Yesterday, I had the great honor of publishing a net assessment of #Afghanistan's security forces & the #Taliban's fighting forces in @CTCWP's Sentinel. In this THREAD, I'll summarize my analysis. 1/n
The article was inspired by this paper by @SethGJones. In it, Jones asserts that "w/o a peace deal, the further withdrawal of US forces…will likely shift the balance of power in favor of the #Taliban...who would eventually overthrow the Afghan gov't" 2/n
This is a critically important judgment for the future of US
policy on #Afghanistan, but a formal, public assessment of how AFG's security forces (the #ANDSF) compare to the #Taliban’s fighting forces in the context of US troop withdrawals doesn't exist. 3/n
So, I set out to answer the Q: If the US withdraws the remainder of its forces from #Afghanistan, would the ANDSF or the #Taliban be stronger militarily? 4/n
Note I assume that the US withdraws the rest of its troops by May 1, 2021 (per the US-#Taliban agreement) or within a single 6-month extension as I and others (incl @BRRubin & @VFelbabBrown) have argued may be possible. 5/n
To answer this Q, I conduct a net assessment of the two sides' forces across five factors: size, material resources (funding & technology), force employment, external support & cohesion. If you're not familiar with net assessment, here's a good primer. 6/n press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol…
The first four factors address the basics of military effectiveness: people, things, & the ability of people to use those things. Cohesion addresses will to fight & is important in the context of ongoing peace talks. 7/n
Size: The best public estimate of #Taliban size came from @AntonioGiustoz2 in 2017. He estimated TB fighting forces at ~60,000 + ~90,000 militia forces + tens of thousands more informal support forces. 8/n
#ANDSF size we know pretty accurately as a result of a new biometric manpower system in #Afghanistan. As of mid-last year (most recent report), total size was 288,702 individuals. Doing some add'l math + assumptions, end w/~96,000 on-hand soldiers + ~83,000 on-hand police. 9/n
Resources: Very unclear how much $$ the #Taliban make each year--there are estimates of this but some great exchanges w/@mansfieldintinc convinced me they're unreliable. More important point is how diversified the TB funding portfolio has become--lots of discrete $ sources. 10/n
The #ANDSF cost $5-6B per year, w/75% of that coming from the US (& only ~$400-500M coming from the Afghan govt). The Afghan Air Force + #SOF account for ~$2B of that total. 11/n
In terms of technology, the #ANDSF are far more technically equipped than the #Taliban's fighting forces, especially when it comes to airpower, protected mobility & western-style weapons. Though the #Taliban have gained access to the latter two via ANDSF checkpoint overruns. 12/n
External spt: #Taliban heavily rely on sanctuaries in #Pakistan & ISI support, as everyone knows & a former ISI DG openly admitted. They also get spt from #alQaeda, #Russia, #Iran & Gulf States. #ANDSF are almost totally reliant on external $$. 13/n
Force employment: #Taliban have been using the "outside-in" strategy we @CNA_org described in our first #ANDSF assessment, supported by guerilla, conventional & terrorist tactics, intel activities, intimidation, info ops & criminal activities. 14/n
The #ANDSF had been using a "ring of steel" around cities + Corps/Div-level clearing ops in the wake of the US surge, until @Commander_RS moved ~2018 to a military pressure model that leads with #SOF & AAF. ANA/ANP now mostly stand on checkpoints. 15/n
Cohesion: Here I apply @CastilloJasen's model of military cohesion. Application of it identifies the #Taliban forces as a "messianic military" (strong cohesion) & the #ANDSF as an "apathetic military" (not so much). 16/n
Size: Contrary to popular belief, the #ANDSF don't outnumber the #Taliban by that much. Holding forces are about equal, #ANDSF fighting force is about 1.5x of the TB. Slight advantage to the ANDSF here. 18/n
Material resources: #Taliban funding model is far more sustainable than the #ANDSF. Strong advantage to the TB.
#ANDSF technological prowess far exceeds that of the TB; air power + #SOF being an especially powerful combo. Strong advantage to the ANDSF. 19/n
Ext spt: Both sides heavily reliant on some form of external support (#Taliban = #Pakistan; #ANDSF = US). Draw.
