Some key points of @JoeBiden's speech on #Afghanistan withdrawal in this THREAD. 1/n
- Only Afghans have the right & responsibility to lead their country
- War & endless US mil force could not create or sustain a durable Afghan govt
- We brought bin Laden to justice 10 yrs ago…our reasons for staying in #Afghanistan have since become increasingly unclear 2/n
- Terrorism threat has metastasized around the globe…makes little sense to keep thousands of troops in one place
- We can’t keep deploying troops to #Afghanistan hoping for the right conditions for withdrawal & expecting a different result 3/n
- He's the 4th President w/this responsibility, won't pass it on to a 5th
- It’s time for American troops to come home
- Inherited a commitment from the prior admin. Might not be what he would have negotiated, but it still means something. 4/n
- We’ll not conduct a hasty rush for the exit, but responsibly ICW our allies & partners
- If the #Taliban attack us as we withdraw, we’ll respond with all the tools at our disposal
- We will hold the TB accountable to its commitment to prevent attacks from #Afghanistan 5/n
- We will reorganize our CT capabilities to prevent the re-emergence of terrorism
- We will revise the US CT strategy to monitor and disrupt terrorist threats globally
- US service members have the thanks of a grateful nation. 6/n
- Our diplomatic and humanitarian support to #Afghanistan will continue, as will our support to the #ANDSF
- The #ANDSF will continue to fight valiantly on behalf of Afghans
- We will support peace talks facilitated by the @UN 7/n
- We will support the rights of women & girls by maintaining significant humanitarian & development assistance
- We will work with #Pakistan, #Russia, #China, #India & #Turkey who have interests in #Afghanistan 8/n
- We will work out what our residual diplomatic presence in #Afghanistan will look like in the months ahead
- Our diplomacy does not hinge on having boots on the ground—that argument is a recipe for indefinite presence in AFG 9/n
- Some argue that withdrawal will damage our credibility; the opposite is true.
- Rather than focus on the #Taliban, we have to focus on the global nature of terrorism, #China, alliances, democratic values, pandemics 10/n
- Need to fight the battles of the next 20 years, not those of the last 20 years
- No one wants to say we should be in #Afghanistan forever, but they say “now is not the right time to leave” 11/n
- In 2015, @NATO declared #ANDSF had the lead for security in #Afghanistan. That was 7 years ago. How many more years will it take? 12/n
- A conditions-based approach for #Afghanistan requires clear answers to: What conditions are required? What means would be required to achieve them? And at what costs of lives and treasure? Haven’t gotten any good answers to those questions—thus, we should not stay. 13/n
- He's the first President in 40 years who had a child in a war zone—saw that impact first-hand 14/n
- We were attacked, we went to war with clear goals, and those goals have been achieved—bin Laden is dead and #alQaeda is degraded in #Afghanistan
- It’s time to end the Forever War. 15/15
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I’ve been asked a number of times the past couple of days what I think of @JoeBiden’s announcement to withdraw all US troops from #Afghanistan by September. I haven’t had the time to write a proper op ed, so instead I’ll give you my thoughts in this THREAD. 1/n
My top-line take is this: What choice did @JoeBiden really have? If you examine his situation through the lenses of #Afghanistan, terrorism risk, credibility, domestic politics, & global US priorities, you’ll see the answer is “he had to do it.” 2/n
Let’s start w/#Afghanistan. Recognize first that the US isn’t in South Asia! We were always visiting, which means at some point, we would leave. Only Q has been when that would happen. That Q was answered in the US-#Taliban Agreement: We would leave by 1 May. 3/n
Lately I’ve had a bunch of people coming at me to say that I’m wrong about various things pertaining to #Afghanistan. So, a brief THREAD about being wrong. 1/n
I *wish* I was wrong about the things I write here & elsewhere about #Afghanistan. I *wish* the Afghan govt wasn’t a kleptocracy. I *wish* the #ANDSF weren’t failing operationally & institutionally. I *wish* the #Taliban weren’t ascendant. I *wish* the US was good at COIN. 2/n
Tonight, in my @ElliottSchoolGW class on military power & effectiveness, we discussed @RyanBaker51's excellent thesis on the relationship between logistics & military power. One of the interesting aspects he identifies is the notion of "log sufficiency." 1/n
An implication of which is: if you give more things (vehicles, etc.) to a log-*sufficient* force, it will make that force better. BUT, if you give more things to a log-*deficient* force, it'll make that force worse--b/c the force now has even more things that it can't sustain 2/n
An example of a log-*deficient* force is #Afghanistan's Army. As I discuss in this @CTCWP Sentinel paper (& as DOD has admitted for years in its assessments), the ANA (& #ANDSF broadly) cannot logistically maintain or sustain its forces independently. 3/n
I'm seeing lots of discussion on @BRRubin's argument in @WarOnTheRocks today for a 6-month extension to the US-#Taliban agreement & have gotten some Q's about it. Will tell you what I think in this THREAD. 1/n
First, I support @BRRubin's idea of trying to renegotiate the timeline of the US-#Taliban agreement. At a minimum, it's logically a middle path between leaving by 1 May (even when the TB haven't met their commitments) & unilaterally going past it (& risking the peace process) 2/n
Second, I agree w/@BRRubin that int'l legitimacy matters to the #Taliban & they care about sanctions relief, delisting, etc. So, there is leverage there as he suggests. The future of US aid to #Afghanistan is another TB concern & point of leverage (though extent is unknown). 3/n
I have now seen several op-eds (including this one) argue that the US could “punish” the #Taliban for, or “deter” it from, violating its obligations in the US-TB Agreement via offshore kinetic means following a full US troop withdrawal. 1/n washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/biden-…
That suggestion is usually made in an off-hand way toward a paper’s end, like it’s a given it would work. But would it? If the #Taliban are willing to host members of #alQaeda w/US troops still in #Afghanistan, why would offshore threats change that? 2/n wsj.com/amp/articles/k…
And didn’t the Clinton admin already provide empirical demonstration that lobbing missiles from the Indian Ocean against terrorist training camps in #Afghanistan doesn’t accomplish much? This was a primary reason for the innovation of arming drones, as I understand it. 3/n
I take issue w/the interpretation of things I’ve said in this article on #Afghanistan as “deferential to the #Taliban.” My view is *not* the one this article attributes to me: that the US has a one-sided obligation in the US-TB Agreement. 1/n brookings.edu/blog/order-fro…
Rather, I believe—as the author does—that the #Taliban have not met their commitments per the deal. But I also believe—as I tweeted earlier today—that the US will have difficulty showing this b/c the TB’s commitments aren’t objectively & publicly verifiable. 2/n
Which means that any attempt now to argue “conditions” with the #Taliban will be difficult & may result in the collapse of the peace process—something the US very much wants to avoid. 3/n