Thread by @LemonSlayerUS

Icymi

https://twitter.com/wesleysmorgan/status/1136635401895055360

This is the 176 page "𝙍𝙚𝙙𝙖𝙘𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝙁𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙞𝙣𝙜𝙨 𝙤𝙛 𝙁𝙖𝙘𝙩 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙍𝙚𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙨" document on 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙉𝙞𝙜𝙚𝙧 𝘼𝙢𝙗𝙪𝙨𝙝 𝙧𝙚𝙥𝙤𝙧𝙩:

esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Doc…

Interesting tidbit: On page 1 of the redacted Niger Ambush report, while describing members of the investigating team that includes both the @FBI and the @CIA, they redacted the name of a 3rd US IC organization. Namely the @NSAGov .

The FOIA exemption (b)(3) 3605 cited is evidently only used by the @NSAGov:

open.defense.gov/Portals/23/Doc…

More tidbits: The investigating team interviewed Nigerien pilots. Probably pilots of the Nigerien helicopter that responded to initial report of the ambush, but "diverted prior to arrival in Tongo Tongo in order to de-conflict airspace for French jets."

dod.defense.gov/portals/1/feat…

More tidbits: Though it has been widely publicized in various reporting, the naming of the Army Special Forces Operational Detachment “Alpha” (ODA) Team 3212 involved in the Niger Ambush is redacted here on page 4:

More tidbits: The Special Operations Command and Control Elements (SOCCE) – Lake Chad Basin (SOCCE-LCB), commanded by an Army O-5/Lieutenant Colonel (LTC), and battalion headquarters for the company-level command during the Niger Ambush has since been disbanded. See footnote 40.

More tidbits: Notable that Team OUALLAM (ODA Team 3212) was missing/lacking its second-in-command, a chief warrant officer who serves as the assistant commander.

More tidbits: Idk if the reference here to "Detachment Commander (18A) was the person "running the Team OUALLAM operations center at the time of the attack" or not. Seems like it, but again, Idk.

FYI - For the uninitiated, note the difference between US Army Special Forces Operational Detachment “Alpha” (ODA) and Operational Detachment "Bravo" (ODB):

More tidbits: This was SSG Dustin Wright's first deployment as a team member of a US Army Special Forces Operational Detachment “Alpha” (ODA).

More tidbits: Seems that like SSG Dustin Wright, this was SSG Jeremiah Johnson's first deployment as a team member of a US Army Special Forces Operational Detachment “Alpha” (ODA).

More tidbits: Unlike some others involved in the Niger Ambush, SGT LaDavid Johnson had been deployed to Niger before in the previous year.

More tidbits: With US and Nigerien forces during the Niger Ambush was a "U.S. Civilian Contractor...who is a civilian contract employee with the Wexford Group and works for the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO)." More info on JIDO here: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Imp…

More tidbits: Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), "including Kevlar helmets and body armor..." was issued. Some had them on, some put them on under fire, and 1 didn't put his on.

Because?

"[T]he perception that they were operating in a permissive environment."

More tidbits: Most of this is redacted and doesn't explicitly say, but irt "U.S. Civilian Contractor", I can't imagine he would've gone out into bad guy country without being armed as well.

More tidbits: This an interesting footnote. Only SSG Jeremiah Johnson is described as grabbing more ammunition during the ambush firefight than the 3 magazines he may have started with.

More tidbits: Another interesting footnote. It would seem that the mission survivors would definitively know whether or not they rolled with ".50 caliber machine guns", so why the uncertainty here? Idk.

More tidbits: Friendly Force Tracking (FFT) Devices. Only "one was functional"?

More tidbits: Any casualty evacuation was by ground. The "Golden Hour" might as well be a fantasy. This is a well-known deficiency across all of @USAfricaCommand's continent-wide/deep Area of Responsibility (AOR), and known from the bottom to the top of the chain of command.

Gonna call it a night. I'll continue my fine-tooth comb reading of the 176 page "𝙍𝙚𝙙𝙖𝙘𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝙁𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙞𝙣𝙜𝙨 𝙤𝙛 𝙁𝙖𝙘𝙩 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙍𝙚𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙨" report on 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙉𝙞𝙜𝙚𝙧 𝘼𝙢𝙗𝙪𝙨𝙝 tomorrow.