Force employment: #Taliban have a better military strategy, though combo of AAF + #SOF mitigate the disparities somewhat. Slight advantage to the TB. 20/n
Overall net assessment: If the US were to withdraw the rest of its forces, the TB would have an immediate slight military advantage that would compound over time. 21/n
Why compounding? Degradations in things like helicopters (e.g., overuse, maintenance failures, cannibalization) that are likely in the absence of advisors will be nonlinear/accelerating. Plus the #ANDSF lack "staying power" as defined in @CastilloJasen's theory. 22/n
What might be done about this? I offer two suggestions. 1. Focus on #ANDSF recruitment. The force is short 63k people relative to authorized end-strength--a hole the size of the entire #Taliban fighting force. 23/n
2. Ruthlessly simplify the force. The best thing the US could do between now & its departure is to focus entirely on improving sustainability of the #ANDSF. This will require both force structure & force employment changes, as I've previously argued. 24/n
The bottom line is the US has built an #ANDSF that has massive technological overmatch on the #Taliban but is almost entirely unsustainable & still in search of a viable military strategy. TB meanwhile have a less snazzy but largely sustainable force & a proven strategy. 25/n
That bodes very ill for #Afghanistan's govt in the absence of US troops. My last suggestion (which I know is tough!) is for the govt to aggressively pursue negotiations & not tempt the #Taliban to exploit the military advantage it will have when the US inevitably departs. 26/26
Lately I’ve had a bunch of people coming at me to say that I’m wrong about various things pertaining to #Afghanistan. So, a brief THREAD about being wrong. 1/n
I *wish* I was wrong about the things I write here & elsewhere about #Afghanistan. I *wish* the Afghan govt wasn’t a kleptocracy. I *wish* the #ANDSF weren’t failing operationally & institutionally. I *wish* the #Taliban weren’t ascendant. I *wish* the US was good at COIN. 2/n
Tonight, in my @ElliottSchoolGW class on military power & effectiveness, we discussed @RyanBaker51's excellent thesis on the relationship between logistics & military power. One of the interesting aspects he identifies is the notion of "log sufficiency." 1/n
An implication of which is: if you give more things (vehicles, etc.) to a log-*sufficient* force, it will make that force better. BUT, if you give more things to a log-*deficient* force, it'll make that force worse--b/c the force now has even more things that it can't sustain 2/n
An example of a log-*deficient* force is #Afghanistan's Army. As I discuss in this @CTCWP Sentinel paper (& as DOD has admitted for years in its assessments), the ANA (& #ANDSF broadly) cannot logistically maintain or sustain its forces independently. 3/n
I'm seeing lots of discussion on @BRRubin's argument in @WarOnTheRocks today for a 6-month extension to the US-#Taliban agreement & have gotten some Q's about it. Will tell you what I think in this THREAD. 1/n
First, I support @BRRubin's idea of trying to renegotiate the timeline of the US-#Taliban agreement. At a minimum, it's logically a middle path between leaving by 1 May (even when the TB haven't met their commitments) & unilaterally going past it (& risking the peace process) 2/n
Second, I agree w/@BRRubin that int'l legitimacy matters to the #Taliban & they care about sanctions relief, delisting, etc. So, there is leverage there as he suggests. The future of US aid to #Afghanistan is another TB concern & point of leverage (though extent is unknown). 3/n
I have now seen several op-eds (including this one) argue that the US could “punish” the #Taliban for, or “deter” it from, violating its obligations in the US-TB Agreement via offshore kinetic means following a full US troop withdrawal. 1/n washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/biden-…
That suggestion is usually made in an off-hand way toward a paper’s end, like it’s a given it would work. But would it? If the #Taliban are willing to host members of #alQaeda w/US troops still in #Afghanistan, why would offshore threats change that? 2/n wsj.com/amp/articles/k…
And didn’t the Clinton admin already provide empirical demonstration that lobbing missiles from the Indian Ocean against terrorist training camps in #Afghanistan doesn’t accomplish much? This was a primary reason for the innovation of arming drones, as I understand it. 3/n
I take issue w/the interpretation of things I’ve said in this article on #Afghanistan as “deferential to the #Taliban.” My view is *not* the one this article attributes to me: that the US has a one-sided obligation in the US-TB Agreement. 1/n brookings.edu/blog/order-fro…
Rather, I believe—as the author does—that the #Taliban have not met their commitments per the deal. But I also believe—as I tweeted earlier today—that the US will have difficulty showing this b/c the TB’s commitments aren’t objectively & publicly verifiable. 2/n
Which means that any attempt now to argue “conditions” with the #Taliban will be difficult & may result in the collapse of the peace process—something the US very much wants to avoid. 3/n
I've seen some #Afghanistan commentators argue recently that the US-#Taliban Agreement is a bad deal b/c it gave too many concessions to the TB while getting too few in return for the US. In this THREAD, I'll state why I think it's a bad deal from an assessment point of view. 1/n
To do that, let's walk through each of the things the US & #Taliban committed to in the agreement & answer the Q: "Is this objectively & publicly verifiable?"
Why is that Q important? B/c a good deal is one where both sides can reliably & transparently determine compliance. 2/n
Let's start w/the US: 1. Within 135 days...The US "will reduce the number of US forces in #Afghanistan to 8,600 & proportionally bring reduction in the number of its allies and Coalition forces."