Problem is Taliban, Khalilzada deal & then Ghani.
| #Taliban, who’ve spent the past year on a rampage, are despised nationally, with approval ratings in the single digits. But #Afghan President Ashraf #Ghani’s government is also extremely unpopular.
Most #Afghans and U.S. officials agree that the #Taliban’s ability to continue the insurgency has been largely due to #Ghani’s bad leadership—and he has shown little interest in reaching a lasting peace agreement that might usher him out of power.
From their point of view, the #Taliban are still at war in #Afghanistan and have only pledged to negotiate both as part of an #intraAfghan peace deal.
The lopsided deal was seen as an act of bad faith by the #Afghan people and rightly convinced the #Taliban that the US was rushing for the exit. This perceived victory over the US occupation has given them confidence to stand firm in their negotiations with Afghan groups.
U.S. military commanders such as Joseph Dunford, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff whose Afghanistan Study Group is due to make its recommendations this week, believe the US should stay,with at least a residual force, until the Afghans reach a political settlement.
Most military experts agree that a small number of US #counterterrorism forces will be needed to maintain maximum pressure on the #Taliban and other armed groups in Afghanistan & to check neighbors like #Pakistan & #Iran,given #Afghanistan’s long-term strategic centrality to US
In theory, #Dunford’s idea makes sense, but it would likely discourage both sides from concluding a deal. Buoyed by their victories in #Doha and momentum on the battlefield, the #Taliban remain confident they can wait Washington out and have little incentive to compromise.
Even as the #Biden team works to reassure #Ghani the US is once again a reliable partner, it must convince him to broaden his governing coalition. US should not be forced to stay in #Afghanistan to prop up his weak government.
If #Ghani stands in the way, the US might consider another Bonn-type forum where the #Afghan political establishment and the #Taliban agree on a governance structure for the country’s future and on new leadership that is acceptable to all parties.
#Biden administration, with whatever #Afghan government it works with, must also make the #Taliban accept that #Afghanistan in the future cannot, and will not, return to the 1990s.
U.S. aid and military training and assistance will give the #Biden administration continued leverage—and that can be used to at least try to maintain a limited number of U.S. troops and ensure that basic standards of #humanRights are protected in a future #constitution.
As they take on more responsibility in the government, #Taliban will have obviously have a say in the way the country is run, including the role of religion & are already eyeing a return to a strict interpretation of #Islam that they imposed on the country a quarter century ago.
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the relationship with the Taliban could be useful. But the envoy must now deliver a clear message to the Taliban: It will be accommodated within Afghanistan's existing structure as the price for peace but should stop expecting to rule Afghanistan again.
#Khalilzad's muted response to #Taliban attacks lay in the language of the Doha agreement.The Taliban had made no commitment to a ceasefire & had only agreed that "A permanent &comprehensive ceasefire will be an item on the agenda of the intra-#Afghan dialogue and negotiations."
But the #Taliban are students of #Islamic#sharia law and, in their belief system, an agreement is binding only in its literal sense. #Khalilzad's expectation of a "reduction in violence"