THREAD 1/13 Just as Russia seemed to be poised to invade Ukraine, protests broke out all over #Kazakhstan, so the Kremlin needs to divide attention between the two and manage strategic instability on two fronts.
2/13 Looks like Ukraine and NATO are no longer the only main focus of the future Russia-US talks, there is a new hot-button issue for negotiations with Biden, plus it’s harder for Putin to make a concerted effort on his key diplomatic front.
3/13 3/ If you have great power ambitions, please show what you can do on several fronts. Many others failed to that. Kazakhstan will test Russia’s actual capabilities. It will be both distracting and sobering.
4/13 4/ Watched news from Kazakhstan. So far, the country’s authorities haven’t blamed the West for the protests, as would certainly be the case in Russia or Belarus. Rather, president #Tokayev put the blame on their own government, as they might do, say, in Europe.
5/13 Kazakhstan has always tried to stay above the fray between Russia and the West. It sought to be friends with both the West and Russia (and China), as well as others – not just exploit their differences, as the Belarusian regime did.
6/13 But as soon as the dawn broke in Russia, semi-official speakers and state-run media taking their place immediately blamed the West for escalating the situation, fomenting revolution, rehashing the Belarusian scenario, attacking Russia from the other flank etc
7/13 The true official speakers – the Kremlin and the Foreign Ministry – are quiet for now. But if they echo these sentiments, Kazakhstan will have to think about how to respond to the narrative of their closest ally and the second largest neighbor.
8/13 Western politicians will also have to do some thinking. Kazakhstan is neither a Western democracy, nor the West’s closest ally. So Western media and spokespeople won’t play soft ball here and frame it as a universal narrative of popular democratic revolution against tyranny.
9/13 After the media do that, Western politicians will have to join in support for the protests, and Kazakhstan will need to respond. Therefore, the protests, which Moscow adversaries are so happy about, might in fact bring Kazakhstan closer to Moscow.
10/13 Despite some discontent among the Kazakh public and elites, Kazakhstan won’t be choosing between Moscow and democratic Europe. Kyrgyzstan’s case supports this notion – it stayed mainly true to its foreign policy despite three regime changes.
11/13 The West has another reason to be cautious on Kazakhstan. While Russia mines and exports its natural resources on its own, Kazakhstan does so as joint ventures with Western company. They mostly deal with oil, which has the cooking gas as its byproduct .
12/13 Global price increases on oil and natural gas might’ve prompted the government and its business partners to hike the prices of cooking gas, which are perhaps the cheapest in the world. And as often happens, the government overestimated people’s tolerance.
13/13 Kazakh events make Kazakhstan power transit scenario virtually impossible for Russia. Now Putin will hardly be inclined to leave his position to a successor and watch over him as a head of National Security Council or some other government body.
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1/7 The Russian authorities do acknowledge some victims of past repression… The real issue is the rivalry over memory, which the Kremlin would like to monopolize.
My piece about trial of the Memorial foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/20/rus…
2/7 Memorial’s problem is not that commemorating these crimes is taboo, but that it is competing with the Kremlin in an area of history that the Kremlin considers its own. Even Putin has written several articles about this part of Soviet history. bit.ly/33NhzOu
3/7 And while Memorial exposes the perpetrators, today’s Russian state prefers silence, lest ordinary people think the Soviet security services’ successor agencies are capable of similar injustices. bit.ly/33NhzOu
THREAD 1/15 #Russia’s Foreign Ministry has taken the unusual step of publicly releasing a draft treaty it has sent to #Washington outlining its demands for deescalating tensions, including over Ukraine. The ministry says it wants to begin negotiations without delay.
2/15 The agreement outlines the concessions to be made by Washington, but does not indicate what concessions Russia is prepared to make. Yet the difference between diplomacy and a military victory is that in diplomacy, everyone makes concessions.
3/15 With rare exceptions, diplomacy is not a rushed affair. If tight deadlines are issued, it means one side wants to take action; if tough conditions are laid down — even more so. Or it means that one side is certain that the other has no other options.
1/16 THREAD: The goal of #Putin at today’s virtual summit with #Biden on #Ukraine is to transfer responsibility for implementing the Minsk agreements from the Europeans and Ukraine to the US.
2/16 To make Biden accept this responsibility, military drills are taking place close to Ukraine’s borders, and Russian troops are massing there enough to launch an offensive. The signal is clear: if the Minsk agreements aren’t being implemented, the alternative is military force
3/16 Peskov’s comments that the Normandy format for talks (Ukraine, Russia, France & Germany) is sufficient & doesn’t require a US presence actually mean Moscow doesn’t see the need for Europe in any serious conversation on Ukraine, & would like to deal directly with Washington.
THREAD 1/12 Fluctuations in the election results are down to Russia being a federation: you get different pictures by looking at the Far East, Siberia & the Urals, European Russia, & the south. Still, even allowing for manipulation of the results, some broad trends are visible.
2/12 Overall, the system is in defensive mode. Putin’s position is that Russia needs some decades of calm, and then there can be change. Russia is defending its sovereignty, and the current system of four patriotic parties has proven reliable.
3/12 The loss of one of those parties, or its replacement by another, untested one would put stress on the system. So any innovation must be made within the current system.
1/10 n fact, the agreement, which at first glance appears to be to Russia’s advantage, is—in its own way—beneficial to all parties. My take of the #NordStream-2 deal carnegie.ru/commentary/850…
2/10 Given Germany’s determination to get the pipeline completed, and Russia’s ability to do so, the agreement has given Russia the chance to do just that without coming under additional pressure, while allowing Germany to do it with the U.S. blessing rather than going against it
3/10 The Biden administration, faced with a done deal, managed at the last minute not to be left standing on the sidelines, but to step up as a friend to some of its allies and a guarantor of the interests of others bit.ly/2VjXuec
1/8 When Russian President Vladimir Putin attended the summit with U.S. President Joe Biden in Geneva this week, he was representing a new Russia. My take of the Geneva summit in a broader context carnegie.ru/commentary/848…
2/8 The new Russia is no longer developing by building Western institutions. Russia will no longer be evaluated according to external criteria. This is why plans for the summit had no impact on the regime’s treatment of the opposition or independent media bit.ly/3q56gs1
3/8 All of Biden’s attempts to shame Putin for the tribulations of Russian opposition were stonewalled with a lack of understanding and counter-accusations. For Putin, there is no longer a system of coordinates in which those reproaches carry any weight.bit.ly/3q56gs1