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Feb 5 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
"Alexander Graef forscht am @IFSHHamburg. Er sagt: "Mit dem #Manöver, welches ausgerechnet in dieser kritischen Phase und in diesem Umfang in #Belarus stattfindet, wird die #Eskalationsstufe noch einmal erhöht." 1/4
mdr.de/nachrichten/we…
2/4 "Letztlich ist es ein weiterer strategischer Puzzlestein, der aber wegen der Anzahl an Waffensystemen und der Verlegung von Truppen aus dem Fernen Osten #Russlands von großer Bedeutung ist."
3/4 "Die Schwierigkeit für Russland ergibt sich derzeit weniger im militärischen Bereich, denn das Land ist der #Ukraine in diesem Sinne klar überlegen", so Graef. "Doch das politische Ziel ist es nicht, wahllos Gebiete zu erobern, ...
4/4 ... denn eine Invasion würde enorme – auch politische und menschliche Kosten – verursachen. Aus Sicht Moskaus ist die Frage vielmehr: Inwieweit kann man die militärische Übermacht in politische Gewinne ummünzen."

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More from @alxgraef

Alexander Graef Profile picture
Feb 6
Much noise about this letter by Gen. Leonid Ivashov & the 'All-Russian officers assembly', calling for Putin's resignation. Yet, when the group was formed in 2003 they already demanded Putin's resignation, supported by communist leader Gennady Zyuganov. 1/ ooc.su/news/obrashhen…
2/ In 2008 they even decided to organize a military tribunal against his "destructive" behavior. In 2011 the tribunal found Putin unfit for public office, this time supported publicly by Communist Duma deputy Viktor Ilyukhin, who has been known as the "red prosecutor".
3/ The OOC is not a large group. In fact, there is no official membership list. OOC "members" are either part of the OOC Council, about 30 people, or belong to those, who registered at irregular (annual) meetings. OOC itself has no information who these people are prior to 2018.
Read 7 tweets
Alexander Graef Profile picture
Feb 1
#Russia wants a commitment to the "#indivisibility of security" concept but its meaning has shifted over time. In fact, the #West introduced it during the #CSCE negotiations 1972-1975 in order to establish a linkage between human (non-military) & politico-military security 1/11🧵
2/ At the time, the Soviet Union/WVO stressed the politico-military dimension but the West/Neutrals wanted both concepts to be treated as parts of #comprehensive security. Respect for #humanrights was to apply also within the Eastern Bloc in order to change the status quo.
3/ However, the term #indivisibility was only mentioned in the Preamble of the 1975 Final Act, where it was reduced to a vague notion of general common interests. After 1975 the debate over indivisibility focused on the indiscriminate implementation of human rights principles.
Read 11 tweets
Alexander Graef Profile picture
Jan 31
The #EU has been sidelined in this crisis by design. Military security dialogue with #Russia remains outsourced to #NATO/#OSCE or takes place bilaterally. How could the EU contribute to managing military security beyond #deterrence? Some ideas 1/6
feps-europe.eu/component/atta…
2/6 The EU should establish a permanent expert dialogue with 🇷🇺on military security issues. Existing bilateral formats (Germany, France, Netherlands etc.) risk undermining unity. Possible starting point: Mil-to-mil dialogue between @ChairmanEUMC and the Chief of the Russian GS.
3/6 The EU should invest in independent capabilities for monitoring, analysing and reducing military escalation risks. A European Centre for Crisis Prevention and Risk Reduction would recognise the need for more co-ordination and data sharing.
Read 6 tweets
Alexander Graef Profile picture
Jan 8
We don’t need #Yalta 2.0 or #Helsinki 2.0 in #Europe now. We need #Stockholm 2.0: The Conference on Confidence- and Security-building measures and Disarmament in Europe 1984-1986. Crucial at the time, largely forgotten today. A thread. 1/14
2/For context: Before Stockholm East-West relations had hit rock bottom. In 1976, the SU started to deploy SS-20. In 1979, it invaded Afghanistan & NATO took its double track decision. In Sep 1983 the SU shot down Korean aircraft 747. In Dec 1983 Pershing II arrived in Europe.
3/In response the SU walked out of the ongoing bilateral talks with the US on INF missiles in Geneva and stopped negotiating conventional arms control (MBFR) with NATO in Vienna. But at the same time Moscow agreed to talks in Stockholm. The conference opened in Jan 1984.
Read 14 tweets
Alexander Graef Profile picture
Dec 17, 2021
#Russian Foreign Ministry has published its proposals on security guarantees as submitted to the US and #NATO: "Agreement on measures to ensure the security of the Russian Federation and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization", 9 articles mid.ru/ru/foreign_pol… 1/x
2/ "Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees", 8 articles, mid.ru/ru/foreign_pol…
3/ Excellent thread by @walberque below although I disagree with the overall conclusion: The NATO-Russia agreement proposal goes way beyond the 2009 European Security Treaty in at least three main respects:
Read 6 tweets
Alexander Graef Profile picture
Dec 10, 2021
Russian MFA publishes a list of demands the West must meet to defuse tensions & ensure Russian security: It wants legal guarantees from NATO not to expand to the East and a formal renouncement of the 2008 Bucharest summit decision on Georgia & Ukraine 1/x mid.ru/foreign_policy…
2/It also wants NATO members to legally guarantee that they will not deploy weapons (strike-systems, probably long-range) that pose a threat to Russia on the territory of neighboring countries, regardless of whether they are NATO members or not.
3/In seeks reactions by NATO on previous proposals to reduce tensions by limiting military exercises in the border zone, clarifying safety distances for warships in the Baltic and Black Sea, and the return to direct mil-to-mil dialogue, Russia-NATO, US-NATO.
Read 15 tweets

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