The People's Tribunal on Aadhaar-related Issues is now underway at the Indian Social Institute #AadhaarFail
Running thread with proceedings.
Running thread with proceedings.
@praavita introduces the Tribunal.
The idea of Aadhaar is based on the idea of "efficiency". But its now clear that there is no efficient Aadhaar.
We are at this Tribunal to give present the human cost of the project.
The idea of Aadhaar is based on the idea of "efficiency". But its now clear that there is no efficient Aadhaar.
We are at this Tribunal to give present the human cost of the project.
@nikhilmkss talks about "How did we get here?".
Aadhaar was justified on three grounds:
1. Inclusion
2. Curb corruption
3. Magic bullet for efficiency
This was sold to us in a very loud pitch.
Aadhaar was justified on three grounds:
1. Inclusion
2. Curb corruption
3. Magic bullet for efficiency
This was sold to us in a very loud pitch.
@nikhilmkss - Before we look into these, imp to note surveillance + data commercialization.
Gopal Gandhi, early on, made an astute point that RTI allowed every citizen to track every move of the govt. Aadhaar inverts that - allows the govt. to track every move of every citizen.
Gopal Gandhi, early on, made an astute point that RTI allowed every citizen to track every move of the govt. Aadhaar inverts that - allows the govt. to track every move of every citizen.
@nikhilmkss - In 2016, issues of pensions being discontinued started coming up. Had heard of pension delays, but never of disrupted pensions. After receiving multiple complaints, putting pressure on govt., was revealed that *10 lakh* pensions were stopped.
@nikhilmkss - Of these 10 lakh, 2.5 lakh were dead, 2.5 lakh were duplicates. The remaining 5 lakh were classified as "other".
Out of 11 people in a single village declared as "dead", 9 were found to be alive.
Similar findings when verification in multiple villages.
Out of 11 people in a single village declared as "dead", 9 were found to be alive.
Similar findings when verification in multiple villages.
This man doesn't have fingers in one hand. @UIDAI, at the time of enrollment, took 5 fingers from another person (!) to meet the 10 fingers + 2 iris requirements.
He was one of the persons whose pensions were disrupted.
He was one of the persons whose pensions were disrupted.
@nikhilmkss - In Jan 2016, 93% of ration card holders did not collect their rations due to various exclusion errors. By mid-2017, this figure had stabilized to about 20%-30%.
There are 1.1 crore ration cards ==> about 20 lakh households excluded.
There are 1.1 crore ration cards ==> about 20 lakh households excluded.
@nikhilmkss - These are what drives "efficiency".
The "machine" [ePOS] has become the lord - if the dealer says its Kalu Ram, the village says its Kalu Ram, Kalu Ram says he's Kalu Ram, but if the machine says its not Kalu Ram, then that's it.
The "machine" [ePOS] has become the lord - if the dealer says its Kalu Ram, the village says its Kalu Ram, Kalu Ram says he's Kalu Ram, but if the machine says its not Kalu Ram, then that's it.
@nikhilmkss - much before Aadhaar/Jan Dhan, NREGA led to one of the biggest financial inclusion drive in rural India.
Bank A/Cs have their own issues, bur Aadhaar linking has added a whole new set of issues - rejected payments, delayed payments, diverted payments!
Bank A/Cs have their own issues, bur Aadhaar linking has added a whole new set of issues - rejected payments, delayed payments, diverted payments!
@nikhilmkss - To conclude, it is a dictatorial, authoritarian, and harmful system which is doing the exact opposite of what we were promised it would.
Sakina begins on Aadhaar's digital payment architecture.
When we met a bank manager, he said "Aadhaar is not mandatory, but it is compulsory".
When we met a bank manager, he said "Aadhaar is not mandatory, but it is compulsory".
Sakina - Payment delays are a big issue. And very little data is available on Aadhaar-related delays because it actually hides the data to a large extent.
Sakina - Aadhaar used in banking/digital payments in 3 ways:
1. Officially valid document (OVD)
2. Seeding/linking bank a/c
3. Mapping UID to NCPI mapper
1. Officially valid document (OVD)
2. Seeding/linking bank a/c
3. Mapping UID to NCPI mapper
@SakinaDH - NREGA payments are quite a complex web involving govts bank, NCPI, beneficiary banks and authentication requirements.
@SakinaDH - In Jharkhand (and perhaps other places in the country), Aadhaar seeding targets were set. Field functionaries found an ingenuous way of meeting these targets - simply deleted all job cards not linked - 100% sending rate [Voila!]
