The possibility of a #parallel govt — capable of rallying several presidential candidates & other anti-Dabaiba forces — has been pre-announced by #Aqila for months.
Such an entity may indeed emerge now.
Beyond symbolism & posturing, will it affect the current reality?
Militarily, bcos Dabaiba has secured the mobilization of Mahjub, Halbus, & al-Jahawi, Bashagha won’t be in a position to contribute much in Misrata, Tajura, or Tripoli itself.
For the #parallel govt to create pain for Dabaiba, it’ll have to consider being in cahoots w/ the #SSA.
In the eventuality above, a new #parallel govt may pull off truly bothersome disruptions in the greater #Tripoli area, but Dabaiba will not be removed from power by force in the foreseeable future.
No can do.
The Turkish-backed setup now protecting the PM is just too formidable
But one question worth asking is:
To which extent would a new #parallel govt be an actual govt, w/ actual ministries & all.
In other words, how will such entity #fund the creation of new offices & form new kernels of power & effectual decision-making that don’t already exist?
The 2 staunchest foreign backers of #Aqila’s — #Egypt & #Russia — are notoriously stingy. Neither is in the business of giving even a penny to anybody.
One possibly however (as I wrote a year ago) is: Moscow could resume injecting Goznak-printed dinars…
Even assuming the above, a new #parallel govt instigated by Aqila, Haftar, Bashagha & al. will have a hard time exerting an actual effect on #Libya’s existing system of power.
e.g., It won’t be easy for the new ministries to matter in real life as formal, functional bodies.
The #CBL now has Cyrenaica-focused #commercial banks on a leash.
Kabir is not only closely allied w/ Dabaiba but also, a bitter enmity exists btwn him & Bashagha.
Lastly, the GNU’s never stopped paying most #LNA staffers’ wages. So Haftar stands to lose if he’s too aggressive.
Morality:
If Aqila & other anti-Dabaiba forces come together & announce a #parallel govt (a distinct prospect), the new cabinet will be unlikely to remove Dabaiba from power & the UN will stick w/ the GNU
The parallel govt’s sole purpose will consist in being a pain for Dabaiba
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1 must go back to May-Oct 2018, when both #UN & #US began exerting a pressure on the #CBL in #Tripoli.
At the time, an #LNA attack on the capital wasn't seen as imminent, nor was a #Hibri-#Kabir reunification considered a hot priority
Following #Haftar's Jun '18 #OilCresc blockade, #US (thru the #UN) helped #CBL devise a measure, which was implemented after the Aug-Sep '18 LoC battle in Tripoli.
An LoC #tax now made the de-facto conversion rate 3.9 dinars to 1 $.
$10k packages were introduced for households.
The #US-designed measure—rolled out by #Kabir in Oct ’18—was effectively a devaluation of the dinar w/ the added benefit of attracting banknotes back into the system.
The measure turned out to be a success.
It also reduced the amount of political controversy surrounding #Kabir
Long before #Ankara began sending #Syrian Turkmen fighters in Dec to help the #GNA, the number of gung-ho fighters willing to go risk their lives on behalf of the #LNA in W #Libya was insufficient.
That is an important reality even if pro-#LNA voices are loathe to acknowledge it
That’s why the #LNA has used #Sudanese mercs throughout 2019. On LNA side, Sudanese mercs have been basically part of the furniture, eliciting little comment.
Above issue is also the reason why the arrival of a few hundred #Russian fighters near #Tripoli in Sep had a big effect.