Commodity markets are reacting to uncertainty in agricultural supply by sending futures through the roof. Will the #UkraineRussiaWar be a challenge to #FoodSecurity in the short to medium term? The short answer is YES. The long answer is a read through this thread ⬇️🧵 1/
#UkraineRussiaWar is disrupting physical, logistical & market dynamics in the Black Sea - a key hub for wheat, feed grains & sunflower seed to world markets. 🇺🇦 ports are all closed or blockaded by 🇷🇺 Navy. 🇺🇦 suspended port operations for commercial activities since 24/02. 2/
Most immediately, this will impact export of 🇺🇦 #corn, which has been harvested but not all shipped. Exports are predicted to drop by 18% due to trade disruptions and part of the stored grain being lost or damaged from shelling. 🇺🇦 exports 14% of all corn, so prices will raise 3/
Corn & barley are vastly used to feed livestock (esp. chicken). 🇨🇳 🇮🇳 source 84% & 70% of their imported corn from 🇺🇦, and 🇺🇦 corn is 50%+ of domestic corn supply for EU countries like 🇫🇮🇱🇻🇳🇱. Feed is ~55-65% of chicken production cost, so prices for European🐔 will increase 4/
Looking ahead, the next 🇺🇦 harvest could be severely compromised by the #UkraineRussiaWar. 🇺🇦 exports 10% of world's wheat, and 97% of Ukrainian wheat is winter-planted. This wheat is due to be harvested in summer 2022, but it is grown in areas that are now a battleground 5/
A large part of population in the areas where #wheat is grown has fled or taken up arms. Farmers need to put nutrients on winter-planted wheat during the spring, but the #UkraineRussiaWar is disrupting the process, with risk of abnormally low yield for the 2022 summer harvest. 6/
For corn, soy, sunflower & summer barley, #UkraineRussiaWar will disrupt sowing. Port blockages & transport issues mean farmers can't receiving the seed. FAO estimates that 20-30% of areas typically cultivated in 🇺🇦 will not be planted or be unharvested in the 2022/23 season 7/
All these factors will inflict a severe blow to 🇺🇦 grain production and export capacity. This comes on the back of severe droughts that compromised 🇺🇸🇨🇦 spring output, and record-breaking rains that damaged and delayed planting on about 30% of 🇨🇳total winter wheat acreage. 8/
The hit on food prices will be compounded by skyrocketing price of #fertilizers, of which 🇷🇺 is the world’s largest exporter. Fertilizers account for 35% of marginal cost of production for wheat & corn. A doubling of fertilizer prices leads to a ~44% increase in food prices. 9/
In poor countries, high fertilizer costs could lead to lower usage, with depressed yields adding to shortage of imports and putting #FoodSecurity at risk. Lebanon, Tunisia, Ethiopia are top of the list – relying on Ukraine for respectively 64%, 49% and 31% of wheat imports. 10/
Using FAO food balances, I calculate that a 50% cut in wheat imports from 🇺🇦 could reduce daily available food calories by ~30% in Lebanon, ~20% in Indonesia, Tunisia, Thailand. FAO estimates that undernourished people could increase by 7.6mn globally due to #UkraineRussiaWar 11/
Many poor countries have subsidies to shelter consumers from price fluctuations on wheat, but the fiscal cost is steep when supply is cut. #Egypt was recently forced to raise the price of subsidized bread for 1st time since 1980s. Geopolitical spillovers could hence be dire. 12/
So summing up: the #UkraineRussiaWar will continue to challenge grain supply well into next year. This will have an immediate effect on a number of low-income countries where food prices have proven to be a factor of significant political instability in the past. 13/
In the medium term, the combined effect of reduced grain supply with restrictions to export of fertilizers from 🇷🇺 will be to push farming costs and hence food prices higher – even in areas of the world that do not depend on Ukrainian exports for their food security. 14/
In the short term, EU countries have little room to counteract these effects. EC's proposal to let farmers temporarily grow crops on the 6% of EU agricultural 'fallow' land, as is the proposal to reduce blending of biofuel, and help package for farmers. 15/
For the longer term, this shock is an opportunity to focus on food & fertilizers security and on higher efficiency agriculture. The 'silver lining' is that innovative technique such as precision and vertical farming will likely receive a boost from this sad episode. end/
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Europe Unplugged: can we give up Russian gas? In our latest ESG investor letter, we find that 🇪🇺 could make up for ~62% of energy needs tied to 🇷🇺 gas, at high economic and political cost. The remaining gas deficit would exhaust reserves in 5-10 months. 1/ algebris.com/insights/green…
