Ori Pomson Profile picture
Sep 15, 2022 19 tweets 9 min read Read on X
#France's declaration of intervention is now available on the #ICJ's website: icj-cij.org/public/files/c…
Some observations – c'est parti! 🪡 #Ukraine #Russia 1/19
Starting off, France invokes its right to intervene under art 63 of the Statute, while also underlining the legal nature of the obligations under the Genocide Convention (no personal touch but does later quote the Court observing the prohibition on genocide is peremptory(!)). 2/
As for the provisions of the Genocide Convention it seeks to offer its construction, by reference to Ukraine's application France cites arts I, II, IV, VIII, IX. 3/
Before entering into the construction of the provisions themselves pursuant to the customary rules of interpretation, France begins with some general observations on good faith in the interpretation and application of treaties. 4/
In addition to the standard references, France argues that "good faith implies that the Convention's integrity must be respected". It adds that good faith demands a treaty be interpreted in light of its object & purpose and prohibits abusive and bias interpretations. 5/
In this light, France states that in its intervention it seeks to emphasise the cardinal importance of good faith in its various manifestations. 6/
France proceeds to its interpretation of art IX. It begins with standard references on the concept of "dispute", then emphasising that any dispute relating to the Convention's interpretation, application or fulfilment falls within the ICJ's jurisdiction. 7/
France then makes an intriguing argument – due to the inclusion of "fulfilment" in the compromissory clause, jurisdiction extends to disputes relating to the application of the obligation pacta sunt servanda regarding the Convention, including its implementation in good faith. 8/
It's possible that France has in mind the finding in the Nicaragua case that disputes over depriving a treaty's object and purpose do not pertain to the interpretation and application thereof. It is still far from clear that "fulfilment" has the effect of overcoming that. 9/
In any event, France then proceeds to the issue of non-violation. It notes the broad language in the French version of art IX, which speaks of state responsibility "en matière de génocide" (rather than "for genocide" in the English), as well as the terms "including those". 10/
Like 🇬🇧🇸🇪🇷🇴, it also notes the language of "any party" in the compromissory clause. This all leads to the conclusion that the language is broad enough not to condition jurisdiction on the applicant being the party alleging a violation of the Convention. 11/
France then proceeds to consider the substantive provisions at stake in the Genocide Convention. Beginning with art I, France focuses on when the obligation of prevention is triggered; namely if genocide is occurring or if there is a serious risk thereof. 12/
On this basis, France argues that no action can validly be taken pursuant to the obligation of prevention if these conditions have not arisen. Presumably, this lays the ground for arguing that Russia had no obligation to prevent genocide vis-à-vis Ukraine. 13/
France then briefly touches upon arts II and III (definition of genocide and modes of liability). Rather than offering constructions, it states that it plans on providing the Court with information on its implementation of these provisions in its municipal legal system. 14/
Interestingly France cites art 31 of the #VCLT as the basis for relevance of its practice. Yet, surely, the Court will not be receiving information on subsequent practice of *all* state parties. Are we not (relegated to) the realms of art 32 VCLT? 15/
Proceeding to art IV (punishment), like 🇱🇻🇱🇹🇬🇧🇸🇪🇷🇴, France emphasises that the means concerned are judicial procedures – not collective punishment. Here, too, France states that it will provide information on its implementation of the provision. 16/
Moving on to art VIII (seising UN organs), France highlights how this provision privileges collective action in preventing genocide. 17/
To conclude, France's intervention is an interesting read. IINM it is the first to allude to information it is leaving out of its declaration but plans to supply during the proceedings.
Unsurprisingly, France also highlights nuances in the French version of Convention's text. 18/
France also (seems to) breaks ground in addressing tricky issue of Cinderella-ing the issue of frustration of object & purpose of the Convention into glass slipper of the compromissory clause. However, it remains to be seen whether it is persuasive. 19/FIN