@SakinaDH - There is lack of consent related to APBS - it is esp important because beneficiaries need to know where the bank account is going to.
[Remeber the 'LALA' (Last Aadhaar-linked Account) rule? ]
[Remeber the 'LALA' (Last Aadhaar-linked Account) rule? ]
Bhaskar from Andhra describes the various problems faced by residents there. Presents the case of Bonangi Vijaya Lakshmi. Despite completing work, she stopped receiving wages. Hoping they would resume soon, she continued to work.
It was later found her job card was deleted.
It was later found her job card was deleted.
@SakinaDH - The core issue that we see is that people really don't know what the issues are. The opacity of the system is dangerous.
@james_herenj, convenor of NREGA Watch Jharkhand, poked into what "Inactive Aadhaar" means.
Filed RTI with @UIDAI in 2018. It was forwarded to MoRD, then forwarded to Rural Dev Dept., GoJ, who in turn said it relates to MoRD.
How will a worker wade through these issues?
Filed RTI with @UIDAI in 2018. It was forwarded to MoRD, then forwarded to Rural Dev Dept., GoJ, who in turn said it relates to MoRD.
How will a worker wade through these issues?
@rajendran_naray - Kanku Devi was rejecyed Rs. 12,037 since May 2019 due to "inactive Aadhaar".
AQ
SBI officials had no real clarity why. Turns out the issue was with the IIN number (bank's UID) not with her Aadhaar seeding.
Do we expect them to understand these issues?
AQ
SBI officials had no real clarity why. Turns out the issue was with the IIN number (bank's UID) not with her Aadhaar seeding.
Do we expect them to understand these issues?
@rajendran_naray - Reliance on Customer Service Centres (CSCs) is an issue. Three-state study found about 40% of workers had to make multiple trips to receive payments - due to biometric authentication failures.
Main structural issues:
1. Passing the baton of accountability
2. Is tech even required?
3. Fancy algos or tech that upholds rights?
4. Workers produce the data but have no role in way data is used
1. Passing the baton of accountability
2. Is tech even required?
3. Fancy algos or tech that upholds rights?
4. Workers produce the data but have no role in way data is used
@rajendran_naray: Usha Ramanathan made an imp point - NREGA is not 'welfare' in the traditional sense cuz workers earn a legitimate wage for work they do.
Aadhaar payments should be moved out.
Aadhaar payments should be moved out.
@iam_anandv - Aadhaar-based Biometric Authentication (ABBA) is basically like Russian Roulette. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't. That's the main issue.
@iam_anandv - The quality of biometrics are poorer for women and older persons. Gender and Age are important quality factors.
Based on UIDAI's own data.
Based on UIDAI's own data.
@iam_anandv - These design issues (designed by 25 yeard old, upper class males) are bound to fail when applied to various aspects.
These issues cant be fixed. That's why when SC/govt. says nobody should be excluded, no wonder it never plays out.
These issues cant be fixed. That's why when SC/govt. says nobody should be excluded, no wonder it never plays out.
@SameetPanda talks about the deletion of 19 lakh ration cards in Odisha. Conducted a small study which found that 53% of persons had Aadhaar, submitted details, and still not receiving benefits.
@digitaldutta now speaking on Aadhaar and DBT with a focus on health.
Begins by explaining that Aadhaar has about 100 error codes.
The first time govt did an analysis of error codes was post the Aadhaar judgment. And even their errors were not standardized.
Begins by explaining that Aadhaar has about 100 error codes.
The first time govt did an analysis of error codes was post the Aadhaar judgment. And even their errors were not standardized.
@digitaldutta - Showing data from 'DBT 09' files obtained via RTI which show large failure rates in DBT payments. While Aadhaar failures are high, even non-Aadhaar failures are there.
"The issue is with technology".
"The issue is with technology".
@digitaldutta - This idea or creation of databases, linking of Aadhaar to welfare, was never aimed at welfare. The idea was always for linking databases to serve commercial interests - laying the seed for the "big Indian tech".
Koyli Devi, mother of late Santoshi Kumari talks about the role Aadhaar played in Santoshi's death and how it is causing havoc in various other ways.
@digitaldutta now speaking about Aadhaar and its link to NPR.
The history of ID cards came in the aftermath of that Kargil War when the War Review Committee 1999 noted that we do not have a universal national ID.
