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Oh, go on then. First thing, it's an interesting piece. Being in a customs union certainly places constraints on an independent UK trade policy.
Questions are: how significant are the constraints? What is preferable from an economic perspective? What is preferable from a political perspective? What is the counterfactual wrt FTAs we could get that we couldn't otherwise.
The easiest to answer is the economics: there is no evidence to suggest that economic impact of being outside of a customs union with the EU can be offset by new trade agreements.
Politically, it's a judgement call - how valuable are new FTAs as trophies in a post-Brexit world?
Politically, it's a judgement call - how valuable are new FTAs as trophies in a post-Brexit world?
As to the constraints being in a customs union places on an independent trade policy, they are real, but as I have argued here I think are often overstated: cer.eu/publications/a…
As to the counterfactual: Would the UK outside of a customs union strike comprehensive FTAs with countries the EU will struggle to do with - so India, US and China. China is doable, but will be lopsided and shallow a la Swiss; India, no; US ... ummm, I'm not sure.
(EU negotiating with Australia and New Zealand anyway - so in a customs union we could just negotiate an FTA with them in parallel with the EU regardless. Note: when it comes to number of FTAs, EU is global powerhouse.)
Right, onto details of piece.
This might be true, it might not. Since the Brexit vote the EU concluded a free trade agreement with Japan, upgraded its deal with Mexico and is close to getting an FTA with Singapore over the line. So let's see.
This might be true, it might not. Since the Brexit vote the EU concluded a free trade agreement with Japan, upgraded its deal with Mexico and is close to getting an FTA with Singapore over the line. So let's see.
It is correct that UK could never have a veto over EU trade policy when outside of the EU (it doesn't have one within the EU, except on rare occasion). However Labour right to expect improved consultation etc beyond that offered to Turkey presently.
see: cer.eu/insights/labou…
see: cer.eu/insights/labou…
This is all irrelevant to the UK being in a customs union with the EU. Nothing the EU agreed with the US on public services, investment protection, chlorinated chicken etc etc (anything other than tariffs) would have an impact on the UK.
This is misleading. The EU would not negotiate on behalf of the UK regardless and the UK would need to negotiate its own market access as part of its own FTA with country x, but EU couldn't offer up UK market as part of its own deal (see future tweet).
Greg points to the 'Turkey trap'. The fear that if the EU signs an FTA with someone, eg India, that refuses to also sign one with the UK, Indonesia will be able to export tariff free into the UK but UK gets nowt in return. Reducing incentive for India to negotiate w/UK.
This is misleading, but a common mistake. UK would not be forced to lower tariffs to EU-levels on direct imports from India, and like Turkey, wouldn't until it also had an agreement. There is a risk that Indian imports enter UK via EU, yes.
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Greg's point on trade remedies is v interesting. In practice we don't know how it would work - something subject to negotiation - but whether it's an independent UK competence or shared with EU remains to be seen. Difficult to be definitive.
This is very much an opinion, not a fact. My opinion is that there is no reason to think that EU approach to trade preferences will become any more protectionist than now. But open to debate, sure.
One of the themes throughout this is that UK would also need to align itself on technical rules for goods and SPS. The extent to which this is true, and the levels of integration required is very much up for debate.
(i.e. UK might want an SPS agreement similar to Swiss, removing need for border inspection posts - this would certainly constrain UK trade policy. Or, it might go for equivalence arrangement similar to NZ, reducing frequency but not need for checks - this wouldn't.)
Overall - as alluded at beginning of thread, when discussing imperfect options is hard to avoid trade offs; much depends on how you weight, in particular, economics against political. @GregHands' has looked at this more than most, which is commendable, but I have a few quibbles.
