Some observers may conclude from current Ukrainian military advances that #Ukraine does not need that many weapons any more. Victory for Kyiv looks more & more possible. Seemingly, the rationale for heavily arming Ukraine is weakening in view of Kyiv's impressive recent gains. /1
However, Ukraine precarious location in a geopolitical grey zone will not change any time soon. As long as Ukraine is neither a NATO nor a full EU member, the country will have to take care of its security itself. Russia may either continue now or resume later its aggression. /2
An as heavy, comprehensive and modern as possible arming of #Ukraine has thus not only a tactical dimension. It is not only necessary for a successful completion of the current counter-offensive, and eventual achievement of a peace deal with Moscow that is acceptable to Kyiv. /3
Arming #Ukraine seriously also has a distinctly strategic & long-term dimension. Kyiv needs to be well-equipped not only as long as current fighting continues, but also during the ensuing interregnum between a peace deal with Moscow, and Ukraine’s eventual EU & NATO accession. /4
Weapons are needed not only to finish the current war, but also to prevent another one. Even after Ukraine’s entry into Nato or the EU or both, it may remain a frontier state, if #Russia continues harboring revanchist ambitions. Then too, a well-armed Ukraine will be needed. /END
PS: Some respondents to and retweeters of this thread found its initial presumption inapt. These commentators overestimate the continental West European eagerness to support #Ukraine, and underestimate the spread of unreflective pacifism among, for instance, ordinary #Germans.
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@JohannesVarwick 1. Ein Ausgleich wäre nur durch faktische oder formale territoriale Zugeständnisse an Russland zu erreichen. Derlei "Konfliktlösungen" gab es seit 1992 betr. Transnistriens, Abchasiens, der Region Zchinwali, der Krim & des Donbas. Resultat waren gespaltene Staaten & neue Kriege.
@JohannesVarwick 2. Angesichts des zunehmend repressiven und teils genozidalen russischen Okkupationsregimes in der Ukraine müsste Kyjiw öffentlich einwilligen, einen Teil seiner Bürger dauerhafter Terrorherrschaft und einem eventuelle Massenmord auszusetzen. Das wäre nicht nur moralisch dubios.
@JohannesVarwick 3. Dies ist auch innenpolitisch unwahrscheinlich. Jede ukrainische Regierung, die sich auf einen solchen Deal einlässt, würde fallen (nicht ganz zum Ungemach Moskaus). Sich als unpopulär aber realistisch darstellende Handlungsanweisungne sollten bitte auch realistisch sein.
#RussiaGoesNuclear: Hopefully, journalistic & political discussion of possible disaster at the #ZaporizhzhiaNPP will address the core of the matter: The cause of the catastrophe will be an, under the #NPT, official nuclear-weapon state & #UNSecurityCouncil permanent member. /1
The #RussianFederation will conduct a weaponization of civilian atomic power and high radioactivity in an offensive war of annihilation against #Ukraine - an official non-nuclear weapon state and UN founding member (the #UkrSSR entered the #UN with a separate seat, in 1945). /2
Moscow's hybrid military deployment of Europe's largest atomic station as the equivalent of a neutron bomb is fully intended to result in massive health damages for millions of Ukrainians, and even potentially their mass murder. /3
Friendly memo to #Russian cynics joyful when #Russia's #cruisemissiles fly into #Ukraine: A thread, in three parts, on unjoyous aspect of your weekly little triumphs. (Let your children and grandchildren also have a look, or tell them. It concerns them too!) Analyze this:
/1
PART 1:
Your missiles are expensive. Many never reach their target, but are intercepted or defunct. Those that hit their targets often destroy infrastructure whose reconstruction is less expensive than your missile. Sure, #Ukraine looses something. But #Russia looses more.
/2
Rebuilding destroyed #Ukrainian infrastructure will be partly done with Western funds. The more you destroy, the more help #Ukraine may get & the more sanctions may be imposed on #Russia. Sure, everybody looses. But, in relative terms, you may loose most. Compare & compute!
/3
Read most of #Dugin's texts published until 2007 (when submitting a dissertation on him at @Cambridge_Uni). Cannot remember anything intellectually stimulating, in his many books and articles - unlike in the often interesting investigations of the interwar #Eurasianists. /2
#Dugin often makes pointedly pompous statements that are either trivialities or absurdities, or a mixture of both. When he discusses an interesting theory, it is not his own. He reads & writes a lot, but it is unclear why he does. /3 @FascismJournal@HNationalism@russia_matters
THREAD on #Russlandverstehen:
There was in September 1999 a Russian spark of support for then still obscure prime minister #VladimirPutin, against the background of the #FSB's blowing up of Russian residential buildings that left ca. 300 Russians dead. /1 fb.watch/eP8tm5fxe5/
This curious popular reaction, in spite of early signs revealing the role of #Russia's secret service in the mass murderous terror attacks on #Russian civilians, points to worrisome psychological deformations of the Russian national mind. /2
The mixture of collective escapism, myopic personalism & necro-masochism that came to the fore already more than 30 years ago should have consequences for Western policies. It indicates that verbal signaling may be of only limited use in communication with the Russian nation. /3
THREAD
Feelings of Deja Vu for a student of post-Soviet affairs: Are we back in the 1990s? Moscow's December 1994 intervention in an inner-Chechen conflict was the beginning of the end of Russia's Second Republic (after the First one of Febr-Oct 1917). 1/3
Moscow's September 1999 start of the #SecondChechenWar, against the background of, probably, #FSB-organized apartment bombings blamed on #Chechen terrorists, was the beginning of #Putin's popularity rise. Now, #Chechens are fighting on both sides of the #RussianUkrainianWar. 2/3
Ukrainian socio-economic life in the non-occupied territories has returned to levels of the 1990s. Russia's economic life will soon too be back to the 1990s. Chechnia may again become a headache for Moscow. More conflict in the Caucasus & Central Asia has become more likely. 3/3