If you can't wait, read it yourself: esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Doc…

Where was I? Oh yeah, the primary method of casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) for any wounded/injured Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 members was "ground evacuation"! Not even by contractor helicopter, but on overland via ground transport in the middle of nowhere. See footnote 124.

If in trouble and needing armed support, Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 members could call on other "Nigerien Partner forces" as "quick reaction forces (QRF)".

As detailed in the 8 page summary report of the Niger Ambush from May 10, 2018, it took this Nigerien Quick Reaction Force (QRF) approximately 4 hours and 25 minutes to arrive at Tongo Tongo:

dod.defense.gov/portals/1/feat…

One might ask why the US Army, and in particular, the US Army Special Forces doesn't teach "skills in fighting from unarmored civilian vehicles" itself. Instead it pays a private contractor to teach it.

Though it is redacted, it would seem likely that the "vehicle training in December 2016" was about "fighting from unarmored civilian vehicles". It was attended by only 4 team members involved in the Niger Ambush, and almost a year before the ambush.

Might be something one gets trained on beforehand when you're destined to be going out on a missions in Niger in "two white Toyota Land Cruiser four-door pickup trucks and a Toyota SUV."

On pages 26-27, the document talks about the changeover from one SF ODA team to the arriving Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212. SOP was to have an overlap, but it didn't really happen.

Page 29 seems to state that Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 did have some joint "react to contact and break contact" drills with their Nigerien partner forces, but it is unclear how much and how real.

Pages 29-30 seem to show that Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212's Concept of Operations document (CONOPS) for their 1st and 2nd missions in Niger were "cut and pasted" identical though the missions were not the same at all. Their 3rd mission ended up being the Niger Ambush.

I can't stress how important this statement is from page 30.

𝙉𝙚𝙞𝙩𝙝𝙚𝙧 𝙏𝙚𝙖𝙢 𝙊𝙪𝙖𝙡𝙡𝙖𝙢 - 𝙊𝘿𝘼 𝙏𝙚𝙖𝙢 3212 𝙣𝙤𝙧 𝙩𝙝𝙚𝙞𝙧 𝙉𝙞𝙜𝙚𝙧𝙞𝙚𝙣 𝙥𝙖𝙧𝙩𝙣𝙚𝙧 𝙛𝙤𝙧𝙘𝙚𝙨 𝙝𝙖𝙙 𝙚𝙫𝙚𝙧 𝙗𝙚𝙚𝙣 𝙞𝙣 𝙗𝙖𝙩𝙩𝙡𝙚 𝙗𝙚𝙛𝙤𝙧𝙚 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙉𝙞𝙜𝙚𝙧 𝘼𝙢𝙗𝙪𝙨𝙝.

Page 32 bluntly describes a Larry, Moe and Curly-level of disorganization in approving Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for missions in Niger.

"Confusion" is their unbelievable understatement.

From page 33 - Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 wasn't buying the intel on Doundou Chefou from AOB Niger, and wasn't buying idea he'd even still be at the site when Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 finally arrived.

But remember that AOB Niger is another name for the team's Command HQ.

More from page 33 in footnote 240 - Seems to state some US IC component in the US Embassy in Niger was the source of the intel on Doundou Chefou. Given the media reports on "cellphone" intel, one would think this was intel from the @NSAGov.

More from page 33 in footnote 244 - I don't know about anybody else, but this reads as if the author is saying someone is lying "about the task and purpose of Team OUALLAM’s Tiloa mission."

And just who was the "I" who made that determination? Idk, but I'd like to.

From page 34 - Oh my!!!

Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 thought the intel for the Tiloa mission was unreliable because it came from the same unreliable sourcing as for a mission they had done several days earlier.

For those of you with a military background, you'll understand what I mean when I say that Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 thought they were on a "snipe hunt".

For those unfamiliar with the term, I give you this: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snipe_hunt

From page 34 - I'm guessing this is the AOB saying to Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 that they'll assign a drone to provide ISR on the target site to help determine if the HVT is actually there.

Using an ISR drone to try to convince Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 on the mission.

