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Also: "the Court’s stare decisis doctrine [gives] the venire of respectability to our continued application of demonstrably incorrect precedents."
2/ " if the Court encounters a decision that is demonstrably erroneous—i.e., one that is not a permissible interpretation of the text—the Court should correct the error"
3/ "A demonstrably incorrect judicial decision ... is tantamount to making law, and adhering to it both disregards the supremacy of the Constitution and perpetuates a usurpation of the legislative power. "
4/ "I am aware of no legitimate reason why a court may privilege a demonstrably erroneous interpretation of the Constitution over the Constitution itself"
5/ Considerations beyond the correct legal meaning, including reliance, workability, and whether a precedent “has become well embedded in national
culture,” S. Breyer, Making our Democracy Work: A Judge’s View 152 (2010), are inapposite."
culture,” S. Breyer, Making our Democracy Work: A Judge’s View 152 (2010), are inapposite."
6/ [[Be sure to read Footnote 6 of the dissent, page 11: supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf…]]
7/ " that the original meaning is not obvious at first blush does not excuse the Court from diligently pursuing that meaning. Stopping the interpretive inquiry short—or allowing personal views to color it—permits courts to substitute their own preferences over the text"
8/ "Although this case involves a constitutional provision, I would apply the same stare decisis principles to matters of statutory interpretation."
8/ "The true irony of our modern stare decisis doctrine lies in the fact that proponents of stare decisis tend to invoke it most fervently when the precedent at issue is least defensible."
9/ "It is no secret that stare decisis has had a “ratchet-like effect,” cementing certain grievous departures from the law into the Court’s jurisprudence."
10/ "Perhaps the most egregious example of this illegitimate use of stare decisis
can be found in our “substantive due process” jurisprudence. ... The Court does not seriously defend the “legal fiction” of substantive due process as consistent with ... original understanding[.]"
can be found in our “substantive due process” jurisprudence. ... The Court does not seriously defend the “legal fiction” of substantive due process as consistent with ... original understanding[.]"
11/ "Likewise, the Court refuses to reexamine its jurisprudence about the Privileges or Immunities Clause, thereby relegating a “‘clause in the constitution’” “‘to be without effect.’” " cc: @IJ
12/ "No subjective balancing test can justify such a wholesale disregard of the People’s individual rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. "
13/ And he concludes thusly: "Our judicial duty to interpret the law requires adherence to the original meaning of the text. For that reason, we should not invoke stare decisis to uphold precedents that are demonstrably erroneous." END
