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Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
@ArveloaMert
Mar 24, 2023 • 101 tweets • 71 min read • Read on X
Here is the fifth thread 🧵 about the strategy of the #RussoUkrainianWar for the early spring. Spring would be an interesting time as both sides claimed to go for a possible offensive. #Bakhmut. #Ukraine #Russia #Soledar #Kreminna #Svatove #Wagner #UkraineWar #Leopard2 #Vuhledar Image
1) As always please take a look for understanding how a counter-offensive should be conducted, what are the goals and requirements and for the events that occured between September to November.
2) You can take a look to this thread for the first part of the Ukrainian Winter Counter Offensive which includes the situation and events between November to January.
3) For the events between January to February and more issues like Wood Warfare, Riverine Warfare and etc. you can look to this thread.
4) Here is the third thread that started after the fall of Soledar and focused on types of Russian offensives, use of artillery and ammunition scarcity, Russian scarcity of armoured vehicles and on the issue of Transnistria.
5) Here is the last thread 🧵 on the strategy of #RussiaUkraineWar that involves a short focus on the latest Russian C2 and tactics, crowdsourcing, aviation, cluster munitions and fortifications.
6) For other threads on the Russo-Ukrainian War, you can navigate through this thread;
7) Here is a thread about #Ukraine’s use of Unmanned Surface Vessels against #Russia in Sevastopol. Its operational and strategic impact and of course its strengths and weaknesses.
8) I will not start this thread with a detailed analysis. But lets talk about #NovaKahkovka a little bit. Yesterday there was an initial report for possible Russian withdrawal from the town which later denied by UAF as wrong. The town is very important.
novayagazeta.eu/articles/2023/…
9) It is the part of #Russia’s linear positional defence outlook with Oleshky and Kinburn Spit. Any withdrawal from these cities would led Moscow for a crumbling of positional defence across the Dnipro River. Ukraine would equally focus here and Zaporizhzhia to spot weaknesses.
10) The defensive cordon protects the GLOCs that goes to Crimea and protect almost whole Russian logistics with a river, a cordon of wood and sand dunes. The region is hard to penetrate but once penatrated it offers much in organizing defence and further deep operations.
11) There are continous claims about possible another offensive by #Russia in the early Spring. Given the stalled performance in Kupyansk, #Kreminna, #Vuhledar and slowed one in #Bakhmut, it would be risky due to depleted resources and Russian experience in mud. Image
12) When did #Ukraine’s counter offensive will start then? It is closely related with the arrival of Western armour, High Command’s planning for them and training of new Offensive Brigades. My personal view is mid or late April but intel picture could change these dates. Image
13) #Prigozhin’s speeches could be seemed as non-sense. But he silently but continously and Igor Girkin much more in an open way convey a single message through Telegram to nationalist circles in #Russia. These messages simply concentrate on two things.
14) The first one is the call for Russifying the war and much more Russification of the military for a single Slavic state. #Prigozhin’s failed dream for Opelcheniye also resembles that. It is a clear discontent against Kremlin’s managed nationalism as it focuses on grassroot one
15) The other desire is, both Girkin and #Prigozhin tries to reduce to Kremlin’s political control on military affairs. They want to rationalize the command which includes giving up Kremlin’s underestimation of Ukraine and for further campaign for escalation of the war. Image
16) #Prigozhin and Girkin’s agenda is quite new for Kremlin to manage + could have unintended consequences. Russian military and state is multi-ethnic and consist multiple religions, it could alienate minorities and simply empower small group of ultranationalist who owns weapons. Image
17) #Prigozhin and Girkin ties #Russia’s failure in #Ukraine with the lack of incentive and ideology in military affairs. (Not true at all) For this, they demand Kremlin to give up its non-sensing political game to much more a indoctrinated approach which Kremlin is anticipating. ImageImage
18) However, #Prigozhin’s message did not attract many audiences simply because;
-Resource allocation is controlled by Kremlin,
-Russian Church supports Kremlin,
-Kremlin is still powerful,
-Urban people are not buying his messages,
-His arbitrary command took many anticipations. Image
19) Here some interesting reports about possible use of tear gas by #Russia against Ukrainian positions. Tear gas is again remains in gray zone in the law of armed conflict. But as Russian offensives stalled in #Ukraine we could witness more of these kind on-the-edge tactics.
