Speaking w/some contacts in #Russia to try to understand evolving sentiments in society re: #RussiaUkraineWar, 3 factors stand out for me:
1. Adaptive behaviour 2. "Besieged fortress" 3. State propaganda working wonders
A thread. /1
1. Adaptive behaviour: Many Russians say "what is expected of them" - they support the #Kremlin on #Ukraine. They might (or not!) hold different views privately, but perceived social pressures + fear of reprisal drive adaptive behaviour - so you can best cope in everyday life /2
2. Besieged fortress: Adaptive behaviour is amplified by a sense among many Russians that their isolation& life under sanctions will be for a long time. Plus, whether you wanted the war or not, Russia is now "mobilized" against immense outside pressures. Result: consolidation. /3
3. State propaganda: The sheer masse of detailed counter-narratives & lies thrown at most Russians by state media re #Bucha, alleged #WMD in Ukraine, or the war broadly, produces chains of thought: "The situation's really complicated" -> "We will never really know the truth"../4
...Add to that, "the West often lies, why would we trust their version...?"
Looking for alternative information is possible, but 1. & 2. increasingly mitigate against an openness to learn about (and then live with!) uncomfortable truths /5
It is my sense that these factors 1.-3. now constantly reinforce each other & drive apparent (and growing) support for what many in #Russia - yes, it's hard to believe - still believe is a "special military operation" with limited scope & aim. #RussiaUkraineWar
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Having worked in Moscow when #Russia intervened in #Syria in 2015 & engaged RUS officials/experts on #Syria for yrs, I see 5 parallels in approach to #Ukraine vs #Syria
1. Sequential war: RUS recently termed 1st phase of #UkraineWar done, announcing focus on Donbas. In #Syria war, Russia had declared new phase in 2017, establishing de-escalation zones (DEZs) in Western parts, which freed up regime resources to take more territory toward the East
Once that was done, regime/Russia turned back & we saw sequential take-over of DEZs (E Ghouta, Homs, Deraa) in 2018 under guise of CT. Not at all to say that sequencing in Ukraine will be the same. Return of larger-scale fighting toward W Ukraine will depend on...
#Russia and #UA, after 3 meetings - Feb 28, March 3 and 7 - in Belarus keep "constantly" talking online now; in video talks, working groups have been created. Zelenskiy on the talks: the sides are talking, "and not just throwing around ultimatums";
Podolyak: There's a dozen proposals on the table, on the political & military settlement: ceasefire (& formula for it), withdrawal of RUS troops...now all is addressed in working groups...once "mutual reciprocal legal formats" are worked out, there will be 4th (physical) meeting;
For those interested in context, amid fears that #Russia might stage false-flag chem. (or bio) attack in #Ukraine, I've followed the #Russia#Chemical weapons dossier
Some background readings that might be useful (1/6)
After #US-#Russia cooperation in removing #Syria's declared CW in 2013-14, things unravelled, w/Russia obstructing efforts at attribution & accountability for CW use in Syria. Over time, rebels were blamed for staging "false-flag attacks". Long read: tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108… (2/6)
I commented here on how the Russian narrative on #CW in Syria - always shielding the Syrian government, blaming rebels for "false-flag" ops - must be understood in context of broader Russian war objectives in Syria: nonproliferation.org/chemical-weapo… (3/6)
An under-appreciated feature of the #UkraineWar is the emergence of #Israel and #Turkey as key international intermediaries. Israeli PM was in Moscow this past weekend, and Lavrov/Kuleba are meeting in Antalya for 1st high-level meeting since bgn of invasion tomorrow. A🧵(1/7)
After Cold War, ISR & TUR emerged as important economic partners for Russia in ME. Russian bilat trade w/both is more significant than with most Arab partners. W/Turkey: Gas, Akkuyu NPP, tourism, mil-tech cooperation. W/Israel: agricultural & food products, minerals, metals (2/7)
Both ISR & TUR, however, also entertain major economic ties with Ukraine. And they've been worried about minority communities suffering under the #UkraineInvasion. Turkey pulled out Crimean Tatars, Israel evacuated Jewish communities. (3/7)
Leaving Moscow as Russia marks "Defender of the Fatherland Day" with a heavy heart after days of intensive mtgs. Some Russians said I witnessed a historic moment (DNR/LNR recognition) but one devoid of euphoria, unlike 2014. Instead, I sensed disbelief & shrugging shoulders (1/8)
Among more liberal/pro-Western minded, the predominant feeling Monday night was bewilderment - with folks thinking until the last moment that "he's not gonna go there" - mixed with a deepening worry about the future trajectory of the country: domestic & its foreign policy. (2/8)
The more hawkish felt vindicated by the building of momentum up to Monday (coercive diplomacy needed as gamble toward rectifying past injustices) but were equally caught by surprise by Putin speech (tone & substance). And seem to lack clear sense of where all this will end. (3/8)