My eyeballs are insisting on closing for the night, so I'll pick up again on my fine-tooth comb reading of the 176 page "𝙍𝙚𝙙𝙖𝙘𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝙁𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙞𝙣𝙜𝙨 𝙤𝙛 𝙁𝙖𝙘𝙩 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙍𝙚𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙨" report on 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙉𝙞𝙜𝙚𝙧 𝘼𝙢𝙗𝙪𝙨𝙝 again tomorrow.

Night all!

From page 37 - Contrary to the entirety of blame placed on Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 for the "inaccurate" CONOP used on their 1st mission to Tiloa to find/fix or capture/kill the HVT, it's clear that the AOB, their immediate higher HQ, was fully aware and approved the mission.

From page 38 - The Lt Col commanding Special Operations Command and Control Elements Lake Chad Basin (SOCCE-LCB), the battalion headquarters, was kept out of the approval/notification loop for the 1st mission to Tiloa. The US Ambassador was briefed, but not SOCCE-LCB, Disturbing!

In case you've missed it, the "𝙍𝙚𝙙𝙖𝙘𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝙁𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙞𝙣𝙜𝙨 𝙤𝙛 𝙁𝙖𝙘𝙩 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙍𝙚𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙨" report on 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙉𝙞𝙜𝙚𝙧 𝘼𝙢𝙗𝙪𝙨𝙝 that I'm referencing in my tweets is here: esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Doc…

From page 39 - This give the lie to the oft-repeated messaging that US forces are only being used to "advise and assist" partner forces. It's quite clear here that the actions to find/fix or capture/kill the HVT in this mission to Tiloa was solely in the hands of the USSOF.

From page 39 again - While haste was described as a primary factor for this mission, higher-ups basically completely damning commentary here on preparations Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 "𝙙𝙞𝙙 𝙣𝙤𝙩" make for their 1st mission to Tiloa to find/fix or capture/kill the HVT.

From page 40 - All the reporting has described Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 as composed of 11 US personnel, but in viewing this graphic, there are 12 people in the US vehicles. Idk if one of them was Nigerien, but that's a possibility.

As I've thought about it, the 12th person in the US vehicles is probably the Interpreter (Nigerien Civilian Contractor) and rode in a US vehicle to provide translation over radio comms to the partner Nigerien forces.

From page 41 - With no luck in their find/fix or capture/kill the HVT 1st mission to Tiloa, apparently the re-directed US ISR platform (unstated whether manned or unmanned aircraft) has new intel on that HVT. Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 stops in preparation for a 2nd mission.

From page 42 - New, at least to me, is the AOB (the Special Forces Company HQ for Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212) initially planned to only have Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 do the 2nd mission alone. Team ARLIT, with a helicopter assault force, was only an aftethought!

In case anyone missed the significance regarding the impetus for this 2nd mission, I'll make it clear. Capt. (O-3) Michael Perozeni,commanded Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212. Though the AOB was commanded by a Major (O-4), he was on leave, so his XO, a Capt. (O-3) was in charge.

It was Team 3212’s leader, Capt. Perozeni, who had to suggest to the AOB Capt. (O-3) acting commander that perhaps Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 wasn't prepared/capable of doing the 2nd mission alone, and maybe Team ARLIT, with a helicopter assault force, was a better plan. 🙄

And to those asking if the AOB Capt. (O-3) acting commander was at all reprimanded/punished for his actions/commands, nope!

From @Tmgneff 's piece: nytimes.com/2018/11/03/wor…

From page 43 - Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 goes from being the primary force of the AOB Capt. (O-3) acting commander's 2nd mission to capture/kill the HVT to being out of the planning loop altogether. But that doesn't mean they won't have a role in that mission. Stay tuned!

From page 43 again - Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 has been driving around all effing day in Saharan heat, and now they'll get to have some "sleep" before they do their 2nd mission which they aren't involved in the planning for.

From page 44 - Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 still out of the planning loop for the 2nd mission they're are going to get.

At least "the SOCCE-LCB Commander, directed the AOB and Team ARLIT to be more deliberate in their planning."🙄

It's that time again. Snooze for me! I'll pick up again on my fine-tooth comb reading of the 176 page "𝙍𝙚𝙙𝙖𝙘𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝙁𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙞𝙣𝙜𝙨 𝙤𝙛 𝙁𝙖𝙘𝙩 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙍𝙚𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙨" report on 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙉𝙞𝙜𝙚𝙧 𝘼𝙢𝙗𝙪𝙨𝙝 again tomorrow with the 2nd mission.

