Thread by @JMJalel_H

[ Thread: Internationalized #manpower in the war for #Tripoli ]

Long before #Ankara began sending #Syrian Turkmen fighters in Dec to help the #GNA, the number of gung-ho fighters willing to go risk their lives on behalf of the #LNA in W #Libya was insufficient.

That is an important reality even if pro-#LNA voices are loathe to acknowledge it

That’s why the #LNA has used #Sudanese mercs throughout 2019. On LNA side, Sudanese mercs have been basically part of the furniture, eliciting little comment.

Above issue is also the reason why the arrival of a few hundred #Russian fighters near #Tripoli in Sep had a big effect.

Prior to December, the #GNA side, too, has made use of foreign mercenaries, including #Chadian.

Yet, until late 2019, the number of foreign combattants was undoubtedly much larger on the #LNA’s side than on the #GNA’s side.

That changed after #Turkey’s Nov 27th MoUs got signed

Right now, the number of #Syrian anti-Assad combattants from the Afrin-Aleppo area on #Libyan soil exceeds 3,000 and, likely, will soon reach 6,000.

The entity responsible for recruiting them, transporting them, equipping them & making sure they are paid is the #Turkish state.

#Erdogan announcing his new, overt military intervention in Dec had two notable effects:

• starting in the first days of Jan, the #Russian fighters in the #Tripoli area became more passive (w/out disappearing);

• the #Emiratis—aware that #Turkey is an obstacle—became angry…

From an #Emirati perspective, translating the aforementioned anger into dramatically larger deliveries of hardware wasn’t a problem. All Western nations are committed to staying silent; and money is an object.

But #manpower—owing to various issues—is a genuine, hard issue indeed

Bcos it has no intention of ever renouncing #Tripoli or letting #Ankara prevail, #AbuDhabi has—over the last ~8 wks—used every possible avenue to send more foreign fighters into #LNA’s side.

In that context, a fresh wave of Egyptian fighters is very likely to have entered #Libya

But an interesting question to ask at this juncture has to do w/ potentially more exotic / less expected sources of fighters than #Egypt.

Recent flights from #Jedda to #Barqa suggest personnel from the #Yemeni theatre may have been introduced: #Yemeni or/& #LatinAmerican mercs.

Now the inescapable question: Is it possible the #UAE may have brought several hundred #Syrian pro-Assad fighters to #Tripolitania.

Yes, it’s a possibility.

#UAE‘s been in dialog w/ #Damascus for a while, & common hatred for #Turkey & political #Islam is enough to yield a deal.

The exotic origins above—& more—do exist as possibilities in the current #Libyan reality… & must be accepted as such.

They comport w/ the flight itineraries seen in open source + tentative, inconclusive clues that began circulating.

The next several weeks may shed more light…