• #macro fault lines have shifted too far away from #Libya’s Jun 2020 equilibrium, which so many policymakers & watchers take for granted;
[ see 🧵 thread👇🏻]
One must, right off the bat, acknowledge the outsized importance of #Zawiyah actors in today’s NW Libya configuration.
The most zealous pro-Dabaiba fighters on 5/17 in #Tripoli were led by #Bahrun.
& the #Buzeriba forces (who didn’t fight on 5/17) are ferociously anti-Dabaiba.
Apr 17, 2022 • 13 tweets • 7 min read
[ thread 🧵 on the NOC’s LFB account ]
In late May 2019, Belqacem Haftar visited DC in a bid to secure U.S. assistance in setting up a mechanism meant to deposit $$$ proceeds from #oil exports into a special account in lieu of sending them straight to the CBL in Tripoli.
The next year, in the summer of 2020, the US & the UN endorsed the idea of preventing oil $$$ proceeds from being funneled directly & systematically to the CBL in Tripoli.
But the rationale now promoted was not the one advocated by Haftar & his associates.
PM #Bashagha took his oath in Tobruk a month ago—& he still hasn’t swept into office or begun governing.
He himself told the media about the physical act of #entering Tripoli “w/in days”, but that hasn’t happened yet.
Bashagha & his ministers entering Tripoli soon is w/in the realm of the possible.
But the thing is, That won’t necessarily be enough to discard Dabaiba.
I.e., entering Tripoli won’t necessarily put an end to the current crisis.
A slew of profound issues are still outstanding.
Mar 8, 2022 • 13 tweets • 8 min read
The war in #Ukraine will bring a sea change in the #Libyan crisis
#JeuneAfrique kindly included a few of my thoughts on why observers really ought to brace for substantial side effects, not just minor ones.
[ thread on the #Russia facet of the #Libya reality c. 2022 ]
Since the Feb. 24 launch of the invasion of Ukraine, apart from lots of unfounded speculation, there’s been not a shred of evidence to suggest any number of #Russian fighters have left Libya.
In fact, over the last several months, the number of Russians in #Brak has increased.
Feb 12, 2022 • 5 tweets • 4 min read
As armed groups block the Radisson to stop the HCS from gathering, it’s a good time to wonder about the rationale of Khaled al-#Meshri this year.
W/out even holding a proper HCS vote, #Meshri gave Aqila the HCS’s blessing — ie a consequential endorsement of Bashagha.
[ thread ]
This year, #Meshri & Mohammed Sowan have been 100% behind Bashagha.
The latter’s connection to the #Ikhwan, of course, has been long-standing but Feb 2021’s events do help understand the present better.
A year ago—in Geneva—the Bashagha-Saleh ticket was backed by Meshri & Sowan
Feb 1, 2022 • 8 tweets • 5 min read
[thread]
The possibility of a #parallel govt — capable of rallying several presidential candidates & other anti-Dabaiba forces — has been pre-announced by #Aqila for months.
Such an entity may indeed emerge now.
Beyond symbolism & posturing, will it affect the current reality?
Militarily, bcos Dabaiba has secured the mobilization of Mahjub, Halbus, & al-Jahawi, Bashagha won’t be in a position to contribute much in Misrata, Tajura, or Tripoli itself.
For the #parallel govt to create pain for Dabaiba, it’ll have to consider being in cahoots w/ the #SSA.
Aug 8, 2021 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
[ Thread on #Libya wage bill ]
One paradox this year in #Libya has been the fact that the #CentralBankOfLibya has handed #Haftar & others in the #East some very substantial gifts over recent weeks—all in the form of salaries.
Most of it is counterintuitive, so let me parse it.
As of 2010, less than 1 million public servants in #Libya were on state payroll.
By 2014, that statistic had exceeded 1.8mm. All of this was before the Karama-vs.-Fajr civil war.
A watershed moment was the autumn 2014 emergence of a parallel govt in #Barqa. More would be hired.
1 must go back to May-Oct 2018, when both #UN & #US began exerting a pressure on the #CBL in #Tripoli.
At the time, an #LNA attack on the capital wasn't seen as imminent, nor was a #Hibri-#Kabir reunification considered a hot priority
Following #Haftar's Jun '18 #OilCresc blockade, #US (thru the #UN) helped #CBL devise a measure, which was implemented after the Aug-Sep '18 LoC battle in Tripoli.
An LoC #tax now made the de-facto conversion rate 3.9 dinars to 1 $.
$10k packages were introduced for households.
Feb 12, 2020 • 11 tweets • 11 min read
[ Thread: Internationalized #manpower in the war for #Tripoli ]
Long before #Ankara began sending #Syrian Turkmen fighters in Dec to help the #GNA, the number of gung-ho fighters willing to go risk their lives on behalf of the #LNA in W #Libya was insufficient.
That is an important reality even if pro-#LNA voices are loathe to acknowledge it