Night all!

As I begin again my fine-tooth comb reading of the "𝙍𝙚𝙙𝙖𝙘𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝙁𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙞𝙣𝙜𝙨 𝙤𝙛 𝙁𝙖𝙘𝙩 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙍𝙚𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙨" report on 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙉𝙞𝙜𝙚𝙧 𝘼𝙢𝙗𝙪𝙨𝙝, that report I'm referencing in my tweets is here: esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Doc…

From page 44 again - Preparations are being made for the 2nd mission of Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212. Acting as a "blocking force" was discarded. Instead Team Ouallam is tasked to be the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for the helicopter-borne Team Arlit force.

Also note from page 44 that it appears the planning for using Team Ouallam as a QRF for Team Arlit is done entirely by Team Arlit and the AOB. Team Ouallam doesn't appear to be directly in the loop. Team Arlit and the AOB "did not provide planning priorities for the QRF."

How far out of the planning loop was Team Ouallam you ask?

All the way!

Confirmed here again on page 44. Team Ouallam thought they were a "blocking force", but Team ARLIT, the AOB, SOCCE-LCB, and SOCFWD-NWA planned Team Ouallam as a QRF for the helicopter-borne Team Arlit force

Again from page 44 - This is a pretty good description of the 2nd mission's seat-of-the-pants "planning".

A hasty mission with major planning and operational gaps including their comms, QRF priorities, CASEVAC, and maneuver.

Proponents would argue - Be nimble! Be quick!

From page 45 - SOCAFRICA is responsible for all Special Operations Forces on the entire continent of Africa. As this entire ¶ makes clear, SOCAFRICA wasn't provided timely notification as required.

Reminds me of "It’s better to beg for forgiveness than to ask for permission.”

From page 45 again - Per @Tmgneff's piece from 11/03/18, this lack of oversight is what got General Hicks, commanding officer of SOCAFRICA, punished.

nytimes.com/2018/11/03/wor…

From page 46 - The flying distance from Arlit, Niger to Niamey, Niger is approximately 945 miles. The "official" reason for canceling the Team Arlit helicopter-borne air assault was "weather".

The "real" reason was they didn't have the fuel and re-fueling to go that distance.

From page 46 again - Team Ouallam is told that instead of being the QRF for the Team Arlit helicopter-borne air assault, they will have to do the assault themselves. Team Ouallam's leader Captain Perozeni objects with good reason. His command HQ at the AOB orders him to proceed.

From page 47 - So many things in this ¶!

1. Suck it up Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212! You have your orders!
2. No CASEVAC plan and not enough fuel for the ISR drone to provide overwatch back to base.
3. Don't tell SOCAFRICA,!

From page 48 - Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 has been spotted!

This likely lead directly to the 𝙉𝙞𝙜𝙚𝙧 𝘼𝙢𝙗𝙪𝙨𝙝! Cheffou, the High Value Target (HVT), likely is immediately informed about being directly targeted and begins to plan his counter-operation with a 100+ force.

From page 49 - Not stated here, but as I interpret these details, it seem obvious that the HVT Cheffou, or his lieutenants, are now in the process of rallying their 100+ force, gathering weapons from caches including RPGs, mortars, and technical vehicles for their ambush.

From page 50 - In hindsight, a critical & tragic point here!

Overhead ISR was providing overwatch of Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212. Had that overhead ISR continued to provide that overwatch, it's likely Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 would never have been ambushed at Tongo Tongo.

Cont'd: Again in hindsight, that Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Tactical Controller (ITC) made the right call, but was tragically overruled by redacted [(b)(3) / (b)(6)].

Who's this decision-maker?

Idk, but he/she will sadly bear the pain of these consequences.

With that I conclude the 2nd mission that morphed into a consequential 3rd mission.

Tomorrow continues my fine-tooth comb reading of the "𝙍𝙚𝙙𝙖𝙘𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝙁𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙞𝙣𝙜𝙨 𝙤𝙛 𝙁𝙖𝙘𝙩 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙍𝙚𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙨" report with the actual 𝙉𝙞𝙜𝙚𝙧 𝘼𝙢𝙗𝙪𝙨𝙝.