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More from @OriPomson

Feb 22, 2023
Some quick observations on the #ICJ's two orders today in the respective #Armenia-#Azerbaijan cases. 🪡1/6
Probably most controversial finding in today's orders is the (thinly reasoned) finding that the interruption of movement along the Lachin Corridor plausibly constitutes violation of #Cerd.
J Yusuf's criticism of shoehorning disputes into Cerd compromissory clause worth a read. 2/
Given the ICJ's finding in 2021 that Azerbaijan's claims relating landmines did not plausibly fall under the Cerd, little surprise that it rejected Azerbaijan's claims this time round. However, a few nuggets in the individual opinions... 3/
Read 6 tweets
Sep 23, 2022
#Finland's🇫🇮 and #Estonia's🇪🇪 respective declarations of intervention are now available on the #ICJ's website:
icj-cij.org/public/files/c…
icj-cij.org/public/files/c…
Observations🪡 #Ukraine #Russia 1/19
Both 🇫🇮🇪🇪 invoke their right of intervention under art 63 and the nature of obligations enshrined in Genocide Convention. 🇪🇪 also invokes J Cançado Trindade's opinion in Whaling case underlying importance of intervention for treaties where collective interests are concerned. 2/ ImageImageImageImage
🇫🇮🇪🇪 also consider capacity to intervene on jurisdictional issues, noting art 63 does not distinguish between different phases. They refer both to Judge Schwebel's opinion in the Nicaragua case and to leading treatises on the subject to justify intervention on such issues. 3/ ImageImageImage
Read 20 tweets
Sep 21, 2022
#Ireland's🇮🇪 declaration of intervention is now available on the #ICJ's website: icj-cij.org/public/files/c…
Observations 🪡 #Ukraine #Russia 1/10
Ireland, like almost all the other other interveners, invokes both its right to intervene pursuant to art 63 of the ICJ Statute as well as the nature of the obligations found in the Genocide Convention to justify its intervention. 2/ Image
Ireland (only) invokes two provisions of the Convention as those it seeks to give its construction on: art I (prevention and punishment of genocide) and art IX (compromissory clause). 3/
Read 10 tweets
Sep 20, 2022
#Poland🇵🇱, #Italy🇮🇹 and #Denmark's🇩🇰 respective declarations of intervention are now available on the #ICJ's website:
icj-cij.org/public/files/c…
icj-cij.org/public/files/c…
icj-cij.org/public/files/c…
Some observations 🪡 #Ukraine #Russia 1/27
To begin all three states invoke their "right" to intervene under art 63 of the Statute, while Denmark and Italy also invoke the nature of obligations in the Genocide Convention. All three also try to add their respective personal touches. 2/
🇵🇱 invokes its "history of supporting efforts to prevent and punish genocide", following "genocide perpetrated on Polish nationals during [WWII] by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union (the predecessor of [Russia])", while noting Soviet perpetrators were never held to account. 3/
Read 27 tweets
Sep 14, 2022
#Romania's declaration of intervention is now available on the #ICJ's website: icj-cij.org/public/files/c…
A few observations 🪡 #Ukraine #Russia 1/16
To begin, Romania's declaration is very much to-the-point. While it does underline the importance of the Genocide Convention, it doesn't expand so much beyond the Statute's requirements for justifying its intervention. 2/ Image
As for the provisions it plans to offer its construction on, Romania cites arts IX (compromissory clause) and I (prevention and punishment), the latter in turn necessitating interpretation of arts II, III, VIII. 3/
Read 16 tweets
Sep 13, 2022
The text of #Sweden's 🇸🇪 declaration of intervention is now available on the #ICJ's website: icj-cij.org/public/files/c…
Observations 🪡. #Ukraine #Russia 1/25
As is becoming routine for these interventions, Sweden invokes both its "right" to intervene under art 63 of the Statute and the nature of the obligations under the Genocide Convention (though first to cite Judge Cançado Trindade's sep op in the Whaling case order). 2/ ImageImageImageImage
For its personal touch, Sweden invokes itself being a "a keen proponent of a rules-based world order", finding that "it is necessary for it to intervene in this case, in order to place its interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Convention". 3/ ImageImage
Read 25 tweets

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