The history of ID cards came in the aftermath of that Kargil War when the War Review Committee 1999 noted that we do not have a universal national ID.
@digitaldutta - The War Review Committee recommended issuing Multipurpose National ID. This is where the idea of biometrics founds its early seed. However, the project died down with change in govts. Saw rejuvenation post the the Bombay attacks in 2006.
@digitaldutta - The idea of linking databases came from NATGRID. The voter rolls turned out to be the largest databases (thanks to ECI efforts to enhance franchise).
Seen here link between Aadhaar, SRDH, Census, HDB.
Seen here link between Aadhaar, SRDH, Census, HDB.
@digitaldutta - In 2010, it was decided that Registrar General of India (MHA) and UIDAI would share the biometric collection efforts. UIDAI would de-duplicate the RGI data.
@digitaldutta - As a result, we see two different ecosystems came together with clashing intentions at time. Two different databases to cover the entire population.
At the borders, verification needed (so NPR) and within the country economic commercial took lead (so Aadhaar).
At the borders, verification needed (so NPR) and within the country economic commercial took lead (so Aadhaar).
@digitaldutta - Civil registration is done commonly in various countries. The issue in India is this idea of linking it across databases and allowing various entities to have access to such data.
@digitaldutta - Issues of the kinds faces by @Guttajwala where they found their names missing on the voter list.
Reason is that NPR data was shared with ECI and all those voter IDs not linked to Aadhaar were simply deleted.
Reason is that NPR data was shared with ECI and all those voter IDs not linked to Aadhaar were simply deleted.
@Ujwala_U - It is important to remember the kinds of ways the govt has sold us the project and the kinds of arguments they have made.
When privacy challenge was raised, their basic argument was "what privacy? there's no privacy."
When privacy challenge was raised, their basic argument was "what privacy? there's no privacy."
@Ujwala_U - Those kinds of arguments clearly shows how the govt. dealt with disagreements/challenges.
@Ujwala_U - What kind of data is collected? CIDR has 3 types of data -
(1) Demographic
(2) Biometrics
(3) Residual
(2) and (3) are quite expansive.
(1) Demographic
(2) Biometrics
(3) Residual
(2) and (3) are quite expansive.
@Ujwala_U - Everytime an authentication request is made, a time-stamped data of that request is recorded and saved. This was argued by Shyam Divan in the SC as well.
@Ujwala_U - good time to recount the Mosaic Theory: a single, discrete piece of info may not seem like much. But multiple such single pieces out together and a picture starts to image which in turns allows fairly reasonable inferences of the person.
@Ujwala_U - The difficulty with the SC judgement - despite making these arguments and demonstrated the issues in court, the arguments relating to surveillance just did not land.
@Ujwala_U - Now, who all have access to Aadhaar's data? The way one is protected from surveillance is via safeguard and penalties for using data in those ways.
The Aadhaar law neither has general safeguards nor particular ones.
The Aadhaar law neither has general safeguards nor particular ones.
@Ujwala_U - When we have acknowledged that Right to Privacy is fundamental, it is quite a significant fact that people do not have any safeguard/redressal mechanism in cases of digital surveillance.
@Ujwala_U - The Data Protection Law was harped up extensively during the Aadhaar debate.
To the contrary, 2019 Personal Data Protection Bill provides absolutely no protections from govt's unchecked access to data via wide exemptions without any legal/parliamentary oversight.
To the contrary, 2019 Personal Data Protection Bill provides absolutely no protections from govt's unchecked access to data via wide exemptions without any legal/parliamentary oversight.
@anivar - Aadhaar is 10 years old now. 2009 was a time with peak govt. trust among people owing to RTI+FRA and other initiatives.
@anivar - Focussing on three stories.
@anivar - @NandanNilekani had at Bishops Cotton School in Bangalore had said that Aadhaar authentication will simply be Yes/No.
Aadhaar Act 2016 provides for e-KYC to share name, DOB, etc. in XML files.
[Such contradiction, much wow]
Aadhaar Act 2016 provides for e-KYC to share name, DOB, etc. in XML files.
[Such contradiction, much wow]
@anivar - Proportionality was a major aspect of cutting down private use of Aadhaar.
Two-years, post judgement, as this Aadhaar-video KYC shows, there is even more data being collected (including GPS coordinates).
Two-years, post judgement, as this Aadhaar-video KYC shows, there is even more data being collected (including GPS coordinates).
@anivar - Now moving to DBT story.
