🚨 𝑵𝒆𝒘 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅: The situation in Tripoli keeps deteriorating rapidly. PM Dabaiba’s forces keep mobilizing for an imminent attack on Radaa in several sites across eastern and southeastern Tripoli, including the Mitiga complex itself. And the Haftar family is sending forces to Sirte & Shwayref. Voices from both the GNU side and the Radaa side acknowledge war could start any day now. Military convoys from Misrata have been streaming into the capital: these aren’t peacekeepers; they’re reinforcements for Dabaiba’s forthcoming offensive.

When fighting erupts, expect 3-4 distinct frontlines to form across the greater Tripoli area, likely inaugurating a sticky urban war.

1/ 𝑻𝒉𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅: War is coming to Tripoli because, diplomatically, the walls have been closing in on Tripoli PM Dabaiba.

Following Hanna Tetteh’s Aug 21 speech, international pressure has been building that could spell the end of his rule — *unless* the Dabaiba family uses the only space it has left: the realm of physical violence.

Here’s what’s happening: 🧵 2/ This month, the UN has introduced delicate semantics, calling for “a new, unified government” in Tripoli. While “unified” could mean just a mere reshuffle, the epithet “NEW” implies Dabaiba needs to go.

Several foreign states have seized on that phrasing. The main one is Turkey.

Further clashes are bound to unfold soon in #Tripolitania.

Because:

• some #local rivalries have become too tense.

• #macro fault lines have shifted too far away from #Libya’s Jun 2020 equilibrium, which so many policymakers & watchers take for granted;

[ see 🧵 thread👇🏻] One must, right off the bat, acknowledge the outsized importance of #Zawiyah actors in today’s NW Libya configuration.

The most zealous pro-Dabaiba fighters on 5/17 in #Tripoli were led by #Bahrun.

& the #Buzeriba forces (who didn’t fight on 5/17) are ferociously anti-Dabaiba.

[ thread 🧵 on the NOC’s LFB account ]

In late May 2019, Belqacem Haftar visited DC in a bid to secure U.S. assistance in setting up a mechanism meant to deposit $$$ proceeds from #oil exports into a special account in lieu of sending them straight to the CBL in Tripoli. The next year, in the summer of 2020, the US & the UN endorsed the idea of preventing oil $$$ proceeds from being funneled directly & systematically to the CBL in Tripoli.

But the rationale now promoted was not the one advocated by Haftar & his associates.

[ thread🧵]

Is a protracted #stalemate burgeoning in Libya?

PM #Bashagha took his oath in Tobruk a month ago—& he still hasn’t swept into office or begun governing.

He himself told the media about the physical act of #entering Tripoli “w/in days”, but that hasn’t happened yet. Bashagha & his ministers entering Tripoli soon is w/in the realm of the possible.

But the thing is, That won’t necessarily be enough to discard Dabaiba.

I.e., entering Tripoli won’t necessarily put an end to the current crisis.

A slew of profound issues are still outstanding.

The war in #Ukraine will bring a sea change in the #Libyan crisis

#JeuneAfrique kindly included a few of my thoughts on why observers really ought to brace for substantial side effects, not just minor ones.

[ thread on the #Russia facet of the #Libya reality c. 2022 ]

https://twitter.com/jeune_afrique/status/1500886979944275969

Since the Feb. 24 launch of the invasion of Ukraine, apart from lots of unfounded speculation, there’s been not a shred of evidence to suggest any number of #Russian fighters have left Libya.

In fact, over the last several months, the number of Russians in #Brak has increased.

As armed groups block the Radisson to stop the HCS from gathering, it’s a good time to wonder about the rationale of Khaled al-#Meshri this year.

W/out even holding a proper HCS vote, #Meshri gave Aqila the HCS’s blessing — ie a consequential endorsement of Bashagha.

[ thread ] This year, #Meshri & Mohammed Sowan have been 100% behind Bashagha.

The latter’s connection to the #Ikhwan, of course, has been long-standing but Feb 2021’s events do help understand the present better.

A year ago—in Geneva—the Bashagha-Saleh ticket was backed by Meshri & Sowan

[thread]

The possibility of a #parallel govt — capable of rallying several presidential candidates & other anti-Dabaiba forces — has been pre-announced by #Aqila for months.

Such an entity may indeed emerge now.

Beyond symbolism & posturing, will it affect the current reality? Militarily, bcos Dabaiba has secured the mobilization of Mahjub, Halbus, & al-Jahawi, Bashagha won’t be in a position to contribute much in Misrata, Tajura, or Tripoli itself.

For the #parallel govt to create pain for Dabaiba, it’ll have to consider being in cahoots w/ the #SSA.

[ Thread on #Libya wage bill ]

One paradox this year in #Libya has been the fact that the #CentralBankOfLibya has handed #Haftar & others in the #East some very substantial gifts over recent weeks—all in the form of salaries.

Most of it is counterintuitive, so let me parse it. As of 2010, less than 1 million public servants in #Libya were on state payroll.

By 2014, that statistic had exceeded 1.8mm. All of this was before the Karama-vs.-Fajr civil war.

A watershed moment was the autumn 2014 emergence of a parallel govt in #Barqa. More would be hired.

Deciphering the #Serraj vs #Kabir squabble.

1 must go back to May-Oct 2018, when both #UN & #US began exerting a pressure on the #CBL in #Tripoli.

At the time, an #LNA attack on the capital wasn't seen as imminent, nor was a #Hibri-#Kabir reunification considered a hot priority Following #Haftar's Jun '18 #OilCresc blockade, #US (thru the #UN) helped #CBL devise a measure, which was implemented after the Aug-Sep '18 LoC battle in Tripoli.

An LoC #tax now made the de-facto conversion rate 3.9 dinars to 1 $.

$10k packages were introduced for households.

[ Thread: Internationalized #manpower in the war for #Tripoli ] Long before #Ankara began sending #Syrian Turkmen fighters in Dec to help the #GNA, the number of gung-ho fighters willing to go risk their lives on behalf of the #LNA in W #Libya was insufficient.

That is an important reality even if pro-#LNA voices are loathe to acknowledge it