Thread by @alxgraef

If Putin wants regime change, this could mean to kill, detain or push the Ukrainian leadership into exile. A point of no return. Alternative is to force them into signing agreements on demilitarization and neutralization. Little reason to assume that this will not happen. 1/9

2/9 Putin wins short-term but it gets all much more complicated afterwards. Whether brute force or coercive diplomacy, fundamental policy and/or regime change will need to be acceptable to the Ukrainian population if it shall be sustainable long-term. This is highly unlikely.

3/9 To be sure, Putin may be able to turn Ukraine into a political rump state for some time, leading to apathetic behavior, but the costs of stabilizing this situation will be immense & growing. Without constant pressure, the country could be sliding into partisan war over time.

4/9 The longer this process endures, the more Russian people will become alienated from the political leadership at home. This will not immediately lead to instability and crisis but long-term this generational frustration will add to existing structural problems.

5/9 Consider Prague 1968. The Warsaw Treaty Organization succeeded militarily. But for an entire generation of Soviet intellectuals, 1968 marked the watershed. They did not become dissidents but many turned tacitly anti-Soviet or decided to work towards improving “the system”.

6/9 When Gorbachev initiated political reforms, these people became his advisors and followers. Some had one thing in common, working in Prague – at the Journal “Problems of Peace and Socialism”: Ambarzumov, Arbatov, Chernyaev, Shakhnazarov, Zagladin and others.

7/9 The younger generation was more critical, anti-socialist but ambitious, working with Gorbachev or Yeltsin. People born primarily in the 1950s – the generation that built modern Russia. Some are still active in politics: Viatcheslav Nikonov, for example, or, Aleksey Pushkov.

8/9 The Russian political system, however, differs greatly from the Soviet Union. In short, it lacks the party or any institutionalized structure on top of the personalist relationships that count. This is quite typical for post-Soviet Eurasia, but makes it more fragile.

9/9 This is not to say that history repeats itself. The war might be unpopular in Russia but many of Putin's opponents are neither liberal nor democrats. People like Gen. Ivashov – the unlikely “hero” – who believe him to be either too anti-Soviet or not nationalist enough.