1: Really, the US would do a hell of a lot better by leveraging addition and multiplication instead of subtraction and division. It has a lot to offer. And the BUILD Act helps. But it is not going to get anywhere by trying to write China out of Asia's story as rhetoric or policy.
2: In my humble opinion, there are multiple unforced errors here, both implicit and explicit. One is the directly comparison of US offerings to China's. America isn't China and shouldn't be comparing apples to apples. We offer something different.
3: Yes, there are two models on offer. But they won't apply equally in all situations, sectors, or countries. The US does some things very well that China can't or won't. But China does some things that the US doesn't. Including in sectors where the US isn't active.
4: Surely, the point should be to leverage uniquely *American* strengths. I was just in Kazakhstan, where there's a ton ambivalence about China and the state has problems keeping "the street" on side with China's growing role. But nobody will be writing China out of the story.
5: And this is replicated all over Asia. Ultimately, at the political level, Washington spends far too much time playing defense against Beijing. And it is not going on "offense" to simply trash Chinese initiatives that more than a few governments actually welcome,.
6: And there's a risk in making the comparison this explicitly. What's the US putting on the table -- and is it on the table everywhere? This approach, whether to BRI or to AIIB, risks inviting comparisons, implicit and explicit, between what the US offers and what Beijing does.
7: I would not simply *presume* that the comparison always favors Washington. It doesn't. The US is diplomatically challenged and commercially weak in around two-thirds of the Eurasian continental landmass. Sadly, then, the comparison will often benefit Beijing not Washington.
8: And that is not all. Trashing China’s initiatives rhetorically while failing to counter and compete with them, which will be the case in many places *even* with BUILD, signals other capitals that their countries are of little interest to the United States on their own terms.
9: Their takeaway will surely be that the United States pays attention to them *only* in the context of its strategic competition with China. That is a poor message indeed.
10: There is certainly a deep suspicion of Chinese intent across Asia today. But I have seen enough from every sub-region of Asia to know that the US will not get far by telling third countries that they should forestall deepening their economic relationships with China.
11: For nearly every country, and especially the smaller ones, that is an impractical choice, and therefore will be rejected.
12: And the Administration doesn't need to do this because it has actually done some very good things. The BUILD Act is a big step. And the Administration is taking Chinese strategic competition seriously, and also taking seriously the need for the US to actually get in the game.
13: And that is for the good. To compete in geopolitics—as in sports, business, and life—one needs to actually compete. Washington has to outperform the Chinese competition, not just belittle and whine about it. I hate to say it, but we still sound like a bunch of whiners.
14: So hats off the Administration for taking Chinese competition and the infrastructure piece seriously. But here's the thing: like Don Quixote tilting at windmills, it is futile for the US to try to write China out of Asia’s story.
15: And this would be true of any China, not just Xi Jinping’s assertive and nationalistic China.
16: One reason for this is cartographic: China borders every sub-region of Asia—Northeast, Southeast, Central, and South. The United States does not. Neither does any other big Asian player.
17: Another reason is financial: even if China can't ultimately deploy the billions of state-backed project finance it has pledged to the Belt and Road, it can still drop plenty of meaningful money into countries all over Asia where the US and its firms are largely invisible.
18: To reject and battle against every instance of China’s effort to foster connectivity, then, would require Washington to fight both geographic and economic gravity.
19: And that is precisely the implicit message when one tells governments across Asia that China offers nothing but a "one-way road" and a "constricting belt." Actually, many of them, even when they don't trust China or the Belt and Road, think they're getting something from it.
20: The US should be deploying messages that best appeal to partners who have stepped into the vacuum created by US absence, disinterest, protectionism, and worse. And some of these partners -- Japan, Singapore, etc. -- aren't spending all their time trashing the Belt and Road.
21: Japan is the best example, and Shinzo Abe is showing how to get it done. He nods to China's initiatives, even exploring co-financing (note the contrast with US messaging). But he also launches his own $110b Quality Infrastructure Initiative (money/momentum, not just mouth).
22: Or look at Singapore, which has Chinese investment, including in infrastructure (e.g., Sinohydro for the Napier subway station and associated tunneling), but not via secret Belt and Road deals.
23: I've written on this elsewhere. Here's a recent essay, "Reluctant Stakeholder," that tried to capture some of the strategic dilemmas for the United States in all of this. Read here: macropolo.org/reluctant-stak… 
24: But the punchline is this: I wish the US would spend more time on offense than defense. And I don't think this kind of rhetoric meets that test or much helps the case. I understand the impulse. I do. And comparison of US strengths to China's offerings can be good. But ...
25: It is a fantasy to think the US will write China out of Asia's story merely by telling everyone to do so. To return to my first tweet: addition and multiplication beat subtraction and division. They certainly will when Asian countries -- governments and publics -- listen.
26: The United States has been in Asia since the Empress of China sailed from New York harbor in 1784. And we have colossal strengths to play to. Colossal. Maybe better to dial down the trash talk and really deliver for the region instead by using those strengths? End of rant.
