Thread by @cdbrose

(1) I have read and written a lot of government documents. The Commandant's Planning Guidance for the Marine Corps is one of the best defense documents I have read in a long time. The blood of sacred cows is all over this thing.

Thread here... 👇

(2) It is no secret that I have been rather critical of the USMC's thinking about its roles, missions, force structure, and force design as part of the Joint Force when adversaries have built up huge long-range precision strike complexes.

(3) Gen. Berger's sweeping critique of his own service is as rare as it is admirable. I'll let his words speak for themselves, starting with the key problem: "the current force is not organized, trained, or equipped to support the naval force.”

(4) He is willing to make hard choices: "We must divest of legacy capabilities that do not meet our future requirements, regardless of their past operational efficacy. There is no piece of equipment or major defense acquisition program that defines us."

(5) And speak truth on force organization: "Likewise, we are not defined by any particular organizing construct – the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) cannot be our only solution for all crises."

(6) Read this twice and savor it: "Force design is my number one priority If provided the opportunity to secure additional modernization dollars in exchange for force structure, I am prepared to do so." When was the last time a service chief said that?

(7) He then redefines the USMC's mission in a sentence: "The focal point of the future integrated naval force will shift from traditional power projection to ... maintaining persistent naval forward presence to enable sea control and denial operations."

(8) And why change? "The ability to project and maneuver from strategic distances will likely be detected and contested from the point of embarkation during a major contingency." Hiding in future war will be hard; once found, surviving will be just as hard.

(9) So we need a totally different force: "We must continue to seek the affordable and plentiful at the expense of the exquisite and few when conceiving of the future amphibious portion of the fleet." I wrote about this at length here: foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-…

(10) 👉"We...must distribute our forces ashore given the growth of adversary precision strike capabilities, so it would be illogical to continue to concentrate our forces on a few large ships. We need...a new fleet design of smaller, more lethal, and more risk-worthy platforms.”

(11) And here come the kickers: "We will no longer use a '2.0 MEB requirement' as the foundation for our arguments regarding amphibious ship building, to determine the requisite capacity of vehicles or other capabilities." Dead sacred cow.

(12) Wait for it, wait for it... " We will no longer reference the 38-ship requirement memo from 2009, or the 2016 Force Structure Assessment, as the basis for our arguments and force structure justifications." Heads exploding...

(13) The CMC just overturned USMC holy writ. I would challenge the CNO to make a similarly bold statement on aircraft carriers, the Army Chief on soldier end strength, and the Air Force Chief on fighter squadrons.

(14) And if that were not enough, the CMC then proceeded to kick the door wide open on DOPMA reform: "While performance is factored into promotion selection, it is narrowed to a slim cohort, roughly based on year groups – an antiquated model.”

(15) "The current manpower model does not accommodate a Marine whose interests change over time, tends to average performance over time instead of weighting current performance more heavily, forces Marines to move out of skills they excel at in the name of developing them…

"...and cuts careers off near the 20-year mark when workers have decades of productivity left in them. These polices drive increased PCS costs, throw away talent at the point it is most productive and highly trained, and discourage performers who would like to continue serving…

(16) "...but may be less interested in promotion or constant disruptive moves of questionable personal and professional value.” 💥💥💥

(17) A case for DOPMA reform in one line: "In the current manpower model, primary occupational fields are set early in a career and Marines are essentially stuck either accepting it for an entire career or choosing separation."

(18) SASC & HASC MUST engage CMC on this: "Modest improvement can be achieved with the tools already in hand, while dramatic improvement will likely take changes in budgets, law (DOPMA), policy, traditions, and mindset. I will communicate more on this idea in the near future.”

(19) Back to force design and warfighting. I could not have said this better myself: "Rather than heavily investing in expensive and exquisite capabilities that regional aggressors have optimized their forces to target…"

(20) "...naval forces will persist forward with many smaller, low signature, affordable platforms that can economically host a dense array of lethal and non-lethal payloads."

How to do it? "By exploiting the technical revolution in autonomy, advanced manufacturing, and [AI].."

(21) "Nascent applications such as swarming and miniature aerial attack systems have the potential to radically change the character of war. Our future force development must include appropriate prioritization in these technologies…"

(22) "...however, doing so will not be easy. It will require divesting of legacy capabilities that cannot be economically adapted to meet the demands of the future, while also taking calculated risks in some areas."

Again: make hard choices in favor of the future over the past.

(23) That sound you hear is small non-traditional defense companies across America cheering this line: "The authority to operate (ATO) and information assurance (IA) processes must not be allowed to inhibit the adoption of these technologies and processes." Amen. Now do it…

(24) Oh, and then he went on for three pages about the centrality of experimentation: "A major focus of my tenure as Commandant will be my direct, personal, regular engagement with our Warfighting Laboratory to drive an integrated process of wargaming and experimentation..."

(25) Like I said, one of the best DOD documents I have read in a while. Now comes the hard part: implementation. I am pulling hard for @CMC_MarineCorps. And I'd be eager to see similarly visionary guidance on hard choices from the Navy, Air Force, & Army.

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