20) Allies supplied not much amount of gas masks to #Ukraine. Providing masks to counter use of teargas is an urgent neccessity for stalled fronts like #Bakhmut, #Avdiivka, #Kreminna and #Marinka.
21) Western equipment started to arrive in #Ukraine. Challenger 2, Leopards, Strykers and other armoured equipments are now delivered to the Ukrainian military. A counter-offensive is now in its planning phase and just a matter of time.
22) #Russian forces trained in #Belarus appeared in #Avdiivka. So its recent advances were caused from these new forces. But their success are limited as discipline and effectiveness is no where near for a months long training. 🇷🇺 use a mobilized Corp for encircling a single town
23) As American and other #NATO equipment flowed to #Ukraine, US Trainers offered crucial educations for C2 and logistics. SOTMO tried to adapt some NATO doctrines to replace 🇺🇦’s Soviet era doctrines. The main focus for this doctrine-making efforts were focused on flexibility.
24) The main problem in #Bakhmut is in industrial blocks of the town. Both directions lack natural barriers and Russians secured their eastern flank via Bakhmutske River. While #Avdiivka is in danger from South. #Ukraine needs to challenge these zones to strip up 🇷🇺 operations.
25) #Russia started to use convicts and problematic soldiers to men Storm Troops. This mission is so hard that needs an intense training, skill and coordination as we underlined earlier. Without this, they would turned out as suicide missions.
26) Suicide Missions are useless and far from delivering any result than consuming men power. It would failure of attacks due to skill, communication problems, creatvity and transparency. Such kind of selection process will anticipate officers to led and take care of its men. Image
27) Such kind of sacrificing approach to warfare led to two important problems. The first one is, it would hamper the development of proper field tactics and strategies. The other one is, it would led to an ignorance in command circles and led to de-valuation of human life. Image
28) #Ukraine significantly improved its counter counter-battery capacity. Arrival of precision guided weapons improved Kyiv’s ability to counter these kind of equipment. This goal is closely related with Kyiv’s goal to secure its forces maeuver for expected offensive in Spring.
29) #Russia use Cold War style mil. phones in the wood around #Kreminna and #Svatove. In modernity, these phones could be seemed as out-dated. But these are good when we thought about paralyzed and hackable 🇷🇺 comms. It shows how much 🇷🇺 defence in the wood is wide and wired.
30) #Ukraine searches for IFVs that can cross shallow rivers and other high-level river crossing equipment. Apart from its need in #Dnipro theatres like #Kherson and #Zaporizhzia, these kind of equipment would boost Kyiv’s political authority in the country after the war. Image
31) #Ukraine wants to change the general short-coming of geo-strategy which sees rivers as natural barriers. These kind of equipment will help it to show that Dnipro and beyond is the indivisible part of the state. Kyiv will need Marines-like Riverine forces even after the war. Image
32) #Russia claimed to develop an UUSV named Skat to patrol, lay mines and increase the control of the #Dnipro and to prevent the breach of possible river crossing points. Still there is no clue for whether Russia can deploy them before an Ukrainian offensive and successfully.
33) Mining rivers is not a new tactic. It was effectively used by the Confederates against the Union. Statitionary mines could be risky in narrow rivers as Mississipi’s bigger ferries were vulnerable in maneuver and almost totally curtailed Union logistics by the river at night. Image
34) Main Confederate goal is to deny the use of the river with blocking cross-river operations and paralyzing the logistics+patrols. #Ukraine’s riverine boats are much more advanced+easier to maneuver. But possible use of riverine mines shows #Russia’s stress+fear of 🇺🇦 capacity. Image
35) Interesting analysis over another emerging Nationalist-like Club in #Russia. The aim is same, to spread the message of the war to public to Russify it and to influence political-military discourse making process. But it looks like they follow different path with #Prigozhin.
