To begin, Romania's declaration is very much to-the-point. While it does underline the importance of the Genocide Convention, it doesn't expand so much beyond the Statute's requirements for justifying its intervention. 2/
As for the provisions it plans to offer its construction on, Romania cites arts IX (compromissory clause) and I (prevention and punishment), the latter in turn necessitating interpretation of arts II, III, VIII. 3/
Before going into the specifics of these provisions, Romania offers some general observations. It probably expands the most, of interveners so far, on the basis of pacta sunt servanda, going as far as citing the Friendly Relations Declarations and the Helsinki Final Act. 4/
This leads it to observe that the Convention must be applied in good faith, which in turn necessitates it being interpreted in good faith and that parties refrain from frustrating its object and purpose – which it expands upon by reference to the 1951 advisory opinion. 5/
Romania then proceeds to analyse art IX. Romania first engages in quite a standard analysis of the concept "dispute" (albeit maybe playing down necessity of dispute existing upon seising the Court, à la 🇲🇭v🇮🇳🇵🇰🇬🇧). 6/
It then considers what this jurisdiction extends to. It also makes the case that jurisdiction extends to claims of non-violation, albeit placing emphasis on teleological considerations. However, like 🇬🇧🇸🇪, it also underlines art IX's use of the phrase "any party". 7/
Romania adds that jurisdiction also extends to disputes over the scope of the obligation to prevent and punish, and specifically whether unlawful use of force would be "acceptable conduct for that purpose". 8/
Romania then ventures into the substantive provisions of the Convention. It begins by observing that the obligation to prevent and punish is one of using reasonably available means, which in turn implies that a state "cannot act" contrary to international law. 9/
Romania also observes that art I creates an obligation of due diligence, which demands a "proper" (and not arbitrary or subjective) determination of a "serious risk of genocide". 10/
It continues to cite ICJ's jurisprudence on the standard of proof for proving genocide and its modes liability, concluding that a state defending actions on the basis of art I must be able to meet that standard, while adding reliance on independent reports a best practice. 11/
There is a sense of conflation between interpretation of obligations under the Convention and the (procedural) standard of proof for proving facts before the ICJ.
Additionally it is questionable whether said independent reports are usually based on "fully conclusive" evidence.12/
In any event, Romania then expands on the need for measures of prevention and punishment to conform to international law, emphasising that actions of prevention cannot violate 2(4) UN Charter. By reference to art VIII, it also underlines preference for collective action. 13/
Finally, like 🇱🇻🇱🇹🇬🇧🇸🇪, Romania notes that measures of punishment under the Convention are those conducted through the municipal and international criminal law frameworks. 14/
Before concluding, worth noting that Romania is first intervener whose foreign minister, @BogdanAurescu, has been appointed agent, though given his expertise in international law (i.a. member of #ILC) this should not come as any surprise. 15/
To conclude, Romania's intervention is very succinct. There is perhaps room for criticism of its analysis on conclusiveness of allegations of genocide or risk thereof, but otherwise the arguments made are mostly straightforward. 16/16
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Probably most controversial finding in today's orders is the (thinly reasoned) finding that the interruption of movement along the Lachin Corridor plausibly constitutes violation of #Cerd.
J Yusuf's criticism of shoehorning disputes into Cerd compromissory clause worth a read. 2/
Given the ICJ's finding in 2021 that Azerbaijan's claims relating landmines did not plausibly fall under the Cerd, little surprise that it rejected Azerbaijan's claims this time round. However, a few nuggets in the individual opinions... 3/
Both 🇫🇮🇪🇪 invoke their right of intervention under art 63 and the nature of obligations enshrined in Genocide Convention. 🇪🇪 also invokes J Cançado Trindade's opinion in Whaling case underlying importance of intervention for treaties where collective interests are concerned. 2/
🇫🇮🇪🇪 also consider capacity to intervene on jurisdictional issues, noting art 63 does not distinguish between different phases. They refer both to Judge Schwebel's opinion in the Nicaragua case and to leading treatises on the subject to justify intervention on such issues. 3/
Ireland, like almost all the other other interveners, invokes both its right to intervene pursuant to art 63 of the ICJ Statute as well as the nature of the obligations found in the Genocide Convention to justify its intervention. 2/
Ireland (only) invokes two provisions of the Convention as those it seeks to give its construction on: art I (prevention and punishment of genocide) and art IX (compromissory clause). 3/
To begin all three states invoke their "right" to intervene under art 63 of the Statute, while Denmark and Italy also invoke the nature of obligations in the Genocide Convention. All three also try to add their respective personal touches. 2/
🇵🇱 invokes its "history of supporting efforts to prevent and punish genocide", following "genocide perpetrated on Polish nationals during [WWII] by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union (the predecessor of [Russia])", while noting Soviet perpetrators were never held to account. 3/
Starting off, France invokes its right to intervene under art 63 of the Statute, while also underlining the legal nature of the obligations under the Genocide Convention (no personal touch but does later quote the Court observing the prohibition on genocide is peremptory(!)). 2/
As for the provisions of the Genocide Convention it seeks to offer its construction, by reference to Ukraine's application France cites arts I, II, IV, VIII, IX. 3/
As is becoming routine for these interventions, Sweden invokes both its "right" to intervene under art 63 of the Statute and the nature of the obligations under the Genocide Convention (though first to cite Judge Cançado Trindade's sep op in the Whaling case order). 2/
For its personal touch, Sweden invokes itself being a "a keen proponent of a rules-based world order", finding that "it is necessary for it to intervene in this case, in order to place its interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Convention". 3/