Further clashes are bound to unfold soon in #Tripolitania.

Because:

• some #local rivalries have become too tense.

• #macro fault lines have shifted too far away from #Libya’s Jun 2020 equilibrium, which so many policymakers & watchers take for granted;

[ see 🧵 thread👇🏻] One must, right off the bat, acknowledge the outsized importance of #Zawiyah actors in today’s NW Libya configuration.

The most zealous pro-Dabaiba fighters on 5/17 in #Tripoli were led by #Bahrun.

& the #Buzeriba forces (who didn’t fight on 5/17) are ferociously anti-Dabaiba.

[ thread🧵]

Is a protracted #stalemate burgeoning in Libya?

PM #Bashagha took his oath in Tobruk a month ago—& he still hasn’t swept into office or begun governing.

He himself told the media about the physical act of #entering Tripoli “w/in days”, but that hasn’t happened yet. Bashagha & his ministers entering Tripoli soon is w/in the realm of the possible.

But the thing is, That won’t necessarily be enough to discard Dabaiba.

I.e., entering Tripoli won’t necessarily put an end to the current crisis.

A slew of profound issues are still outstanding.

The war in #Ukraine will bring a sea change in the #Libyan crisis

#JeuneAfrique kindly included a few of my thoughts on why observers really ought to brace for substantial side effects, not just minor ones.

[ thread on the #Russia facet of the #Libya reality c. 2022 ]

https://twitter.com/jeune_afrique/status/1500886979944275969

Since the Feb. 24 launch of the invasion of Ukraine, apart from lots of unfounded speculation, there’s been not a shred of evidence to suggest any number of #Russian fighters have left Libya.

In fact, over the last several months, the number of Russians in #Brak has increased.

[thread]

The possibility of a #parallel govt — capable of rallying several presidential candidates & other anti-Dabaiba forces — has been pre-announced by #Aqila for months.

Such an entity may indeed emerge now.

Beyond symbolism & posturing, will it affect the current reality? Militarily, bcos Dabaiba has secured the mobilization of Mahjub, Halbus, & al-Jahawi, Bashagha won’t be in a position to contribute much in Misrata, Tajura, or Tripoli itself.

For the #parallel govt to create pain for Dabaiba, it’ll have to consider being in cahoots w/ the #SSA.

Deciphering the #Serraj vs #Kabir squabble.

1 must go back to May-Oct 2018, when both #UN & #US began exerting a pressure on the #CBL in #Tripoli.

At the time, an #LNA attack on the capital wasn't seen as imminent, nor was a #Hibri-#Kabir reunification considered a hot priority Following #Haftar's Jun '18 #OilCresc blockade, #US (thru the #UN) helped #CBL devise a measure, which was implemented after the Aug-Sep '18 LoC battle in Tripoli.

An LoC #tax now made the de-facto conversion rate 3.9 dinars to 1 $.

$10k packages were introduced for households.

[ Thread: Internationalized #manpower in the war for #Tripoli ] Long before #Ankara began sending #Syrian Turkmen fighters in Dec to help the #GNA, the number of gung-ho fighters willing to go risk their lives on behalf of the #LNA in W #Libya was insufficient.

That is an important reality even if pro-#LNA voices are loathe to acknowledge it