1. So, I’ve finished the full interview with Macron and it didnt make things better.
Firstly, publicly doubting Art.5, as one of the key NATO powers, have little upside and a big deterrence disadvantage.
Per @MarkGaleotti, Russia seems to believe in Art5 economist.com/europe/2019/11…
Firstly, publicly doubting Art.5, as one of the key NATO powers, have little upside and a big deterrence disadvantage.
Per @MarkGaleotti, Russia seems to believe in Art5 economist.com/europe/2019/11…
2. A common problem Macron is manifesting is overestimating the importance of a well-performing economy in Russia.
It is neither the overarching goal, nor a requirement for Russia being a security-political threat or for the Russian leadership enriching themselves.
It is neither the overarching goal, nor a requirement for Russia being a security-political threat or for the Russian leadership enriching themselves.
3. Here, the reporter nails it; Macron concludes that Russia must become a partner to the West from his one logic and not Russia’s.
4. The anti-European goal in Russia’s political & information subversion is not accidental, it is correctly identified as a centre of gravity to undermine.
Bilaterally, Russia has so much better opportunity to gets its way than dealing with a united EU. Macron should know this.
Bilaterally, Russia has so much better opportunity to gets its way than dealing with a united EU. Macron should know this.
5. This brings us on to the D-word, deterrence. Saying “it’s time to ease tensions” and “the US is tough b/c superego” is really downplaying the invasion of another country, using chemical nerve agents in UK soil (whilst murdering one) and it’s significant election interference.
6. I’m arguing that Russian aggression is premised on West always coming to the table and hoping for a negotiated solution without making significant concession. And I don’t see anything here to that change that calculus to the contrary.
7. “Ukrainian crisis”?
One of my students said Ukrainian crisis and I asked them to list all the definitions of war they could think of.
The war in Ukraine fulfilled all of them, except one as Ukraine hasn’t declared it (the student still used crisis in the essay tho...).
One of my students said Ukrainian crisis and I asked them to list all the definitions of war they could think of.
The war in Ukraine fulfilled all of them, except one as Ukraine hasn’t declared it (the student still used crisis in the essay tho...).
8. Macron, correctly, identifies that Europe both needs to do better, think better and act better without the full reliance of the US.
Nonetheless, as a Russia analyst, there’s little to nothing to be happy with in here.
Fin.
Nonetheless, as a Russia analyst, there’s little to nothing to be happy with in here.
Fin.
9. Bonus: Yes, Trump has also publicly talked about qualifying article 5 and such, but that simply does not make it a good idea for Macron to do it as well.
Rather there’s a good argument that Trump is a problem himself, but that the US remain committed to NATO.
Rather there’s a good argument that Trump is a problem himself, but that the US remain committed to NATO.
10. Bonus II:
11. Bonus III: Lavrov’s words rings familiar from somewhere.
“If Macron had felt that the diagnosis he made [of NATO] was so evident – he had all the right to state it. He knows NATO better than me, since he represents a nation which is a member of the alliance”
“If Macron had felt that the diagnosis he made [of NATO] was so evident – he had all the right to state it. He knows NATO better than me, since he represents a nation which is a member of the alliance”