From page 50 - Team Ouallam at Tongo Tongo. The ISR drone returns to Niamey (due to running low on fuel?).

The claim there's "insufficient evidence" that had the ISR drone provided overwatch to Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 it might not have "observed the enemy" is total BS!

From page 54 - Whether the Tongo Tongo villages attempted to delay the departure of Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 so the attackers could setup the ambush has long been a suspicion.

Evidence that some villagers participated in the ambush firefight is redacted.

From page 56 - The actual 𝙉𝙞𝙜𝙚𝙧 𝘼𝙢𝙗𝙪𝙨𝙝 has begun. Troops in Contact (TIC) radioed to higher command echelons at 11:40.

Firing was coming from the left rear of the convoy. The convoy stopped. Fire was returned.

Cont'd - Remember from page 39 that "Team OUALLAM conducted no specific mission rehearsals or immediate action drills (i.e. actions on the objective, react to contact, react to ambush, break contact,,,either internally...or with partner Nigeriens comprising the total force."

Cont'd again - Because there were no mission rehearsals or immediate action drills, Team Ouallam and their partner Nigerien forces had no plan to follow and simply fell back on whatever each individual thought. No mention at this stage of any Team Ouallam "organized" response.

From page 58 - A visual depiction of the convoy of Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 and Nigerien partner forces at the ambush site.

From page 62 - Fwiw, given no "mission rehearsals or immediate action drills (i.e. actions on the objective, react to contact, react to ambush, break contact,,,"), returning fire just happens just because.

In hindsight, the convoy missed a choice to simply "get out of Dodge".

PSA - for those following along my multi-day fine-tooth comb reading of the "𝙍𝙚𝙙𝙖𝙘𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝙁𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙞𝙣𝙜𝙨 𝙤𝙛 𝙁𝙖𝙘𝙩 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙍𝙚𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙨" report on 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙉𝙞𝙜𝙚𝙧 𝘼𝙢𝙗𝙪𝙨𝙝, that report I'm referencing in my tweets is here: esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Doc…

From page 63- The orders to move out of the ambush site (TIC) apparently were made verbally by shouting. No mention of any radio comms to effect the "break contact" to Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 and Nigerien partner forces.

From page 63 again - The document previously described Partner Vehicle 4 (PV4) as "under heavy fire and was immediately disabled." The other two vehicles that remained at the ambush site (USV2 and PV3) were likely also disabled, but it's not explicitly stated.

From page 63 again - Footnote 475 confirms that members of Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 were not monitoring their radios when the "break contact" process began.

From page 64 - There will NEVER be an explanation, satisfactory or otherwise, as to why USV2 was only moving "slowly south" to "break contact" from the ambush site (TIC).

That's because SSG Black, Staff SSG Johnson, and SSG Wright were all fatally wounded there.

From page 64 again - Though there were eyewitness accounts from Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 members that their adversary was equipped with and setting up mortars, the investigation "found no evidence of mortars or other indirect fire (i.e., craters, etc.)."

From page 68 - After moving 700 meters south to Position 2 from the ambush site (TIC) Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 first uses their radio comms in an attempt to contact US Vehicle 2 (USV2).

From page 69 - In an apparent redaction oversight failure, the names of 2 surviving team members of Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 are publicly identified here.

They are Staff Sergeant Howe and Master Sergeant Figaro.

From page 70 - While the investigating team found no evidence of mortar fire (page 64), team members of Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 testified they were indeed targeted by enemy mortars.

From page 70 again - About those mortars...from footnote 530:

From page 72 - For a "mechanic" working as part of Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212, that La David Johnson is something else!

From page 74 - As this image shows, the convoy of Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 and their Nigerien partners were about to get overrun by the enemy.

The enemy was enveloping them from their rear (North), from their left flank (East), and now from their front (South).

From page 76 - When the group of Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 members and their Nigerien partners thought the end was near, they "prepare a final fighting position" called “The Alamo.”

From page 77 - Two US ISR drones arrive over Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 members' and their Nigerien partners' final fighting position at 1311.

You can watch video footage from the US ISR drones at thedrive.com/the-war-zone/2…. The US ISR drone video starts at approximately 17:40.