🇪🇺 gas production declined by 20% over the past 20 years. Today 🇷🇺 supplies ~38% of European gas imports. With gas accounting for 45% of all energy imports and 🇷🇺 providing 95% of imported gas, 🇭🇺 is by far the most exposed. 🇩🇪 and 🇮🇹 would also bear much pain from cut-off. 2/
Substituting 🇷🇺 gas with LNG is difficult, for logistic and price reasons. The historical avg of European gas prices has been around 20 EUR per MWh. Paying for an additional 1300 TWh of LNG imports would translate into an annual cost of approximately 26bn euro for the EU. 3/
In light of interest in yesterday's tweet on central bank sanctions, let me add a few more details. 🧵
Russia has ~USD 630bn in reserves. After invading Crimea in 2014, CBRU has moved reserves out of Europe/USA and into gold and China. Clearly, they were thinking ahead. 1/
A similar picture if we look at currency composition of reserves: out of EUR/USD (down from a combined 87% in 03/2014 to 49% in 06/2021, which is the latest figure available) and into gold and Yuan (up from 9% in 2014 to 25% in 2021). 2/
What are reserves needed for? First, trade: ~80% of 🇷🇺 trade is settled in EUR or USD. 🇷🇺 imports are worth ~USD 307bn, 58% of which is from EU/US. Total reserves are worth ~2 years of total imports, and EUR/USD reserves are worth ~1.7 years of EU/US imports (current quantity) 3/
(...anche attuali Ministri degli Esteri). Ma lasciando perdere la facile ironia vorrei prendere spunto da questo tweet per parlare di alcuni dati che, pur essendo cruciali nel contesto della discussione di questi giorni, non mi pare ricevano abbastanza attenzione. Thread ⬇️
1) I salari in Italia praticamente non crescono da 20 anni, MA anche così sono cresciuti più della produttività (sia produttività del lavoro che TFP). È una situazione che nel lungo erode la competitività esterna, non è sostenibile, ed è il risultato di un circolo vizioso
2) In parte il problema è macro: burocrazia, ambiente non favorevole all'imprenditorialità (barriere in entrata e uscita), difficoltà di attrarre investimenti stranieri che non siano simil-predatori (read: Cina Belt and Road). Tutto arci-noto, materia di discussione nel PNRR
Thank you @gpapak@alexstubb@BrigidLaffan for hosting me as a speaker in the excellent @STGEUI@EUI_EU executive training seminar on #NextGenerationEU. Here are 5 issues I highlighted in my presentation, and that I think it will be worth keeping an eye on in coming months ⬇️
What are countries prioritising? Looking at some of the #NRRPs published so far, spending areas are largely driven by the targets on green and digital, but priorities (the largest single spending items) vary. Italy stands out for prioritising infrastructure investment ⬇️
How effective will the investment be in creating jobs? Estimates vary. Spain is the country where the expected number of new jobs per million of euros invested is largest, #Italy - despite investing the largest amount - seems to expects the most moderate job creation ⬇️
Three very important votes in #coreper today. Despite threats by 🇭🇺and 🇵🇱 to veto the EU budget if this Regulation passed, the Rule of Law (RoL) Regulation passed. 🇭🇺 and 🇵🇱 vetoed the Own Resources Decision (ORD). So what happens now? (thread)
1) First, if no agreement is found on ORD, we fall back on the previous MFF, which obviously didn't include RRF. BUT the new RoL mechanism will apply to all EU spending, hence also to the carried over MFF. Cohesion & CAP money for 🇭🇺 🇵🇱 will now be scrutinised on RoL grounds.
2) Meanwhile, rest of EU could simply copy-paste the RRF text into an ad hoc intergovernmental Treaty (like the ESM one) and take it out of the EU budget. It would require some technical tweaks, like setting up an SPV to issue rather than having the EU do it, but it is feasible.
It's #ElectionDay in an unprecedented election in an unprecedented year. I think this chart offers the clearest and most synthetic picture of where the perfect political storm scenario could come from: it's all in the timeline mismatch. ⬇️ 1/
Biden's lead is stronger in swing states (notably Pennsylvania and Michigan) that are unlikely to be called tonight because they do little pre-processing of postal ballots. Swing states Trump could win (Florida and NC above all) have long pre-processing and will be called. 2/
Add to this that the in person vote has become a completely partisan issue in this election, because of COVID. So it could very well look like the in person vote is leaning red in 'Biden states' such as Pennsylvania and Michigan, tonight. Voters self-selection at work. 3/