategy" (1963) is astonishing for its clarity, and the manner in which he crystalized a lot of dense thinking into a slim, clear volume. If only Clausewitz wrote like him. 4/n
There's a lot of Foch in the book, in a good way, and mostly a ton of realism. He stresses above all adaptability and agility: things are changing much too fast for anyone to pretend there are hard and fixed rules or formulas for war. People need to think. Adapt. 5/n
A key argument is that in thanks to nuclear weapons, big direct wars are unlikely. So we need to master "Indirect strategy." I think that's still true. 6/n
What gets my riled up is his discussion of revolutionary wars or wars of national liberation against enemies like the Viet Minh, the FLN, Chinese Maoists, etc. 7/n
He pretty much lays out as clear as can be what one mustn't do, and what one must do, largely grounded in the insight that military action is of little value, as the war has more to do with psychology, and ultimately myths, religion, and ideology. 8/n
The enemy's goal is to drag the fight out and discourage its adversary, which it can never defeat on the battlefield. One has to attack its message and counter it with another. 9/n
To my knowledge, the US in Afghanistan never ever attempted anything like this other than practice the bizarre notion that one can buy Afghans' good will by building some stuff. Digging some wells. 10/n
Beaufre argued for securing the big population centers and making it clear that they have it better than those out in the countryside. The US in Afghanistan ignore the population (in the name of "economy of force", even though we all said the pop was the "center of gravity") 11/n
Sometimes we tried securing a few underpopulated districts or towns (remember that snake oil, Village Stability Operations?) 12/n
I could go on but won't. Anyway, further proof that US military leaders have little grasp of strategy. Maybe they've read a few books, but they always default to operations. 13/n
I should add that Beaufre closes with some interesting ideas about how Western nations need to close ranks to defend Western civilization and reestablish its prestige. The idea of Western civilization these days is so tattered that I wonder if that's possible. 14/n
I should say, a bridge between the pre-1940 and post. For everything changed that summer.