Tomorrow continues my fine-tooth comb reading of the "𝙍𝙚𝙙𝙖𝙘𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝙁𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙞𝙣𝙜𝙨 𝙤𝙛 𝙁𝙖𝙘𝙩 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙍𝙚𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙨" report with almost 100 pages left to go.

Night all!

PSA - For those following along my multi-day fine-tooth comb reading of the "𝙍𝙚𝙙𝙖𝙘𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝙁𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙞𝙣𝙜𝙨 𝙤𝙛 𝙁𝙖𝙘𝙩 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙍𝙚𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙨" report on 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙉𝙞𝙜𝙚𝙧 𝘼𝙢𝙗𝙪𝙨𝙝, that report I'm referencing in my tweets is here: esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Doc…

From page 78 - Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 had destroyed their radio comm gear to prevent its use by the enemy. Now at the "final fighting position" called “The Alamo", they were unable to communicate back to the AOB on their position and status until the US ISR drone arrived.

From page 78 again - In the extended DOD video footage from the US ISR drones at the Niger Ambush site (see it here at approximately 17:40 - thedrive.com/the-war-zone/2…), the DOD narrator says there were "2" US ISR drones overhead. Confirmed here in footnotes 587 and 588.

Also in that screen capture image is a statement of the use of Microsoft Internet Relay Chat (“mIRC chat”) with the ISR operator "relaying" Q&A between Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 and the AOB and other HQ entities.

From page 79 - Given their destruction of their radio comm gear, Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 was also unable to establish comms with the arriving French jets for Close Air Support (CAS). The 2nd US ISR drone's arrival ended up providing this communication.

From page 79 again - The inability of Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 to have direct comms with the French Mirage jets also prevented the use of CAS because the French aircrew couldn't tell friendly forces from enemy forces.

From pages 79 and 80 - These 2 screenshots show that US ISR drones observing multiple instances of the enemy forces leaving the TIC site (Troops In Contact or the Niger Ambush site) and moving back into Tongo Tongo which probably reinforced US suspicion about villager betrayal.

From page 80 - The arriving French helicopters were unable to locate Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 in spite of relayed comms between US ISR drones overhead. An arriving Nigerien Quick Reaction Force (QRF), mistaking them for the enemy, opened fire on Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212.

Again from page 80 - Confusion (and suspicion) still abounds about who said what and did what in the friendly fire incident of the Nigerien Quick Reaction Force (QRF) opening fire on Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212.

From page 85 - A detail I was previously unaware of. From this image of page 85 we learn that the Commander of the partner Nigerien forces was with SGT LaDavid Johnson as they tried to escape together from the area of the US Vehicle 1 (USV1).

Both were subsequently killed.

Correction: It was from US Vehicle 3 (USV3) and not US Vehicle 1 (USV1).

From page 85 again - Another detail I was previously unaware of. After killing SGT LaDavid Johnson, the enemy was able to "depart the area" with US Vehicle 3 (USV3).

From page 87 - As you can see from this investigation image, SGT LaDavid Johnson was under fire from a enemy "technical" vehicle-mounted DShK heavy machine gun at almost point blank range.

From page 88 - A number of media reports had US Special Operations Forces with the French troops onboard the rescuing French helicopters. Unless that information is being deliberately withheld, it appears by this document that there were only French troops onboard.

From page 89 - Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 and their Nigerien partners were definitely outnumbered by the enemy.

Was it by 2 to 1, 3 to 1, or even more? We may never know. As this finding states, the numbers of enemy fighters is at best an approximation.

From page 90 - I'll make a couple of points here with the last highlighted sentence first.

Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 members apparently hearing these chants and cheers = suspicion that Tongo Tongo residents had involvement in the Niger Ambush. True? Idk.

Cont'd: I'm not sure what to make of the investigators' description of the enemy as "sub-Saharan and Arab fighters". Is there some difference that the investigators are trying to describe? Idk.

Cont'd: The investigators describe the enemy's "small unit tactics" skills, but no mention is made of the "elephant in the room" - the enemy's intel gathering and surveillance skills.

I've long harped on the fact that the enemy had better intel on the US than the US had on them.

From page 92 - More confirmation that an "armed Nigerien helicopter" was tasked to help Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212 and their Nigerien partners at the Niger Ambush site.