36) #Russia will increasingly feel the political pressure and stress of 'repatriated' politicians and activists from #Ukraine. In all wars, as we see in Greece after the Turkish Independence War, repatriated people tried to actively influence the politics of the home country. Image
37) #Germany’s Rheinmetall is planning to open a maintainance plant in Romania to provide fast repair of #Ukraine’s new equipment and esse the logistical issues. The plant is planned to come in action only in one month.
reuters.com/world/europe/a…
38) The frontline remained stable around #Kreminna, Kupyansk, #Svatove and #Vuhledar. This shows us that the real concentration of the operations were in #Bakhmut and #Avdiivka. The situation in these two towns are difficult but success of 🇷🇺 performance is far from its losses. Image
39) #US announced another security assistance package for #Ukraine. IR is important to underline that in addition to ammunition, recovery, supply and logistical vehicles take a heavy place. This indicates a possible planning for sustaining future offensives.
40) Clashes continues around #Bakhmut. #Ukraine continues to inflict losses and damage to Russian forces but for now they couldn’t stabilized the town. In #Avdiivka, Ukrainian forces made a limited counter-attack and retook some territory in the South of the town. Image
41) The stabilization problem in #Bakhmut is related with two problems. #Russia use enormous men+firepower to erase the town as it did in Mariupol. #Ukraine fights well but without fully neutralizing the 🇷🇺 firepower and create a diversionary attempt full stabilization is hard. Image
42) We are now wittnessing a lengthened transitionary period where both sides are replenishing and re-organizing their forces and reserves. The interesting point is both sides name their new forces as ‘Storm’. This shows that the following war will see limited... Image
43) ... offensive efforts from both sides. Both will try to find weakpoints to exploit in their offensive actions. Planning and evaluations of these actions would be even more crucial and harder. The question now focus on two points; a) How 🇺🇦 use its armour and b) fortifications Image
44) British Ministry of Defence underlined that the latest advances in #Bakhmut is related with possible return of VDV troops and re-established cooperation between MoD and #Wagner. It is unclear whether both sides reached to a modus operandi or just it is just a modus vivendi. Image
45) The New York Times reported an intelligence leak that casted a shadow on the US-Ukr. intelligence sharing. There are discussions on whether the slide is real or fake or distorted. But the leak pushed #Ukraine to limit its intel sharing with the #US.
nytimes.com/2023/04/06/us/…
46) OPSEC and Communication are hardest issues in war. Clausewitz highlighted communication as the easiest and simulataneously the hardest thing to do. Belligerents continued communication with their Allies were remained as main intelligence target due to fragility. Image
47) Operational significance of the leak is not much important, since if you have a valuable intel about a presumed offensive, you would not leak it before. Because you would not want your enemy to change it. For example, the Union discovered Confederate’s secret offensive plans. Image
48) The move abled the Union to defeat the Confederate in the Battle of South Mountain and Battle of Antietam. But this leak significantly detoriated #Ukraine’s trust in intelliegence to the #US. Intel sharing among two countries were important components of success. Image
49) The other issue is for the #US military intelligence itself. The leak created a distrust among the US military intelligence which is a desired outcome for #Russia and #China who put mistrust and disinformation at the center of its strategy. Image
50) The last point of concern is the risk of further intelligence leaks that could put #Ukraine’s presumed offensive in a risk. Kyiv, now, needs to double its efforts in OPSEC and it could led to redesigning and replanning of it which could delay the operation for couple of days. Image
51) An interesting sight, #Russia re-formed its Battalion Tactical Groups in Donetsk to conduct an operation to #Avdiivka and #Marinka. This shows that the move is conducted by RAF and estimates that #Ukraine’s lines are weakened in that sector due to #Bakhmut and Assault Teams.
52) #Russia reform and re-equip #VDV with heavy equipment as a major offensive tool. This shows that Russian Command’s belief in Assault Detachments are not solid and wants to protect older pound-destroyer-move tactics. VDV has an expeditionary character not for major offensives.
