Perhaps the most conspicuous part of Germany's declaration is that it seeks solely to give its construction on article IX of the Genocide Convention (the compromissory clause), unlike 🇱🇻🇱🇹🇳🇿🇬🇧 which offered interpretations for several provisions and relating to the merits. 2/
Now, by reserving "right to submit further arguments as to the scope ratione materiae" if declaration deemed admissible, Germany would presumably address the interpretation of the Convention's substantive provisions. However, this doesn't really feature in present declaration. 3/
Germany is also first intervener to allude to difficulties arising from mass intervention, expressing its "willing[ness] to assist the Court in grouping its intervention together with similar interventions from other State parties". What "grouping" entails remains to be seen. 4/
Justifying its intervention, Germany presents article 63 as conferring a right to intervene by mere status of being party to Genocide Convention. However it buttresses this, referring to its interest in interpretation given the erga omnes (partes) nature of obligations. 5/
Germany goes a step further, arguing that it "has a specific interest in the Court exercising its jurisdiction" – in order to prevent reliance on the Convention to justify "blatantly illegal use of military force" – in light of "its own past". 6/
Still on preliminary matters of its declaration, like 🇱🇻🇱🇹🇬🇧, Germany seeks to underline that art 63 intervention is not limited to constructions of substantive treaty provision, highlighting art 63's unqualified language and citing Judge Schwebel in Nicaragua. 7/
Moving on to Germany's construction of article IX. Germany begins by focusing on the concept of "dispute". Not many surprises in its interpretation of the term "dispute", but intriguing is how Germany frames the dispute. 8/
That is, Germany notes that the case "raises the question whether an alleged behavior by the applicant State, which could fall within the provisions of the Genocide Convention, can justify a reaction by another state". 9/
Yet, Germany then (merely) frames the dispute as "disagree[ment] over the lawfulness of" *Ukraine's* conduct. Moreover, this is the focus of the remainder of Germany's declaration – whether Ukraine's non-violation claim is encompassed within jurisdiction ratione materiae. 10/
Germany answers this question in the affirmative, particularly referencing the art IX formula, which extends jurisdiction to disputes on "fulfilment" of the Convention (also of interest is recognition of permissibility of third party countermeasures re erga omnes violations). 11/
Nevertheless, somewhat by-the-way in its analysis on jurisdiction ratione materiae – and more to-the-point in its conclusions – Germany appears to consider that jurisdiction extends to whether Russia's invasion is a violation of the Convention. 12/
In concluding, Germany's declaration seems to be narrowest in scope of interveners to-date, focusing on Genocide Convention compromissory clause. Even on compromissory clause, it appears primarily focused on Ukraine's non-violation claims, rather than Russian violations. 13/13
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Probably most controversial finding in today's orders is the (thinly reasoned) finding that the interruption of movement along the Lachin Corridor plausibly constitutes violation of #Cerd.
J Yusuf's criticism of shoehorning disputes into Cerd compromissory clause worth a read. 2/
Given the ICJ's finding in 2021 that Azerbaijan's claims relating landmines did not plausibly fall under the Cerd, little surprise that it rejected Azerbaijan's claims this time round. However, a few nuggets in the individual opinions... 3/
Both 🇫🇮🇪🇪 invoke their right of intervention under art 63 and the nature of obligations enshrined in Genocide Convention. 🇪🇪 also invokes J Cançado Trindade's opinion in Whaling case underlying importance of intervention for treaties where collective interests are concerned. 2/
🇫🇮🇪🇪 also consider capacity to intervene on jurisdictional issues, noting art 63 does not distinguish between different phases. They refer both to Judge Schwebel's opinion in the Nicaragua case and to leading treatises on the subject to justify intervention on such issues. 3/
Ireland, like almost all the other other interveners, invokes both its right to intervene pursuant to art 63 of the ICJ Statute as well as the nature of the obligations found in the Genocide Convention to justify its intervention. 2/
Ireland (only) invokes two provisions of the Convention as those it seeks to give its construction on: art I (prevention and punishment of genocide) and art IX (compromissory clause). 3/
To begin all three states invoke their "right" to intervene under art 63 of the Statute, while Denmark and Italy also invoke the nature of obligations in the Genocide Convention. All three also try to add their respective personal touches. 2/
🇵🇱 invokes its "history of supporting efforts to prevent and punish genocide", following "genocide perpetrated on Polish nationals during [WWII] by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union (the predecessor of [Russia])", while noting Soviet perpetrators were never held to account. 3/
Starting off, France invokes its right to intervene under art 63 of the Statute, while also underlining the legal nature of the obligations under the Genocide Convention (no personal touch but does later quote the Court observing the prohibition on genocide is peremptory(!)). 2/
As for the provisions of the Genocide Convention it seeks to offer its construction, by reference to Ukraine's application France cites arts I, II, IV, VIII, IX. 3/
To begin, Romania's declaration is very much to-the-point. While it does underline the importance of the Genocide Convention, it doesn't expand so much beyond the Statute's requirements for justifying its intervention. 2/
As for the provisions it plans to offer its construction on, Romania cites arts IX (compromissory clause) and I (prevention and punishment), the latter in turn necessitating interpretation of arts II, III, VIII. 3/