With the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act having been passed (& now sitting on President Trump's desk for signature or veto), thought I'd put together a THREAD on what it says about #SOF. 1/n

govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BI…
SEC. 163. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR THE ARMED OVERWATCH PROGRAM.

No armed overwatch aircraft for @USSOCOM in FY21 or @usairforce FY21-23. Seriously disappointing for @AFSpecOpsCmd, which has been pushing hard for this. 2/n
SEC. 165. AIRBORNE INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, & RECONNAISSANCE ACQUISITION ROADMAP FOR THE UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND.

Requires @USSOCOM & ASD-SOLIC to submit an acquisition roadmap to meet the manned & unmanned airborne ISR req'ts of #SOF by Dec 1, 2021. 3/n
SEC. 166. PROHIBITION ON DIVESTITURE OF MANNED INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT OPERATED BY UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND.

@USSOCOM can't divest any manned ISR in FY21. 4/n
SEC. 352. EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL DEFENSE PROGRAM

Appears to assign responsibility for this program to ASD-SOLIC. 5/n
SEC. 557. EVALUATION OF BARRIERS TO MINORITY PARTICIPATION IN CERTAIN UNITS OF THE ARMED FORCES.

Requires a study specifically on Army SF; Rangers; SEALs; USAF Combat Control Teams, Pararescue & Special Recon; Marine Raiders & Force Recon... 6/n
...Coast Guard Maritime Security Response Team; Any other forces designated by the Secretary of Defense as #SOF; and pilot and navigator military occupational specialties. 7/n
SEC. 576. REPORT ON POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS TO CERTAIN MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

Includes focus on @USSOCOM's Joint Special Operations University. 8/n
SEC. 577. COLLEGE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY.

Requires SECDEF to assess requirements for Joint PME for CT/irregular warfare & determine whether a college @NDU_EDU or somewhere separate is required to meet them. 9/n
SEC. 583. SUPPORT SERVICES FOR MEMBERS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBERS.

Seems to expand coverage of Section 1788a of title 10, United States Code to forces supporting #SOF & their family members as well. 10/n
SEC. 599. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CULTURE AND ETHICS.

Holds @USSOCOM & ASD-SOLIC's feet to the fire on implementation of all of the recommendations from SOCOM's CR. 11/n
SEC. 902. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AND RELATED MATTERS.

For #SOF matters, puts ASD-SOLIC directly subordinate to SECDEF (effectively codifying (A)SECDEF Miller's change in law)... 12/n
...and puts the Special Ops Secretariat firmly under ASD-SOLIC (& outside of USD-Policy). Re-directs the establishment of a Special Operation Policy and Oversight Council (which had been previously mandated in an earlier NDAA). 13/n
SEC. 1002. BUDGET MATERIALS FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Requires a lot more specificity on #SOF budget information, to include service-common support, acquisition support, training, operations, pay & allowances, base operations sustainment, etc. 14/n
SEC. 1051. SUPPORT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS TO COMBAT TERRORISM.

Provides a host of new clarifications & requirements associated with the 127(e) authority. 15/n
SEC. 1207. MODIFICATION AND EXTENSION OF SUPPORT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FOR IRREGULAR WARFARE.

Increases funding associated w/the 1202 authority to $15M & adds some similar requirements as for 127(e). 16/n
SEC. 1723. TAILORED CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS ORGANIZATIONS.

Potentially allows ASD-SOLIC/@USSOCOM to create a #SOF version of the Navy Cyber Warfare Development Group (though oddly this section calls SOLIC the "ASD for Special Operations and Irregular Warfare.") 17/n
SEC. 4301. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

Authorizes the following:
- $6.3M for Indo-Pacific Special Operations Joint Task
Force
- $8.8M for MISO
- $1.07B for @USSOCOM combat development
- $2.9M for #SOF exfil from #Syria
- $9.8M for SOCOM cyber
- $550M for SOCOM intel... 18/n
...and:
- $706M for @USSOCOM maintenance
- $156M for SOCOM HQ
- $1.06B for SOCOM operational support
- $2.58B for SOCOM theater forces (e.g., TSOCs)