53) More details emerge about #Russia’s fortigicationd efforts in Southern #Ukraine before a possible Ukrainian counter-offensive. Russia use three layered fortifications which is inherited from the USSR. The first line of the contact is the one which is hardened for combat.
54) British intelligence reform confirms that #Russia is using second and rear zones of defence for possible withdrawal and protection of supply. The main strongpoint of Russian fortifications focuses on #Tokmak and #Melitopol which the shortest corridor and the decisive point.
55) In tactical aspect, #Russia use minefields, dragons teeth, again minefield, a line of trench, a revetment, an anti-tank ditch and again dragon teeth. The aim is holding an armoured maneuver while protecting the trenches against the Ukrainian infantry infiltrations.
56) We talked much about fortifications. Here the thread about 🧵 Russian fortifications and Soviet fortification doctrine, its aims, needs, Ukrainian capacity and strategies to overcome it.
57) Another earlier talk on Russian fortifications and historical utility of them in previous wars.
58) For a seperate thread on trench warfare and positional defence;
59) #Russia’s dependency on fortifications shows 3 things. They have concerns about #Ukraine’s capabilities, has a little trust in its soldiers as this region is defended by reserves and mobilized since VDV is tied in #Bakhmut and aware that loss of #Melitopol could mean defeat. Image
60) As historical examples showed positional defence and fortifications have one big handicappe. Once a line breached it could led to the collapse of whole defence architecture. And it requires menning down huge amount of infantry to work. Image
61) Please note this down. #Melitopol is active. Nothing happening in actual military terms except #Ukraine's long range strikes but the town increasingly came under a psychological siege. In the coming days we could hear more about partisan warfare.
62) #US investigation about claimed intelligence leak on #Ukraine was occured on Discord and tied with a Massachusetts AFNG who published them in alt-right channels. A clear warning for the US to stress on OPSEC, military intel and crypto alt-right members
63) It looks like #Russia’s contactless warfare and Integrated Mass Missile Strategy faltered. This is closely related with decreased missile stocks, pointless and failed targeting, #Ukraine’s sustainability of its infrastracture and simply end of the winter (no need for heating)
64) But this strategy is nowhere to end. 🇷🇺 missile strikes to 🇺🇦 cities continues. In the coming months, with possible Ukrainian advances, intimidation attacks will continue and water infrastructure could make the main target of this inhumane strategy.
themoscowtimes.com/2023/04/09/rus…
66) #Russia’s strikes could increase again before the next winter. 🇷🇺 announced that it will ramp up Kh-50 and other missiles production. We could not asses whether it is possible. But Xi’s visit guaranteed the further supply of semi-conductors and others.
euromaidanpress.com/2023/04/13/rus…
67) Increased cooperation between #Wagner forces and #VDV in the center of #Bakhmut. This cooperation will make the process harder in the town for Ukrainian forces since these two forces are complementing each other.
68) In addition to mines, loitering munitions are an important threat for #Ukraine’s riverine patrol boats and future landing ops. Boats are assumed as hard targets to precise but this footage shows Lancet is much more capable in targeting.
69) Here an older footage of #Russia’s targeting of a Gyurza-M patrol boat of #Ukraine via loitering munition. This two examples shows that Lancet LMs have enough fire power to neutralize an armed boat which made them important to counter.
70) #Ukraine could try to mount small AA guns, fishnets and could use assigned watchmen to check and clear the skies. Approaching to the hostile shore of the river and disembarking the boat are the most vulnerable phasis. So 🇺🇦 could enhance the security of these boats. Image
71) We need to be careful in taking these ‘leaked intel’ news. JDAMs could have had problems in the initial days as it is a foreign and alien terrain and #Russia GPS-jamming systems. But this problem would and could easily be mitigated. These leaks have both truths and lies. Image
72) These ‘intel leak’ news have negative nature and important in its timing. It timely targets the information space in favour of #Russia before the 🇺🇦 offensive. For example, JDAM story could easily shape the public opinion and harm the process of transferring fighters to Kyiv.
