1. Last night, #IS published a new statement from its spokesman Abu Hamza al-Qurashi in which, among other things, he lauded the recent exploits of #ISWAP—#IS’s West Africa Province—in #Nigeria, alluding to Abubakar #Shekau's group, #JAS, as "khawarij."
2. #Qurashi said #IS was “pleased to hear the news of the bay’a” of former #Shekau followers.
This wasn't rhetoric. In the last two weeks, #ISWAP has been claiming attacks in parts of Borno in which it was previously inactive, places in which #JAS had previously been dominant.
3. After its victory over #JAS in May, many #JAS fighters joined #ISWAP, which consolidated these gains and began launching attacks in former #JAS areas quicker than many had anticipated it would.
The first such attack took place on 13 June southeast of #Maiduguri, near #Bama.
4. In the #Bama attack, #ISWAP fighters (likely #JAS defectors) assaulted a local #NA base. The photo-report published after the attack featured adolescent fighters, with one image showing a teen posing in front of the burning barracks.
5. That attack was followed by a number of other #ISWAP assaults in former #JAS areas—in #Kwamdi (15 June), #Kumshe (19 June), #Konduga (20 June), and #Mayanti (21 June).
To reiterate, these were not areas in which #ISWAP was active prior to this month.
6. To be sure, not all of #JAS has defected. At least one group in #Chad|ian and #Niger|ien parts of Lake Chad continues to operate separately.
That said, in a video last week it appealed directly to #IS’s leadership to mediate between it, other #JAS elements, and #ISWAP.
7. At ExTrac, we are tracking these dynamics closely.
If you’d like to know more about our reporting, visit extrac.io or email info@extrac.io.
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1. Most #Afghanistan analysis of late has been preoccupied with the strategic inroads being made by the #Taliban.
Meanwhile, #IS’s affiliate in #Afghanistan, #ISKP, has been experiencing a dramatic resurgence in the country, one that has gone almost entirely under the radar.
2. Yesterday, #ISKP reported 3 attacks, killing and injuring 44. The day before, it claimed to have killed/injured 20.
(While devastating, these ops are small compared to the 4 biggest of 2020, in which more people were killed than all other attacks combined since Jan '20.)
3. While #ISKP’s attacks in 2021 have so far been of a smaller scale than the biggest ops of last year, they are increasingly being targeted at civilians.
This graph shows how, since Jan '21, #ISKP has been walking back its war on the #ANDSF and focusing more on non-combatants.
1. Last week, #Biden said #US troops would withdraw from #Afghanistan by 11 Sep. Critics say setting the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks as a deadline is a big propaganda win for the #Taliban.
Here's a thread exploring what the #Taliban has made of the announcement to date.
2. To do this, we tracked the impact of the (so far) one and only statement the #Taliban has made on the matter, in which it welcomes #Biden’s confirmation that the #US will pull out but condemns the fact that it is happening 6 months later than was agreed under #Trump.
3. True to form, the #Taliban published its response in five languages—Arabic, Dari, English, Pashto, and Urdu—with all versions emerging on 15 Apr. We plugged each of them into ExTrac’s social listening system to see how much of a splash they made in the subsequent seven days.