END. 19/19

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More from @JJSchroden

16 Dec
So, I did a little more analysis on the lists of agenda items reportedly put forth by the government of #Afghanistan and the #Taliban (listed in this @TOLOnews article from yesterday). Some observations in this THREAD. 1/n
tolonews.com/afghanistan-16…
In the table below, I tried to combine some of the like themes on each side & then compare them to each other--to identify areas of overlap & gaps. Areas of strong overlap include drugs, corruption, care for war disabled/wounded, & ceasefire. 2/n Image
Areas of moderate/limited overlap (which includes areas where one side was very broad but the other more specific) include type of future govt, future foreign policy, future of the #ANDSF, territorial integrity, education, and human rights. 3/n
Read 7 tweets
16 Dec
With the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act having been passed (& now sitting on President Trump's desk for signature or veto), thought I'd put together a THREAD on what it says about #Afghanistan. 1/n
SEC. 1212. EXTENSION OF THE AFGHAN SPECIAL IMMIGRANT VISA PROGRAM.

Extends the program through through 2022 (and appears to expand the number allowed by 120 slots). 2/n
SEC. 1213. EXTENSION & MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT FOR RECONCILIATION ACTIVITIES LED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN.

Extends #DOD ability to provide funding to cover certain costs of participants in peace talks (which includes #Taliban) through 2021 & adds some restrictions. 3/n
Read 14 tweets
26 Nov
Op-Ed here by the leads of ⁦@USIP⁩’s #Afghanistan Study Group: “An abrupt withdrawal of US troops, as is now being contemplated by the Trump administration, would undermine the fragile but potentially transformational peace process.” 1/n washingtonpost.com/opinions/afgha…
“It would embolden the #Taliban, destabilize the Kabul government and allow terrorist groups to reconsolidate. A civil war could result, provoking a wider regional conflict and an inevitable humanitarian and migration crisis.”

They make 4 recommendations. 2/n
1. “We should make clear to all parties involved what the desired end state will be. In particular, a post-peace #Afghanistan must be able to either sufficiently control its territory to prevent the harboring of terrorists or accept international assistance to do so.” 3/n
Read 8 tweets
17 Nov
I’m seeing lots of stratospheric-level discussion on US drawdown to 2500 troops in #Afghanistan & what it might mean, but let’s get operational for a moment in this THREAD. 1/n
The US is conducting 2 missions in #Afghanistan: counterterrorism (CT) & train/advise/assist (TAA) of the #ANDSF. It does so from a half-dozen major bases around the country. The TAA mission it does w/@NATO ally forces. CT it does unilaterally & partnered w/Afghan #SOF. 2/n
For the past few years, TAA has been at the level of the MOD & MOI (in Kabul) & the Afghan Army Corps HQs & Afghan Air Force at regional bases. That posture—which was sustainable even at 4500 troops—is heavily enabled by contractors. 3/n
Read 9 tweets
16 Nov
I was thinking again this morning about the argument to rapidly withdraw from #Afghanistan (& #Syria, #Somalia...) emanating from the Trump White House & was reminded of a conference I spoke at last year, on the 30th anniversary of #alQaeda. 1/n
One of the audience Qs was "what events or developments might you predict would give #alQaeda the biggest boost in the future?" The other panelists--which included some of the US' best terrorism experts--gave great answers that covered a variety of possible contingencies. 2/n
Being by far the least impressive terrorist analyst of the group (& someone focused more on countering terrorism), I chose to focus on ourselves. My answer: "Another strategic blunder of historic proportions by the United States." 3/n
Read 6 tweets
12 Nov
I’ve been asked several times over the past couple of days (given the Pentagon shake-ups) whether it would be logistically feasible to get all US troops out of #Afghanistan by Christmas as Trump supposedly wants. So, here goes a THREAD. 1/n
The answer depends on what you consider “withdrawal” of all the troops. Currently, the US has somewhere around 5000 troops in #Afghanistan & @NATO has about as many (& possibly slightly more). They are located on a small number (10 or so?) of bases across the country. 2/n
Those forces are supported by another 10-15k (maybe more?) contractors. If all Trump wanted was to get the uniformed personnel out, it’d likely be possible to do that in 2-3 weeks (a C-17 can carry ~200 people), so 10k troops = 50 C-17 sorties. 3/n
Read 11 tweets

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