73) #Russia clearly wittnessed and experienced in #Bakhmut and #Kreminna that delaying the Western support via use of subversion is the only way to further attrit Ukrainian forces. These months claimed lives of 🇺🇦 soldiers and civilians. Info Space is too important to lost. Image
74) Battles in #Bakhmut continues by house-to-house it looks harder for #Ukraine to hold the town center and followed up by a move to the West. But 🇺🇦 mining of the town turn any inch of advance to an unbearable cost. 🇺🇦 fight in a unbelievable way in here
75) Heavy battles for the center of #Bakhmut continues. #Russia again re-organized its troops for another push in the town. #Ukraine still actively defend and deny Russian movements and 🇷🇺 forces’ slow progress despite constant reinforcements persists the problems for Moscow.
76) #Ukraine actively target #Russia’s electronic warfare units in recent weeks. The reason for this is the 🇺🇦 forces desire to control EMS for a better use of GPS and other EM requirements. It coud be a sign for gurther use of PGMs, drones or for improving the strikes vs jamming
77) #Ukraine uses camouflaged screens against #Russia's loitering munitions. The exact efficiency of these measures are still far from vision. But it is a creative+effective adaptation against a new danger at above. But it only protects stationary assets.
78) An interesting claim by ISW, #Ukraine tries to gain a foothold near #Oleshky (a possible bridgehead or a forward point). Oleshky is a suitable point for an amphibious op. but with Nova Kahkovka these two points are #Russia’s most prepared towns to defend. Can’t confirm this.
80) #Ukraine continously move around Kinburn Spit, Potemkin Island, #Oleshky and #NovaKahkovka. Ukrainian SOF forces tries to establish weak points of Russian defences to go on with an amphibious landing. For now, landing is slow paced as Western armour+supply is still on its way
81) #Oleshky is also important for hit-and-run and attritional attacks. It has massive green tree lines along the river and sand dunes. So it can be a position to harass Russian forces while conducting a main landing elsewhere.
82) It looks like #Russia is no longer in an actual offensive around Kupyansk, #Kreminna and #Avdiivka. The main Russian efforts, now, focuses on #Bakhmut and Mar’inka. Russian forces and Wagner, now, call for an operational pause to prepare against 🇺🇦 offensive. Image
83) #Ukraine's predicted counter-offensive is tigthly related with its goals. From a tactical level crossing up the Dnipro and establishing a bridgehead for follow-up forces is the first goal. Ukraine has three possible directions to ultimate political goal: Crimea. Image
84) Ukraine could land from Kinburn, Potemkin, Oleshky and Nova Kahkovka direction and could move to the ultimate political goal. Threatening Crimea could stall 🇷🇺 advances in 🇺🇦 land and could push Russian forces to defend its main logistics lines and led to a political outrage. Image
85) But any attempt to take Crimea without securing its rear in the Peninsula could put 🇺🇦 forces at risk. Ukraine could land on the Kinburn Spit. It resembles Normandy. It is remote, has beaches, protected by natural barriers (reduce the need for troop deployment) but lacks... Image
86) ... any railway and proper road connection. This requires a limited control of sea and river to continue the supplies. Ukraine could try to isolate Crimea and move towars oper. goals Myrne and Sokolohirne to isolate the peninsula. Ukraine could force Russian forces to a... Image
87) ... battle or to a retreat to Krasnoprerekopsk-Enerhodar line. In this scenario taking Melitopol would be the strategic goal. In a third scenario, Ukraine could try to land in Enerhodar or move via Vasilivka and Orikhiv. It would be hard and long process, so highly unlikely. Image
88) All these expectations are highly abstract, we still don't know how much troops Ukraine could mass for an offensive, their quality and equipment. There would be many war friction. There is a high number of 🇷🇺 troops, in a landing to Kinburn...
89) Myrne's north would be the decisive ground. If Ukraine could succed in moving fast it could trap Russian forces along the Dnipro. Russian forces claimed that they are in #Oleshky. Not surprising but their presence is not granted since 🇺🇦 are active.