Who bears the cost if DBT? Last mile DBT is basically money reaching an "account" (anywhere in the country), not reaching the "individual" as such.
Who bears the cost if DBT? Last mile DBT is basically money reaching an "account" (anywhere in the country), not reaching the "individual" as such.
@anivar - How were these DBT accounts opened?
Via "consent camps" where consent clauses were more or less mandatory. Most of these DBT beneficiaries already had post office accounts or even non-Aadhaar based accounts.
Via "consent camps" where consent clauses were more or less mandatory. Most of these DBT beneficiaries already had post office accounts or even non-Aadhaar based accounts.
@anivar - Three main costs related to DBT:
1. Payment to intermediaries (banks, NCPI)
2. Costs of AePS (Business Correspondent charges)
3. Bank charges and bounce charges
1. Payment to intermediaries (banks, NCPI)
2. Costs of AePS (Business Correspondent charges)
3. Bank charges and bounce charges
@anivar - This is the cost structure of APBS. A total of Rs. 0.90 per transaction.
This is significantly higher than the charges for NEFT - the system used for DBT before Aadhaar.
But when we talk of Aadhar savings, don't mention these higher costs.
This is significantly higher than the charges for NEFT - the system used for DBT before Aadhaar.
But when we talk of Aadhar savings, don't mention these higher costs.
@prasanna_s to speak about Aadhaar and elections.
@prasanna_s - The logic of linking Aadhaar data with voter rolls was ostensibly to de-duplicate voter rolls.
When folks went to court, the SC in 2015 said, even *voluntarily* it could be used in only PDS & LPG. Later expanded to NREGA, EPFO, NSAP.
But not for voter rolls.
When folks went to court, the SC in 2015 said, even *voluntarily* it could be used in only PDS & LPG. Later expanded to NREGA, EPFO, NSAP.
But not for voter rolls.
@prasanna_s - But subsequent RTIs and poking around revealed that some opaque algorithms were uses to de-duplicate the database. We saw the result of it in Telangana, Bangalore etc.
@prasanna_s - There is no documented evidence of "voter frauds". On the other hand, various issues with appointment of ECI, MCC, independence etc. Always this inversion of fraud falls on citizenry.
@prasanna_s - It seems increasingly that these complicated processes of linking/cleaning voter rolls is meant as a way to disenfranchise certain communities [often the weakest].
Jury begins with judgements. They rule:
1. Aadhaar project was unconstitutional both in design and implementation.
2. Supreme Court was incorrect in ruling it as constitutional & didnt aptly apply proportionality test.
3. Aadhaar enables surveillance by function creep.
1. Aadhaar project was unconstitutional both in design and implementation.
2. Supreme Court was incorrect in ruling it as constitutional & didnt aptly apply proportionality test.
3. Aadhaar enables surveillance by function creep.
4. Right to Privacy has not been respected and Aadhaar has always focussed on commercialization of data.
5. Sufficient evidence has been placed to show that Aadhaar impedes payments of MNREGA wages.
6. The SC was incorrect in dismissing surveillance by linking records.
5. Sufficient evidence has been placed to show that Aadhaar impedes payments of MNREGA wages.
6. The SC was incorrect in dismissing surveillance by linking records.
7. Using Aadhaar to seed various databases is dangerous.
8. Jury finds that various reports for Aadhaar leaks were credible and @UIDAI is to be held responsible.
8. Jury finds that various reports for Aadhaar leaks were credible and @UIDAI is to be held responsible.
Tarangini Sriraman presents a dissent note for point #1 - while the other three jury members felt there was a "legitimate state aim" with Aadhaar, she *doesn't* think so given that there were always commercial interests involved in the project.
Subhashis Banerjee:
-The biggest issue for him is the issue of "exclusions". A clear theory of exclusion has been established and Aadhaar-based Biometric Authentication (ABBA) must go.
- Identity is a social construct. Forcing people to define it at UIDAI window is obnoxious.
-The biggest issue for him is the issue of "exclusions". A clear theory of exclusion has been established and Aadhaar-based Biometric Authentication (ABBA) must go.
- Identity is a social construct. Forcing people to define it at UIDAI window is obnoxious.
Patricia Mukhim - One issue with the 2-day discourse at Tribunal is that the North East was left out entirely. The region anyway feels alienated.
The NE region did not see tje kind of mandatory Aadhaar like mainland has. Would be good to hear voices from there.
The NE region did not see tje kind of mandatory Aadhaar like mainland has. Would be good to hear voices from there.
