I’m seeing lots of stratospheric-level discussion on US drawdown to 2500 troops in #Afghanistan & what it might mean, but let’s get operational for a moment in this THREAD. 1/n
The US is conducting 2 missions in #Afghanistan: counterterrorism (CT) & train/advise/assist (TAA) of the #ANDSF. It does so from a half-dozen major bases around the country. The TAA mission it does w/@NATO ally forces. CT it does unilaterally & partnered w/Afghan #SOF. 2/n
For the past few years, TAA has been at the level of the MOD & MOI (in Kabul) & the Afghan Army Corps HQs & Afghan Air Force at regional bases. That posture—which was sustainable even at 4500 troops—is heavily enabled by contractors. 3/n
At 2500 troops, that posture isn’t sustainable & collapses into a few positions in/near Kabul. Which means the TAA mission at the Army Corps & AAF regional locations goes away. Advising would likely continue w/in the MOD & MOI HQs, which are close to @ResoluteSupport HQ. 4/n
The CT mission & air support to beleaguered #ANDSF would be prioritized & continue. I assume that most @NATO troops would also depart (since they tend to follow the US’ lead). And many of the contractors (eg those currently supporting the regional bases) would also leave. 5/n
It *might* be possible to cont the TAA mission via remote means—b/c of #COVID, US TAA forces haven’t been allowed frequent contact w/#ANDSF & have had to rely on remote conferencing & chat apps. So there’s some practice of this already. But obviously not as good as in person. 6/n
Net effects are likely to be:
- Continued CT ops & air spt to #ANDSF
- Reduced US visibility/intel on what’s happening outside of Kabul
- Reduced operational capability of the #ANDSF (even if remote advising continues, loss of regional log/maint support will have neg impacts) 7/n
And net gains on the ground for the #Taliban. It’s also not a sustainable long-term troop presence b/c it assumes the #ANDSF can hold the #Taliban at bay while the US does CT indefinitely, which is a bad assumption. 8/n
Bottom line: This move is meant to accomplish this👇 9/9
I was thinking again this morning about the argument to rapidly withdraw from #Afghanistan (& #Syria, #Somalia...) emanating from the Trump White House & was reminded of a conference I spoke at last year, on the 30th anniversary of #alQaeda. 1/n
One of the audience Qs was "what events or developments might you predict would give #alQaeda the biggest boost in the future?" The other panelists--which included some of the US' best terrorism experts--gave great answers that covered a variety of possible contingencies. 2/n
Being by far the least impressive terrorist analyst of the group (& someone focused more on countering terrorism), I chose to focus on ourselves. My answer: "Another strategic blunder of historic proportions by the United States." 3/n
I’ve been asked several times over the past couple of days (given the Pentagon shake-ups) whether it would be logistically feasible to get all US troops out of #Afghanistan by Christmas as Trump supposedly wants. So, here goes a THREAD. 1/n
The answer depends on what you consider “withdrawal” of all the troops. Currently, the US has somewhere around 5000 troops in #Afghanistan & @NATO has about as many (& possibly slightly more). They are located on a small number (10 or so?) of bases across the country. 2/n
Those forces are supported by another 10-15k (maybe more?) contractors. If all Trump wanted was to get the uniformed personnel out, it’d likely be possible to do that in 2-3 weeks (a C-17 can carry ~200 people), so 10k troops = 50 C-17 sorties. 3/n
Watching the @USIP event with @US4AfghanPeace now. Some points that resonate with me in this thread. 1/n
His opening remarks were prepared and nothing really new there--hit all the talking points he's made in recent appearances. 2/n
First Q from Stephen Hadley: What makes you hopeful that talks will succeed? A: Both sides understand that violence cannot be the answer forever. Afghan leaders recognize they made a mistake in the wake of Soviet withdrawal by fighting each other--want to rectify that now. 3/n
"The current Afghan system is totally corrupt and incapable," began one of the senior members of the #Taliban's negotiating team, suggesting that forming a coalition with the "sinking ship" of President @ashrafghani’s government would "drown the Taliban as well." 3/n
"The int’l community shouldn't be nervous," the deputy leader of the #Taliban's negotiating team insisted. Stanikzai said that, in return for being treated as a legitimate political entity in #Afghanistan, "we will be nice this time, more responsible in respect to int’l law." 4/n
“The senior #Taliban negotiator, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the previous TB regime—forced from power by the 2001 US-led invasion of #Afghanistan—was "inexperienced" and dismissed by the rest of the world, leaving it to "slide away from the int’l community." 5/n
Very good thread by @and_huh_what. Seems to me the current govt wishes its BATNA would be Biden doubling-down on it, US-TB agreement be damned. More likely is its WATNA: US grows tired of its feet-dragging and heads for the exit before a deal is done. 1/n
The govt’s perceived position of weakness for peace talks isn’t b/c of the US-TB deal. It’s because the govt is highly corrupt & divided, has been militarily losing for the past 5 years, & global trends have made it far less important to its primary backers over time. 2/n
Contrary to popular belief, the war is not stalemated. The #Taliban have been steadily gaining ground tactically & operationally for years. The US-TB deal was borne of those trends + US recognition that the ROI on its interests in #Afghanistan is bad & getting worse. 3/n