90) #Ukraine's officials preferred an plausible denialability over the reports about #Oleshky. It is a clear move that values OPSEC. It is clear that Ukrainian forces are active there but this is not a territory liberation rather a contestation.
kyivindependent.com/military/
91) Climate remains tricky in #Ukraine. In some regions in the South mud is continously challenge Ukrainian forces. Mud have excessive impact on operational outcome in the regions like Kreminna, Oleshky and Kinburn as they would require intense rural ops.
92) Our operational designs tend to focus on the Southern #Ukraine. But could Ukrainian forces try a second push from #Kreminna to Starobilsk? The answer is yes. But Ukraine experienced that even the narrow differences in map, the region is hard to advance by parallel to P-66. Image
93) Interesting but highly important statistics from #Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian sources 80% of its wounded soldiers had an access in treatment in the 'Golden hour' and achieved to return combat. #Russia did not share exact numbers over this issue
ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/369…
94) #Ukraine's reports also underlined that 'barotravma' or 'shell-shock' (in mil. terminology) caused %93 of all hospitalizations while mines caused 7% of injuries. A soldier with an injury in his or her heart in frontline was transferred to Kharkiv in 6-8h to Kyiv in 12h. Image
95) War continues to put a stress on #Ukraine's healthcare system (higher in #Russia but never went public as 🇷🇺 use hospitals in occupied 🇺🇦) physiotheraphical rehabilitation, mental health and cancer treatment. Mines continues to be a persisting problem.
bbc.com/news/world-eur…
96) #Ukraine experience a persisting problem in antibiotic resistant superbugs caused infections. Germany reported similiar concerns among 🇺🇦 patients and resistance caused by widespread antibiotic use in livestock. It hardens the treatment of soldiers.
japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/04/1…
97) #Russia is planning to redeploy its naval assets in Black Sea to the Southern #Ukraine as rumours over possible offensive effort intensifies. Russian Navy could fulfill two important goals in this phase; protect the entrance of Dnipro in Kinburn Spit,
98) ... via use of Coastal Defence Ships, shipborne helicopters or could try to assist forces in a scenario of Ukrainian offensive with landing ships and surface-to-shore capabilities. But Ukrainian MUSVs and ASMs would seriously limit its role.
99) Here an interactive map for the strategy of #RussiaUkraineWar.

#Bakhmut #Ukraine #Russia #Soledar #Kreminna #Svatove #Wagner #UkraineWar #Vuhledar #Oleshky

earth.google.com/earth/d/1h7Koe…
100) A footage showed that #Ukraine used its JDAMs in an airstrike against an ammunition depot in #Bakhmut. You can clearly see the difference from the corrected and repeated artillery shots, JDAMs resolve is much more efficient with the use of few rounds.
101) #Russia’s main offensive efforts, now, focused on #Bakhmut and #Marinka. A seperate offensive action was carried in #Avdiivka which was failed. The real problem is in Bakhmut as #Ukraine shifted to defend Chasiv Yar since rural supply routes were congested with mud.
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More from @ArveloaMert

Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Sep 17
It's worth reading this impressive initial report from the Financial Times. It is linked to Israel and is quite significant in terms of offensive cyber operations. Lets analyze, #Israel's large scale cyber operation against #Hezbollah in #Lebanon.
ft.com/content/dbaac6…
1) Firstly, the attack was designed to cause real damage using cyber/virtual tools vs a strategically important network (communication infrastructure). It was carried out in a very organized manner, but it is also stated that the attack was not heavily based on 'remote intrusion'
2) Another observation is based on the fact that the batteries of pagers are unlikely to cause this level of injury. Lithium-ion batteries are dangerous and flammable, but the condition of the injured suggests the possibility that the batteries were designed to be more explosive.
