Since this video has been blowing up, I thought it might be useful to annotate some of the analysis.
Here are the receipts.
Here are the receipts.
On the policy lessons we took from the 2016 Ebola response - I wrote this report last year, touching on why strong federal leadership and internal USG coordination are so central to success.
cgdev.org/publication/st…
cgdev.org/publication/st…
Re: the pandemic response playbook, here's the first line: "The goal...is to assist in coordinating a complex USG response to a high-consequence emerging disease threat with potential to cause a pandemic"
Sounds useful, right?
politico.com/news/2020/03/2…
Sounds useful, right?
politico.com/news/2020/03/2…
The playbook provided risk assessment dashboards to gauge USG actions to the known risk.
A novel virus demonstrating "efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission" is specifically cited as a trigger.
We knew COVID met that threshold by late January.
A novel virus demonstrating "efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission" is specifically cited as a trigger.
We knew COVID met that threshold by late January.
Novel coronaviruses were specifically cited as a "Pathogen of Pandemic Potential." Along with novel flu, they were cited as a "Tier 1" threat.
Document actually cites potential of a highly transmissible respiratory pathogen to kill in large #s at modest fatality rate.
Document actually cites potential of a highly transmissible respiratory pathogen to kill in large #s at modest fatality rate.
Document goes on to lay out a range of specific domestic readiness measures to consider if we see a high-risk novel pathogen emerge.
Disease surveillance and testing are identified as early priorities:
Disease surveillance and testing are identified as early priorities:
PPE availability, deployment of the strategic national stockpile, and use of the Defense Production Act are all cited as dimensions to address.
Planning for community mitigation measures - school closure, social distancing, telework, cancellation of large gatherings, etc - also in there.
Clinical care capacity - and options for expanding toward mass-care scenarios...also in there.
Re: 2018 dissolution of the NSC pandemics team, I wrote at the time: "Breaking up the only NSC directorate with specialized knowledge of infectious disease crises means the White House will be slower off its marks when the next big disease threat emerges." cgdev.org/blog/global-he…
And as I wrote here, Bolton's defense of dissolving the directorate doesn't stand up to scrutiny: justsecurity.org/69197/lessons-…
So - the playbook and the NSC team could have positioned the Trump administration to get this response off on the right foot.
Instead, they ignored the risk that was clear by late Jan/early Feb - and failed to trigger preparedness. I wrote this on Feb 4: washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/0…
Instead, they ignored the risk that was clear by late Jan/early Feb - and failed to trigger preparedness. I wrote this on Feb 4: washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/0…
But don't take my word for it. Two former Trump administration officials wrote this on Jan 28: wsj.com/articles/act-n…
We don't yet fully know why the USG didn't actively prepare.
But the President's comments through this period focused on downplaying domestic risk, stating they'd shut down the threat from China, and reassuring the markets.
But the President's comments through this period focused on downplaying domestic risk, stating they'd shut down the threat from China, and reassuring the markets.
And we know that when a senior CDC official diverged from that narrative, the President berated the HHS Secretary.
The next day, he and the Task Force spent a whole press conf walking back the (very accurate!) CDC warning. nytimes.com/2020/03/07/us/…
The next day, he and the Task Force spent a whole press conf walking back the (very accurate!) CDC warning. nytimes.com/2020/03/07/us/…
As for Trumps' repeated claims that this kind of scenario was unimaginable....it wasn't unimaginable to his own administration, which ran an exercise in 2019 that eerily foreshadowed how COVID has played out. nytimes.com/2020/03/19/us/…
The irreplaceable importance of federal leadership was also clearly anticipated. The NSC playbook explicitly notes that the federal government - not the states - must lead the response:
In lieu of federal leadership, we get chaos.
So as I said - preparedness is a choice. And the failure to prepare is a choice. This administration made the wrong choice, despite ample opportunities to get it right. They're continuing to make poor choices. And the whole country is paying.
