I’ve been asked a number of times the past couple of days what I think of @joebiden’s announcement to withdraw all US troops from #Afghanistan by September. I haven’t had the time to write a proper op ed, so instead I’ll give you my thoughts in this THREAD. 1/n
My top-line take is this: What choice did @joebiden really have? If you examine his situation through the lenses of #Afghanistan, terrorism risk, credibility, domestic politics, & global US priorities, you’ll see the answer is “he had to do it.” 2/n
Let’s start w/#Afghanistan. Recognize first that the US isn’t in South Asia! We were always visiting, which means at some point, we would leave. Only Q has been when that would happen. That Q was answered in the US-#Taliban Agreement: We would leave by 1 May. 3/n
That deadline was contingent on the #Taliban meeting their commitments w/in the deal. Some (including me) have argued that they haven’t fully done so. But those arguments are hard to make—& the TB reject them—b/c the TB’s commitments are vaguely stated. 4/n
Thus, for all intents and purposes, @JoeBiden inherited an agreement *made by the USG* to withdraw all non-diplomatic personnel from #Afghanistan by 1 May, w/little ability to convincingly argue otherwise. A bad deal, yes. But a deal the US agreed to nonetheless. 5/n
Some argued @JoeBiden should leave the deal. Ignore the deadline. Peg withdrawal to conditions instead of a timeline & if the #Taliban walk away from the peace process & their CT commitments, so be it. These were effectively the recs of the #AfghanistanStudyGroup, for ex. 6/n
What would that option have done for #Afghanistan? Guaranteed war for as long as the US stayed. Thousands of dead Afghans every single year in perpetuity, as I discussed previously. 7/n
warontherocks.com/2019/03/weighi…
The #Taliban have been clear: there'll be no peace until the US leaves. Pundits arguing the US should stay to bring about conditions for peace ignore the TB’s stance on this. It’s true peace may not come to #Afghanistan after the US leaves. But it'll def not come if we stay. 8/n
What abt #alQaeda & #ISIS in #Afghanistan? Yes, they’re still there & might expand after the US leaves (tho that’s debatable given better options elsewhere). But arguments that go from that to “attacks on the US homeland” make enormous leaps of logic & ignore relative risks. 9/n
For example, while the intel community may say “the risk to the homeland will go up,” what they won’t do is put that into broader context. How *much* will the risk go up? How does that risk compare to the risk of any of a hundred other threats to the average American? 10/n
The risk of an avg American being killed by #alQaeda/#ISIS today is negligibly low. Yes, some of that's due to US CT efforts overseas. But a lot is due to hardening the US homeland & monitoring terrorist threats. & some is due to preferences of terrorist groups themselves. 11/n
Yes, the risk of a terrorist attack might rise after we withdraw from #Afghanistan. But will it rise more than a negligible amount? Is the prevention of that rise worth billions of dollars and thousands of dead Afghans every year? The IC & pundits don't answer these Qs. 12/n
IMO, it’s not worth it. The cost-benefit analysis of US #counterterrorism activities has been out of whack for a long time. I know a lot of USG leaders know this—including many in #DOD—b/c they’ve told me so. A recalibration of our terrorism risk calculus is long overdue. 13/n
What about US credibility?? Many of the pundits & officials pressing for the US to stay argue that US credibility will take a hit for leaving #Afghanistan in defeat. Interestingly, many of these same people argued for the US to leave the Paris Agreement and/or the JCPOA. 14/n
I’m no diplomat. But for me, it seems like US credibility takes the biggest hit when we go back on things we’ve publicly agreed to do. The US signed an agreement in which it committed to withdraw from #Afghanistan. Seems the credibility argument would suggest honoring that. 15/n
Some are asking, “what about Afghans?” & Afghans are asking, “what about us?” These are reasonable Qs. But @JoeBiden isn't the pres of #Afghanistan. He’s the US pres. & while most Americans know nothing about what’s happening in AFG today, polls show those who do want out. 16/n
Many in his own party also want out. @JoeBiden can’t ignore those domestic politics. Especially when he’s trying to advance a domestic agenda that requires *every single vote* his party has in the Senate. 17/n
Now consider #Afghanistan in the broader context of US interests globally. US policy on AFG's a priority to those who focus on it. But the instant you adopt a global lens, AFG’s importance to the US ⬇️ & the opportunity costs of our presence there are staggeringly apparent. 18/n
The days of the US being able to throw its money & forces around the globe in unprioritized and astrategic ways are GONE. The US has to be more circumspect & smarter. IT HAS TO. Continuing to spend $20-30B/yr on #Afghanistan makes no strategic sense. None. 19/n
So, as the US president, who took office after an insurrection & amidst a pandemic, facing global challenges like belligerent Russia & China & climate change, w/terrorism farther down the risk list than before, & w/a withdrawal commitment: Did @JoeBiden really have a choice? 20/n
No, I don’t really think he did. Despite what your personal views are, the cold calculus of a serious policy review could only reach one conclusion: now’s the time to go. 21/n
Of course, what happens next will be critical for the future of #Afghanistan, and in some ways @JoeBiden will have more leeway to make the many follow-on decisions that will come. But deciding to leave was the only logical choice the US president had, all things considered. 22/22