Read 15 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Oct 21, 2023
Lets start the twelfth and the newest thread on the strategy of the Russo-Ukrainian War that will cover fall offensives. #Avdiivka #Bakhmut #Ukraine #Robotyne #UkraineWar #Kherson #UkraineRussiaWar️ #Melitopol #Zaporizhzhia #Kyiv #Berdyansk #Verbove #Novoprokopivka #Tokmak Image
1) Here is the previous thread on the strategy of the Russo-Ukrainian War that includes issues like information warfare, Allied trainings for Ukraine, situation in #Avdiivka offensive and #Kherson counter offensive, Zaporizhzhia and modern day fortified wars and other issues.
2) Lets talk about #Russia’s losses of officers in #Ukraine. Russian Military lost unbelieavable number of 3000 officers in Ukraine from different ranks. However, the lion share the losses were concentrated on junior officers like Lieutenants and Majors. This group is important.
Read 109 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Aug 23, 2023
Lets start our tenth and the newest thread on the strategy of Russo-Ukrainian War which will cover operations during the late August and early fall. #Bakhmut #Ukraine #Kreminna #Svatove #UkraineWar #UkraineRussiaWar️ #Melitopol #Zaporizhzhia #Kyiv #Mariupol #Berdyansk #Kherson Image
12) Few words on #Tokmak. We have to carefully asses the claims that state #Russia’s defences in the town is in the brink of imminent collapse. The town is one of the #Ukraine’s critical operational goals with Melitopol. Its South has key railroad link that makes the land bridge. Image
12) #Tokmak is heavily fortified town which increasingly become a target of #Ukraine’s long range strikes. But still the town is main position for #Russia to hold-on. Leaving Tokmak without a fight is highly irrational for 🇷🇺 as it would not only risk the theatre but entire war. Image
Read 92 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Jul 15, 2023
Here is the ninth and the newest thread about Russo-Ukrainian War that includes #Ukraine’s counter offensive efforts in #Bakhmut. #Ukraine #Zapoizhzhia #Kreminna #Svatove #UkraineWar #Oleshky #UkraineRussiaWar️ #Melitopol #Zaporizhzhia #Kyiv #Mariupol #Berdyansk #Kherson #Wagner Image
1) You can find all earlier Twitter threads on war in #Ukraine and #Russia's unlawful invasion and more in this interactive map. Please remember that this map is not for showing the exact lines of contacts but to understand strategies.
2) Mistrust increasingly become visible after the #Wagner's mutiny within the Russian Command. After General Surovikin (who is the most senior officer that disappeared), Major Generals Popov and Vladimir Selivestrov were dismissed from their duties.
Read 45 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
Jun 19, 2023
Here is the eight and the newest thread about Russo-Ukrainian War that includes #Ukraine’s counter offensive efforts in #Zaporizhzhia #Ukraine #Bakhmut #Kreminna #Svatove #UkraineWar #Oleshky #UkraineRussiaWar️ #Melitopol #Zaporizhzhia #Kyiv #Mariupol #Berdyansk #Kherson #Wagner Image
13) The Attacker could use firepower to prevent this laying process. But just like the first aspect, defenders could increase their fire power which would decrease the operational pace. Russian decision to relocate troops from Kherson and further risking of air power shows this. Image
14) But different from what Malthus claimed, just like population all this laying and firepower increase process has a limit of production, resupply and logistics. In long run with long-range strikes #Ukraine could balance this rate if they can achieve to protect their equipment. Image
Read 97 tweets
Mert N. Matsumoto (松本信秀) Profile picture
May 28, 2023
Here is the seventh thread 🧵 about the strategy of the #RussoUkrainianWar for the early summer. Russia took the control of #Bakhmut while Ukraine is still planning its offensive efforts. #Ukraine #Russia #Soledar #Kreminna #Svatove #Wagner #UkraineWar #Leopard2 #Vuhledar Image
1) You can find all earlier Twitter threads on war in #Ukraine and #Russia's unlawful invasion and more in this interactive map. Please remember that this map is not for showing the exact lines of contacts but to understand strategies.
2) British MoD underlined that, as planned, #Wagner is now withdrawing from the center of #Bakhmut. The defence of the town will be transferred to so-called DNR forces combined with VDV units. This shows that Wagner will not be in defensive efforts.
Read 62 tweets

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