The debate contained within these tweets is a critical one: the question of to what extent the #Taliban will try to seize Kabul by force—as opposed to using force in support of a political track—is one I see many people grappling with here. 1/n
My view is that the #Taliban will press the mil front in 2022 but in a calibrated way—ie, they won’t “empty the madrassas” in a Tet style offensive, but will likely cont surrounding & pressuring provincial capitals. If the opportunity presents to seize 1/more, they’ll take it 2/n
But they know they can’t win militarily so long as the AAF/Commandos are in tact & the #ANDSF doesn’t fracture—neither of which are likely to happen so long as US security assistance $$ continues at scale. I assess it will until at least 2024. 3/n
I say that b/c @JoeBiden made the decision to leave early in his presidency & he won’t want to see #Afghanistan collapse during his term. There are also plenty of influential Congress members who support staying engaged in AFG for CT & human rights reasons. 4/n
The Moscow “Troika Plus” statement also made clear that no regional state wants to see a massive civil war or even outright #Taliban victory—not even #Pakistan wants those things. The int’l community is aligned on the necessity of a pol solution—of course, they vary on terms. 5/n
Finally, the #Taliban derive too much legitimacy & recognition from the Doha process & US-#Taliban agreement to abandon that path to push wholesale for mil victory or to risk int’l community isolation that would come from massive increases in violence. 6/n
All of which is to say, I expect 2022 to be more violent than this year, but not massively so. I believe the #Taliban will continue their “strangle the cities to generate leverage & extract concessions” approach that has frankly been working well for them so far. 7/n
Of course, battlefield developments (such as the collapse of the #ANDSF checkpoint structure around Kandahar this year) may prove to be too tempting to pass up, but on the whole I’d expect the #Taliban to continue w/a more calibrated use of force in 2021-22. 8/8
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Very excited to post this report by my team @CNA_org from a congressionally-mandated study led by @Pamela_Faber on whether DOD policies & activities adequately account for the roles of #women & #gender in #terrorist groups.
For the study, the team researched & ID'd the roles of women & gender in terrorist groups; assessed whether current DOD counterterrorism (CT) & countering violence extremism (CVE) strategy, policy, & activities incorporate gender considerations; ... 2/n
... and identified gaps, risks & opportunities for DOD in the areas of strategy/policy/doctrine, training & education, operations & programs, and conceptual understanding. 3/n
I’ve been asked a number of times the past couple of days what I think of @joebiden’s announcement to withdraw all US troops from #Afghanistan by September. I haven’t had the time to write a proper op ed, so instead I’ll give you my thoughts in this THREAD. 1/n
My top-line take is this: What choice did @joebiden really have? If you examine his situation through the lenses of #Afghanistan, terrorism risk, credibility, domestic politics, & global US priorities, you’ll see the answer is “he had to do it.” 2/n
Let’s start w/#Afghanistan. Recognize first that the US isn’t in South Asia! We were always visiting, which means at some point, we would leave. Only Q has been when that would happen. That Q was answered in the US-#Taliban Agreement: We would leave by 1 May. 3/n
Some key points of @JoeBiden's speech on #Afghanistan withdrawal in this THREAD. 1/n
- Only Afghans have the right & responsibility to lead their country
- War & endless US mil force could not create or sustain a durable Afghan govt
- We brought bin Laden to justice 10 yrs ago…our reasons for staying in #Afghanistan have since become increasingly unclear 2/n
- Terrorism threat has metastasized around the globe…makes little sense to keep thousands of troops in one place
- We can’t keep deploying troops to #Afghanistan hoping for the right conditions for withdrawal & expecting a different result 3/n
Lately I’ve had a bunch of people coming at me to say that I’m wrong about various things pertaining to #Afghanistan. So, a brief THREAD about being wrong. 1/n
I *wish* I was wrong about the things I write here & elsewhere about #Afghanistan. I *wish* the Afghan govt wasn’t a kleptocracy. I *wish* the #ANDSF weren’t failing operationally & institutionally. I *wish* the #Taliban weren’t ascendant. I *wish* the US was good at COIN. 2/n
Tonight, in my @ElliottSchoolGW class on military power & effectiveness, we discussed @RyanBaker51's excellent thesis on the relationship between logistics & military power. One of the interesting aspects he identifies is the notion of "log sufficiency." 1/n
An implication of which is: if you give more things (vehicles, etc.) to a log-*sufficient* force, it will make that force better. BUT, if you give more things to a log-*deficient* force, it'll make that force worse--b/c the force now has even more things that it can't sustain 2/n
An example of a log-*deficient* force is #Afghanistan's Army. As I discuss in this @CTCWP Sentinel paper (& as DOD has admitted for years in its assessments), the ANA (& #ANDSF broadly) cannot logistically maintain or sustain its forces independently. 3/n
I'm seeing lots of discussion on @BRRubin's argument in @WarOnTheRocks today for a 6-month extension to the US-#Taliban agreement & have gotten some Q's about it. Will tell you what I think in this THREAD. 1/n
First, I support @BRRubin's idea of trying to renegotiate the timeline of the US-#Taliban agreement. At a minimum, it's logically a middle path between leaving by 1 May (even when the TB haven't met their commitments) & unilaterally going past it (& risking the peace process) 2/n
Second, I agree w/@BRRubin that int'l legitimacy matters to the #Taliban & they care about sanctions relief, delisting, etc. So, there is leverage there as he suggests. The future of US aid to #Afghanistan is another TB concern & point of leverage (though extent is unknown). 3/n