Because it was directed to leave by the French Mirage pilots, we'll never know if it could've saved lives.

From page 93 - Shades of Black Hawk Down! In today's ubiquitous social media world, the images of dead US soldiers being displayed by their attackers would've caused a firestorm even beyond that of en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of…

From page 96 - By 6:00 PM of the night of the Niger Ambush, ODA Team Arlit was given approval to go to Tongo Tongo.

At this point there were 3 drones and 1 manned aircraft overhead providing "overwatch" for the forces in the area as well as searching for any of the missing.

From page 98 - To show just how focused and driven ODA Team Arlit was, sunset in Tongo Tongo on the night of October 4, 2017 was at 6:39 PM (2039 in military terms), so ODA Team Arlit was doing this search in darkness at 7:00 PM (2100).

Correction - Sheesh! The times are incorrect! Sorry about that. The sunset in Tongo Tongo on the night of October 4, 2017 was at 6:39 PM (1839 in military terms). ODA Team Arlit was doing this search in darkness at 9:00 PM (2100).

Double sheesh! I really do know better. :-)

I want to say a couple more things about just how focused and driven ODA Team Arlit was. It's 9:00 PM (2100).It's dark. They've recovered the bodies of 3 US troops (SSG Black, Staff SSG Johnson, and SSG Wright ), but SGT LaDavid Johnson was still missing! This is not good!

Cont'd: ODA Team Arlit is doing a "search and rescue" with emphasis on "rescue"! They are "dismounted" which means they're only carrying their personal weapons. Their Nigerien partner forces are only a FAN QRF platoon though they have "several DShK-mounted FAN trucks".

Cont'd: ODA Team Arlit is doing this nighttime "search and rescue" after a large enemy force ambushed Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212. ODA Team Arlit can't know if that enemy force will attack yet again.

Cont'd: ODA Team Arlit does have 3 overhead drones and 1 manned aircraft (for an unknown period of time), but they don't have armed aircraft to provide Close Air Support (CAS) if ODA Team Arlit is attacked.

Cont'd: Yes, ODA Team Arlit could call for the French Mirages to provide CAS, and yes, ODA Team Arlit would likely be able to have comms with those jets (unlike Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212), but it's NIGHTTIME! Hitting targets at night would be doubly hard!

From page 98 again - It's now 11:39 PM (23:29) and about any CAS from the French Mirages or "overwatch" provided by those 3 drones and 1 manned aircraft? All gone because AOB radioed "weather had grounded all aviation".

See what I mean about just how driven ODA Team Arlit was?👍

Typo alert - 11:29 PM. My eyes are starting to close again. Or so my fingers are telling them. :-)

From page 99 - So what happened to that driven ODA Team Arlit? At 0216 AM on the morning of October 5, 2017, "they were running out of water, food, and
batteries." And their HQ boss decided they were at serious risk themselves!

And with that I'll call it a night myself.

Tomorrow continues my fine-tooth comb reading of the "𝙍𝙚𝙙𝙖𝙘𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝙁𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙞𝙣𝙜𝙨 𝙤𝙛 𝙁𝙖𝙘𝙩 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙍𝙚𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙨" on 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙉𝙞𝙜𝙚𝙧 𝘼𝙢𝙗𝙪𝙨𝙝.

Night all!

From page 99 again - Footnote 747 states that "ISR assets maintained a continuous presence over the area looking for SGT Johnson."

Irt the acronyms on page 100:

1. Believe the SOCCE reference is SOCCE-LCB – Special Operations Command and Control Elements-Lake Chad Basin.

Cont'd:

2. SOCFWD-NWA – Special Operations Command Forward-North & West Africa
3. SOCCE-LCB, commanded by a Lt. Colonel (O-5) reports to SOCFWD-NWA which is commanded by a Colonel (O-6) as shown on page 10.

From page 101 - It's the day after 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙉𝙞𝙜𝙚𝙧 𝘼𝙢𝙗𝙪𝙨𝙝 in the early hours of 5 October 2017. Team Arlit puts a CONOP (concept of operations) plan together to search for the missing SGT LaDavid Johnson, but it is denied in a joint decision by SOCAFRICA and SOCFWD-NWA.