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More from @JJSchroden

14 Apr
Some key points of @JoeBiden's speech on #Afghanistan withdrawal in this THREAD. 1/n

- Only Afghans have the right & responsibility to lead their country
- War & endless US mil force could not create or sustain a durable Afghan govt
- We brought bin Laden to justice 10 yrs ago…our reasons for staying in #Afghanistan have since become increasingly unclear 2/n
- Terrorism threat has metastasized around the globe…makes little sense to keep thousands of troops in one place
- We can’t keep deploying troops to #Afghanistan hoping for the right conditions for withdrawal & expecting a different result 3/n
Read 15 tweets
25 Feb
Lately I’ve had a bunch of people coming at me to say that I’m wrong about various things pertaining to #Afghanistan. So, a brief THREAD about being wrong. 1/n
I *wish* I was wrong about the things I write here & elsewhere about #Afghanistan. I *wish* the Afghan govt wasn’t a kleptocracy. I *wish* the #ANDSF weren’t failing operationally & institutionally. I *wish* the #Taliban weren’t ascendant. I *wish* the US was good at COIN. 2/n
I *wish* I didn’t have cause to write an op-ed with this title (warontherocks.com/2016/12/afghan…) & then to write this one 4 years later: lawfareblog.com/afghanistan-wi… 3/n
Read 9 tweets
25 Feb
Tonight, in my @ElliottSchoolGW class on military power & effectiveness, we discussed @RyanBaker51's excellent thesis on the relationship between logistics & military power. One of the interesting aspects he identifies is the notion of "log sufficiency." 1/n
An implication of which is: if you give more things (vehicles, etc.) to a log-*sufficient* force, it will make that force better. BUT, if you give more things to a log-*deficient* force, it'll make that force worse--b/c the force now has even more things that it can't sustain 2/n
An example of a log-*deficient* force is #Afghanistan's Army. As I discuss in this @CTCWP Sentinel paper (& as DOD has admitted for years in its assessments), the ANA (& #ANDSF broadly) cannot logistically maintain or sustain its forces independently. 3/n

ctc.usma.edu/afghanistans-s…
Read 5 tweets
19 Feb
I'm seeing lots of discussion on @BRRubin's argument in @WarOnTheRocks today for a 6-month extension to the US-#Taliban agreement & have gotten some Q's about it. Will tell you what I think in this THREAD. 1/n

warontherocks.com/2021/02/how-to…
First, I support @BRRubin's idea of trying to renegotiate the timeline of the US-#Taliban agreement. At a minimum, it's logically a middle path between leaving by 1 May (even when the TB haven't met their commitments) & unilaterally going past it (& risking the peace process) 2/n
Second, I agree w/@BRRubin that int'l legitimacy matters to the #Taliban & they care about sanctions relief, delisting, etc. So, there is leverage there as he suggests. The future of US aid to #Afghanistan is another TB concern & point of leverage (though extent is unknown). 3/n
Read 15 tweets
12 Feb
I have now seen several op-eds (including this one) argue that the US could “punish” the #Taliban for, or “deter” it from, violating its obligations in the US-TB Agreement via offshore kinetic means following a full US troop withdrawal. 1/n washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/biden-…
That suggestion is usually made in an off-hand way toward a paper’s end, like it’s a given it would work. But would it? If the #Taliban are willing to host members of #alQaeda w/US troops still in #Afghanistan, why would offshore threats change that? 2/n wsj.com/amp/articles/k…
And didn’t the Clinton admin already provide empirical demonstration that lobbing missiles from the Indian Ocean against terrorist training camps in #Afghanistan doesn’t accomplish much? This was a primary reason for the innovation of arming drones, as I understand it. 3/n
Read 5 tweets
11 Feb
I take issue w/the interpretation of things I’ve said in this article on #Afghanistan as “deferential to the #Taliban.” My view is *not* the one this article attributes to me: that the US has a one-sided obligation in the US-TB Agreement. 1/n brookings.edu/blog/order-fro…
Rather, I believe—as the author does—that the #Taliban have not met their commitments per the deal. But I also believe—as I tweeted earlier today—that the US will have difficulty showing this b/c the TB’s commitments aren’t objectively & publicly verifiable. 2/n
Which means that any attempt now to argue “conditions” with the #Taliban will be difficult & may result in the collapse of the peace process—something the US very much wants to avoid. 3/n
Read 4 tweets

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