[ Thread on #Libya wage bill ]

One paradox this year in #Libya has been the fact that the #CentralBankOfLibya has handed #Haftar & others in the #East some very substantial gifts over recent weeks—all in the form of salaries.

Most of it is counterintuitive, so let me parse it.
As of 2010, less than 1 million public servants in #Libya were on state payroll.

By 2014, that statistic had exceeded 1.8mm. All of this was before the Karama-vs.-Fajr civil war.

A watershed moment was the autumn 2014 emergence of a parallel govt in #Barqa. More would be hired.
The CBL never quit paying the Eastern-based Libyans who were already on payroll in 2014. But ignored those newly hired by the East.

As of 2020, the total nbr of public servants in #Libya stood at about 2.4mm.

That is a jump of ~600k employees added btwn 2014 & 2021 nationwide.
Out of the 600k above, a majority of ~400k individuals were hired by #Haftar, #Theni & Co. (not just in Barqa, but also in Zintan, etc.).

On top of these new #hires, the eastern authorities gave #raises to ~300k existing civil servants in various areas (Barqa, Zintan, Fezzan…).
In Jun 2021, #Tripoli started paying all Eastern-hired employees hired after 2014.

#Tripoli also began paying all the raises that had been granted by the East after 2014.

This move to unify entire payroll into 1 national salary system is important but has been seldom discussed.
Now, there’s talk the HoR might take away its confidence from PM Dabaiba. Haftar & Aqilah may even form a new Eastern govt this summer/autumn.

Will the #CBL retaliate by interrupting payment of all the salaries mentioned above?

No.

Kabir is unlikely to change the current setup

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More from @JMJalel_H

Aug 30, 2025
🚨 𝑵𝒆𝒘 𝒕𝒉𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅: The situation in Tripoli keeps deteriorating rapidly. PM Dabaiba’s forces keep mobilizing for an imminent attack on Radaa in several sites across eastern and southeastern Tripoli, including the Mitiga complex itself. And the Haftar family is sending forces to Sirte & Shwayref.
Voices from both the GNU side and the Radaa side acknowledge war could start any day now. Military convoys from Misrata have been streaming into the capital: these aren’t peacekeepers; they’re reinforcements for Dabaiba’s forthcoming offensive.

When fighting erupts, expect 3-4 distinct frontlines to form across the greater Tripoli area, likely inaugurating a sticky urban war.
The mediation vacuum is stunning. Yesterday, Turkey’s Hakan Fidan suggested that his country’s military presence in Tripolitania would suffice to prevent war. This type of arrogant delusion has engendered an “absolute desert” in terms of serious talks or diplomatic pushes to avoid war.
Read 6 tweets
Aug 28, 2025
1/ 𝑻𝒉𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅: War is coming to Tripoli because, diplomatically, the walls have been closing in on Tripoli PM Dabaiba.

Following Hanna Tetteh’s Aug 21 speech, international pressure has been building that could spell the end of his rule — *unless* the Dabaiba family uses the only space it has left: the realm of physical violence.

Here’s what’s happening: 🧵
2/ This month, the UN has introduced delicate semantics, calling for “a new, unified government” in Tripoli. While “unified” could mean just a mere reshuffle, the epithet “NEW” implies Dabaiba needs to go.

Several foreign states have seized on that phrasing. The main one is Turkey.
3/ Turkey - once Dabaiba’s key protector - has been switching sides lately. Days ago, MIT head Ibrahim Kalin celebrated the Haftars in Benghazi (eastern Libya) while snubbing Tripoli altogether. This is diplomatic whiplash of the highest order.

Egypt, UAE, France (and even parts of Washington) are following suit: honoring & applauding the Haftar family while cooling on the Dabaiba family. The diplomatic momentum is an existential threat to the sitting PM.
Read 7 tweets
May 19, 2022
Further clashes are bound to unfold soon in #Tripolitania.

Because:

• some #local rivalries have become too tense.

#macro fault lines have shifted too far away from #Libya’s Jun 2020 equilibrium, which so many policymakers & watchers take for granted;

[ see 🧵 thread👇🏻]
One must, right off the bat, acknowledge the outsized importance of #Zawiyah actors in today’s NW Libya configuration.

The most zealous pro-Dabaiba fighters on 5/17 in #Tripoli were led by #Bahrun.

& the #Buzeriba forces (who didn’t fight on 5/17) are ferociously anti-Dabaiba.
Other #local antagonisms that became evident on 5/17 in Tripoli include Mustafa Qaddur’s animosity vs. his #Mukhabarat superior & Dabaiba ally Hussein al-#Ayeb.

Nawassi — which holds a major grudge against Bahrun, too — coordinates w/ Buzeriba & Wershefana’s Muammar al-Dhawi. Image
Read 12 tweets
Apr 17, 2022
[ thread 🧵 on the NOC’s LFB account ]

In late May 2019, Belqacem Haftar visited DC in a bid to secure U.S. assistance in setting up a mechanism meant to deposit $$$ proceeds from #oil exports into a special account in lieu of sending them straight to the CBL in Tripoli.
The next year, in the summer of 2020, the US & the UN endorsed the idea of preventing oil $$$ proceeds from being funneled directly & systematically to the CBL in Tripoli.

But the rationale now promoted was not the one advocated by Haftar & his associates.
In 2020, international diplomats began suggesting the formation of a special #committee overseeing the equitable & transparent distribution of oil #revenues among the three provinces, & among essential #budget categories.

Said #committee would be above the govt & above the CBL.
Read 13 tweets
Apr 6, 2022
[ thread🧵]

Is a protracted #stalemate burgeoning in Libya?

PM #Bashagha took his oath in Tobruk a month ago—& he still hasn’t swept into office or begun governing.

He himself told the media about the physical act of #entering Tripoli “w/in days”, but that hasn’t happened yet.
Bashagha & his ministers entering Tripoli soon is w/in the realm of the possible.

But the thing is, That won’t necessarily be enough to discard Dabaiba.

I.e., entering Tripoli won’t necessarily put an end to the current crisis.

A slew of profound issues are still outstanding.
A big chunk of opinion & sentiment in both Tripoli & Misrata remains skeptical about Bashagha.

Latter has been making a bit of progress but there’s still a gap.

Plus, the passage of time alone isn’t doing all that work for free, *no matter* how isolated & weak Dabaiba looks.
Read 10 tweets
Mar 8, 2022
The war in #Ukraine will bring a sea change in the #Libyan crisis

#JeuneAfrique kindly included a few of my thoughts on why observers really ought to brace for substantial side effects, not just minor ones.

[ thread on the #Russia facet of the #Libya reality c. 2022 ]
Since the Feb. 24 launch of the invasion of Ukraine, apart from lots of unfounded speculation, there’s been not a shred of evidence to suggest any number of #Russian fighters have left Libya.

In fact, over the last several months, the number of Russians in #Brak has increased.
Historically, 1 of the top reasons #Russia has acquired a clandestine #military presence in #Libya is the fact that it’s key strategic territory on #NATO’s southern flank. The #Ukraine crisis of 2014 deepened the Kremlin’s perception of NATO as hostile to Russia’s core interests.
Read 13 tweets

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