Cont'd: Maj Gen J. Mark Hicks. commander of SOCAFRICA rationale for denying Team Arlit's CONOP plan to search for the missing SGT LaDavid Johnson is two-fold:
1. Too much perceived operational risks with possible enemy personnel in Tongo Tongo (even with French forces assistance)

Cont'd:
2. No intel that SGT LaDavid Johnson is even present in the Tongo Tongo area.

"Most importantly, absent intelligence identifying SGT Johnson’s location,
Maj Gen Hicks did not believe he had the lawful authority" - This another reason Hicks was punished? Idk, but maybe.

Cont'd" I'd think that many in the US military, particularly the Army Special Forces, and Marines like DOD Secretary Mattis and @USAfricaCommand commander Marine Gen. Waldhauser, would see this decision by Maj Gen Hicks as unbelievable timidity irt ethos of "leave no one behind".

From page 102 - The search for the missing SGT LaDavid Johnson gets escalated.

"CDRUSAFRICOM activated the USAFRICOM Crisis Response Force (CRF) and requested nationally-controlled assets in support of personnel recovery operations."

From page 102 again - The entire day of 5 October 2017 has gone by with apparently no US forces on the ground in the Tongo Tongo area searching for the missing SGT LaDavid Johnson.

On 6 October 2017, his body is found by "[c]hildren from the village".

From page 106 - I'm going to spend a couple tweets on this particular topic of "intelligence failure" versus intelligence collection capability gaps.

Cont'd: I expect there will be a book or two written about 𝙏𝙝𝙚 𝙉𝙞𝙜𝙚𝙧 𝘼𝙢𝙗𝙪𝙨𝙝.

As a working title, may I suggest "𝙏𝙝𝙚𝙮 𝙉𝙚𝙫𝙚𝙧 𝙎𝙖𝙬 𝙄𝙩 𝘾𝙤𝙢𝙞𝙣𝙜"?

True from the top of the chain-of-command to the bottom with the members of Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212.

Cont'd: "Capability gaps in the ability to collect intelligence, however, do not equate to a failure to interpret existing intelligence."

This statement under the signature of Army Maj. Gen. Cloutier, chief of staff, @USAfricaCommand, apparently misses the forest for the trees.

Cont'd: What about failure of common sense? What about failure of imagination?

The leadership assumption here is that one can have a US armed force wandering around in bad guy country, and even running a capture/kill mission, and blithely assume no response from the bad guys.

Cont'd: In the press conference on May 10, 2018 giving the then "public" information on the 𝙉𝙞𝙜𝙚𝙧 𝘼𝙢𝙗𝙪𝙨𝙝, the officer in charge of the investigation, Army Maj. Gen. Cloutier, chief of staff, @USAfricaCommand, said this:

dod.defense.gov/News/Transcrip…

Cont'd: "[T]hat first mission...does not result in the attack in Tongo Tongo."

With all due respect to Army Maj. Gen. Cloutier, chief of staff, @USAfricaCommand, I think he is dead wrong here!

From page 108 - There are a number of factors described here that indeed contributed to the 𝙉𝙞𝙜𝙚𝙧 𝘼𝙢𝙗𝙪𝙨𝙝, but missing are 2 serious key factors: Command organizations and the leadership of their commanders.

From page 111 - Basically this says that when the top officials of the US military say our forces are ONLY doing "advise, assist, and accompany activity" they are either:

1, Clueless.
2. Blowing smoke up our *sses.

From page 112 - Well, maybe a few have a clue:

From page 113 - Fwiw, "hot climates" are everywhere. The wearing of personal protective equipment (PPE) is never going to be able to change that fact.

From page 116 - New to me at least, this appears to be a description of the 2nd mission of Team Ouallam - ODA Team 3212:

And so it goes. Time for some zzzzs again, so back to my fine-tooth comb reading of the "𝙍𝙚𝙙𝙖𝙘𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝙁𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙞𝙣𝙜𝙨 𝙤𝙛 𝙁𝙖𝙘𝙩 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙍𝙚𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙨" on 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙉𝙞𝙜𝙚𝙧 𝘼𝙢𝙗𝙪𝙨𝙝 tomorrow.