Afghan security forces have been consolidating the past year, collapsing vulnerable remote checkpoints & relocating them to stronger defensive positions along main roads.
But this strategy is only as effective as ANDSF's ability to repel large-scale attacks on these bigger posts.
But this strategy is only as effective as ANDSF's ability to repel large-scale attacks on these bigger posts.
High-casualty clashes like this (or days ago in Balkh) raise question:
If US military did not respond with "defensive airstrikes" as they did on 4 March in Helmand, what does this reveal about the contours of US-Taliban understanding on reducing violence?
If US military did not respond with "defensive airstrikes" as they did on 4 March in Helmand, what does this reveal about the contours of US-Taliban understanding on reducing violence?
Best guess thus far is that US has not set a single-incident threshold, on number of fighters or casualties involved.
Instead, looking closely at the 4 March Helmand airstrike, US military's expectation might be focused on protecting provincial capitals:
Instead, looking closely at the 4 March Helmand airstrike, US military's expectation might be focused on protecting provincial capitals:
Major highways are likely not included: intense clashes on routes connecting provincial capitals (Mazar-Shibergan, Kunduz-Pul-e Khumri, and elsewhere) have not prompted a US 'defensive airstrike' response.
