THREAD:
The critique of @amnesty of the behavior of Ukraine's military is inapt for one or both of the following two reasons:
It can (a) be a critique of tactical decisions taken on the spot by Ukrainian army officers. However, @Amnesty is not a military agency or think tank. /1
The human rights NGO has neither the professional competence nor the public authority to assess the military necessity of, or putative alternatives to, an occasional stationing of Ukrainian troops in residential areas or near other civilian facilities. /2
Even more worrisome about the foray of the reputed NGO into military affairs is an absence of consideration of possible human rights repercussions of the publicly suggested more cautious tactical behavior of the Ukrainian armed forces. /3
Is the suggested larger distance of Ukrainian armed forces from Ukrainian civilians indeed always and clearly in the interests of these civilians? What can be various possible net results of such more cautious military behavior in terms of protecting human rights in Ukraine? /4
The remarks of @amnesty can (b) imply a more fundamental critique of the Ukrainian state's behavior that is about not only tactical but also ethical issues. It could mean that the Ukrainian army does not care about Ukrainian civilians, or even uses them as human shields. /5
@amnesty While this is a worrisome interpretation of the motivation behind @amnesty's critique, it would provide an explanation of why the NGO's criticism has been made public in the first place. Presumably, even non-military experts of @Amnesty understand the many vagaries of defense. /6
One simply wonders why an international human rights organization would publicly criticize a certain country's army's way of desperate resistance against a massive armed attack on this country - especially so as the attacker's human rights reputation is not entirely spotless. /7
Shouldn't one assume that a defending army will by itself try to minimize the effects of its armed resistance against aggression, on civilian citizens and infrastructure? Do Ukraine's generals and officers need a foreign NGO to alert them to possible risks of their decisions? /8
As @Amnesty has decided to go public with its fundamental critique of Ukraine's army, it appears that the Ukrainian military leadership cannot be trusted to actually defend the life and interests of Ukraine's citizens. Doesn't such an assumption about Ukraine sound familiar? /9
The claim that the Ukrainian state does not care about the fundamental needs of its citizens is well-known, in Russia and Ukraine. It is at the core of Moscow's apology for the entire war and has been a constant theme in the Kremlin's propaganda for more than eight years. /10
The @amnesty report has immediately become recognized, by both Russians and Ukrainians, as feeding into Moscow's official justification for its armed invasion of Ukraine since 2014. Didn't Russia always say that it has a "responsibility to protect" Russian speakers from Kyiv? /11
@amnesty The explicit contents of, and implied conclusions from, @amnesty's public critique of Ukraine's armed forces will not lead to better protection of human rights in Ukraine. They will instead support the Kremlin's narrative of the sources and nature of the entire conflict. /12
The military incompetence of @amnesty's official comment on Ukraine's conduct of its defensive war against Russia's annihilation war is excusable. However, the political insensitivity of such an inapt coming out of the reputed human rights organization is rather regrettable. /END
THREAD
Feelings of Deja Vu for a student of post-Soviet affairs: Are we back in the 1990s? Moscow's December 1994 intervention in an inner-Chechen conflict was the beginning of the end of Russia's Second Republic (after the First one of Febr-Oct 1917). 1/3
Moscow's September 1999 start of the #SecondChechenWar, against the background of, probably, #FSB-organized apartment bombings blamed on #Chechen terrorists, was the beginning of #Putin's popularity rise. Now, #Chechens are fighting on both sides of the #RussianUkrainianWar. 2/3
Ukrainian socio-economic life in the non-occupied territories has returned to levels of the 1990s. Russia's economic life will soon too be back to the 1990s. Chechnia may again become a headache for Moscow. More conflict in the Caucasus & Central Asia has become more likely. 3/3
Did the West provoke Moscow? Comment on Sweden's and Finland's forthcoming accession to NATO: 1. In principle, the forthcoming northern enlargement of NATO does not change much in the geopolitics of Europe.
CC: @Konflikt_Sicher@Geopoliti_org@GeopoliticsMag@GSPSipo@debates_eu
3. The accession to NATO of Finland doubles the length of the NATO-Russia border. Sweden's and Finland's entry into the alliance was explicitly warned against by Moscow's statements in 2021.
1. I wonder what the plan of the remaining sane parts of the Russian elite is: Their country is becoming more isolated and distrusted accross the globe, by the month. Russia is entering a major socio-economic and political crisis.
2. Growing tensions between the center and periphery of the pseudo-federation could lead to the country's break up, or even to a civil war. In many other countries, #Russians with known ties to the current regime are or will become stigmatized, as enablers of a genocidal regime.
3. Many #Russians also do not understand the rapidly increasing public role of Ukrainians with their deep grievances, in the societies of the Western world. #Ukrainians will make sure that the Russian elite & its children will feel uncomfortable throughout Europe & North America.
2. Many generalists' underlying argument, whether im- or explicitly indicated, is that #EasternEurope specialists suffer from professional distortion. An emotions overload weakens their political judgement. Thus the generalists' texts are often educational rather than analytical.
3. #Areaexperts, in contrast, suspect the #generalists of suffering from a lack of empirical and contextual information. They are afraid that the generalists neither properly know nor fully understand (or are even not interested in) key peculiarities of the #RussianUkrainianWar.
#Erinnerungspolitische Notiz zur Debatte um #StepanBandera: 1. Es geht um das Maß der Verantwortung eines ehemaligen Häftlings des KZs #Sachsenhausen für bestimmte Verbrechen in der #Ukraine, die dort unter deutscher Besatzung bzw. Führung und in Abwesenheit Banderas stattfanden.
2. Es geht um die Bewertung eines Politikers mit zwei Brüdern, die in deutscher Gefangenschaft in Auschwitz umkamen (und dort scheinbar von Mitgefangenen ermordet wurden) sowie einem weiteren Bruder, der in der Ukraine unter deutscher Besatzung unter ungeklärten Umständen umkam.
3. Es geht um die historische Einordnung einer ultranationalistischen Bewegung, die unter deutscher Besatzung bzw. Führung Massenverbrechen verübte, jedoch auch von den Nazis verfolgt wurde, gegen deutsche Besatzung Widerstand leistete & dabei viele Opfer zu beklagen hatte.