One paradox this year in #Libya has been the fact that the #CentralBankOfLibya has handed #Haftar & others in the #East some very substantial gifts over recent weeks—all in the form of salaries.
Most of it is counterintuitive, so let me parse it.
As of 2010, less than 1 million public servants in #Libya were on state payroll.
By 2014, that statistic had exceeded 1.8mm. All of this was before the Karama-vs.-Fajr civil war.
A watershed moment was the autumn 2014 emergence of a parallel govt in #Barqa. More would be hired.
The CBL never quit paying the Eastern-based Libyans who were already on payroll in 2014. But ignored those newly hired by the East.
As of 2020, the total nbr of public servants in #Libya stood at about 2.4mm.
That is a jump of ~600k employees added btwn 2014 & 2021 nationwide.
Out of the 600k above, a majority of ~400k individuals were hired by #Haftar, #Theni & Co. (not just in Barqa, but also in Zintan, etc.).
On top of these new #hires, the eastern authorities gave #raises to ~300k existing civil servants in various areas (Barqa, Zintan, Fezzan…).
In Jun 2021, #Tripoli started paying all Eastern-hired employees hired after 2014.
#Tripoli also began paying all the raises that had been granted by the East after 2014.
This move to unify entire payroll into 1 national salary system is important but has been seldom discussed.
Now, there’s talk the HoR might take away its confidence from PM Dabaiba. Haftar & Aqilah may even form a new Eastern govt this summer/autumn.
Will the #CBL retaliate by interrupting payment of all the salaries mentioned above?
No.
Kabir is unlikely to change the current setup
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🚨 𝑵𝒆𝒘 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅: The situation in Tripoli keeps deteriorating rapidly. PM Dabaiba’s forces keep mobilizing for an imminent attack on Radaa in several sites across eastern and southeastern Tripoli, including the Mitiga complex itself. And the Haftar family is sending forces to Sirte & Shwayref.
Voices from both the GNU side and the Radaa side acknowledge war could start any day now. Military convoys from Misrata have been streaming into the capital: these aren’t peacekeepers; they’re reinforcements for Dabaiba’s forthcoming offensive.
When fighting erupts, expect 3-4 distinct frontlines to form across the greater Tripoli area, likely inaugurating a sticky urban war.
The mediation vacuum is stunning. Yesterday, Turkey’s Hakan Fidan suggested that his country’s military presence in Tripolitania would suffice to prevent war. This type of arrogant delusion has engendered an “absolute desert” in terms of serious talks or diplomatic pushes to avoid war.
1/ 𝑻𝒉𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅: War is coming to Tripoli because, diplomatically, the walls have been closing in on Tripoli PM Dabaiba.
Following Hanna Tetteh’s Aug 21 speech, international pressure has been building that could spell the end of his rule — *unless* the Dabaiba family uses the only space it has left: the realm of physical violence.
Here’s what’s happening: 🧵
2/ This month, the UN has introduced delicate semantics, calling for “a new, unified government” in Tripoli. While “unified” could mean just a mere reshuffle, the epithet “NEW” implies Dabaiba needs to go.
Several foreign states have seized on that phrasing. The main one is Turkey.
3/ Turkey - once Dabaiba’s key protector - has been switching sides lately. Days ago, MIT head Ibrahim Kalin celebrated the Haftars in Benghazi (eastern Libya) while snubbing Tripoli altogether. This is diplomatic whiplash of the highest order.
Egypt, UAE, France (and even parts of Washington) are following suit: honoring & applauding the Haftar family while cooling on the Dabaiba family. The diplomatic momentum is an existential threat to the sitting PM.
• #macro fault lines have shifted too far away from #Libya’s Jun 2020 equilibrium, which so many policymakers & watchers take for granted;
[ see 🧵 thread👇🏻]
One must, right off the bat, acknowledge the outsized importance of #Zawiyah actors in today’s NW Libya configuration.
The most zealous pro-Dabaiba fighters on 5/17 in #Tripoli were led by #Bahrun.
& the #Buzeriba forces (who didn’t fight on 5/17) are ferociously anti-Dabaiba.
Other #local antagonisms that became evident on 5/17 in Tripoli include Mustafa Qaddur’s animosity vs. his #Mukhabarat superior & Dabaiba ally Hussein al-#Ayeb.
Nawassi — which holds a major grudge against Bahrun, too — coordinates w/ Buzeriba & Wershefana’s Muammar al-Dhawi.
In late May 2019, Belqacem Haftar visited DC in a bid to secure U.S. assistance in setting up a mechanism meant to deposit $$$ proceeds from #oil exports into a special account in lieu of sending them straight to the CBL in Tripoli.
The next year, in the summer of 2020, the US & the UN endorsed the idea of preventing oil $$$ proceeds from being funneled directly & systematically to the CBL in Tripoli.
But the rationale now promoted was not the one advocated by Haftar & his associates.
In 2020, international diplomats began suggesting the formation of a special #committee overseeing the equitable & transparent distribution of oil #revenues among the three provinces, & among essential #budget categories.
Said #committee would be above the govt & above the CBL.
Since the Feb. 24 launch of the invasion of Ukraine, apart from lots of unfounded speculation, there’s been not a shred of evidence to suggest any number of #Russian fighters have left Libya.
In fact, over the last several months, the number of Russians in #Brak has increased.
Historically, 1 of the top reasons #Russia has acquired a clandestine #military presence in #Libya is the fact that it’s key strategic territory on #NATO’s southern flank. The #Ukraine crisis of 2014 deepened the Kremlin’s perception of NATO as hostile to Russia’s core interests.