1/7 On #defence and #security policy choices in the #IndoPacific :
I recently produced research assessing how 12 nations are aligning, looking at defence spending, arms imports, military exercises, intel sharing, and force presence agreements.
3/7 A statistical analysis on trends in stocks of imported armaments shows most countries with a break (a change) around the year 2014 - this is consistent with threat perceptions towards #China going up around 2012.
4/7 It gets interesting with data on multinational military exercises - since around 2012, military exercises involving U.S. Allies in the region begin to attract new partner nations, and exercise scenarios orient more towards high intensity warfare.
5/7 Similarly with Force Presence Agreements (Status of Forces / Visiting Forces / Reciprocal Access), some interesting developments post 2012, notably involving #Japan - with #Australia and most recently the #UK
6/7 And at the same time, total defence spending in the region hasn't gone through large shifts if measured as a percentage of GDP - that was the initial research puzzle. But pulling in additional indicators helps make sense of the regional picture.
7/7 The paper is published with the journal Defence and Peace Economics and is available Open Access.
1/5 Alright. This about wraps it up for #Scholz.
Now this is reported speech, not quotations, but the source is legitimate. #Scholz deliberately limits both military assistance and boycotts in support of #Ukraine and is not oriented towards a vision of Ukraine winning.
2/5 He believes this ensures he will not be Kaiser Wilhelm II - Emperor in the First World War.
I presume this relates to the contemporary myth of "the sleepwalkers" - as if supplying weapons for a defensive war were comparable to invading Belgium.
I struggle.
3/5 #Scholz doesn't see Ukraine prevailing, he sees the end game as #Putin declaring he's done, and he also neither wants to maximise help to Ukraine nor maximise the squeeze on Russia. Talk about a self-fulfilling prophecy. At the expense of Ukraine.
1/18
Interesting, if infuriating to those who want more decisive support for #Ukraine.
My sense is that #Germany's State Secretary (see below) slightly misrepresented a true issue. The true issue is that nobody is supplying Western models of MBTs and IFVs.
2/18
This suggests there are thresholds or limits, and evidently they have been discussed and are being pursued by the US, UK, France and others, and Germany is aligned onto them. However, to suggest this is or requires a NATO *decision* is dubious.
3/18
NATO doesn't regulate the arms supplies of its members to third countries. Those are sovereign, national decisions. Arms supplies to Ukraine come from both NATO and non-NATO countries and the key consultations are held outside the NATO framework.
1/9 Notes on the Ukraine Defense Contact Group.
This is a US-led contact group for donors of military aid to #Ukraine. Its first meeting was at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, on 26 April.
This 2nd meeting, held virtually today, 23 May, saw new commitments, notably:
2/9 Previously, the UK had led two Donor Conferences in February and March, and established the International Donor Coordination Centre, alongside the US' own coordination centre. Both work out of US EUCOM HQ in Stuttgart.
3/9 This 2nd meeting: 47 countries, at Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Defence level. Ukraine attends of course. All NATO Allies take part, plus several others. New countries joining for the first time at this meeting: Austria, Bosnia, Colombia, Ireland, Kosovo.
1/7 It has been obvious for a long time that Gaullist ideas are rooted in how France bemoaned its loss of Great Power status. But if you're a mid-sized European nation worried about Moscow, you want reliable protection and no artificial irritants to relations with the U.S.
2/7 But how, then, should Europeans insure themselves against a possibly more demanding or overstretched U.S.? Security starts at home, at the national level. CEE Allies are moving towards this: strong national capabilities and defence budgets are the win-win approach.
3/7 In a healthy context of high defence investment, allied collaboration will be on a solid footing, with no resentment due to free riding. The other part is boots on the ground and skin in the game. Here, another France is coming into focus -
1/4 Is Ruscism such concentrated evil that it is not just horribly violent but also absurd?
Yes. Sadly, yes.
Examples:
-Knowingly accuse your enemy falsely of what you are doing to them
-Lie to prisoners unnecessarily in the process of illegally executing them
2/4 True evil not only does not have to answer the question 'why?' - it does not want to, and is even triumphalist in the observable fact that there is no reason. Being irrationally evil is part and parcel of being truly evil.
3/4 Evil unleashed is a most dreadful force. But it also contains the seeds of its own defeat. Because the chiefs are evil idiots who are easily provoked, and the executioners are evil idiots who are easily killed.
1/6 I'm afraid this is true. In effect, there is a permanent split in our Alliance between the continental Western Europeans and the rest. So are the denials from French and German colleagues incorrect? No. Paris and Berlin are helping and they make more-or-less the right noises.
2/6 Paris & Berlin are also clearly acting very differently from what they were doing in January 2022. So what's the model of behaviour?
It is to go in the right direction, while doing less than others and looking for off-ramps - not for Putin but for one's pre-existing beliefs
3/6 The Paris-Berlin-Rome approach is to be reluctant helpers. Let others do more, spend more, take more risks - and follow some distance behind.
When a shock occurs, move up with everybody else - but not as high. While still expecting to "lead" Europe of course.