Thread by @RichardGowan1

Last week, @columlynch published a very good piece @ForeignPolicy about how the #UNSC might respond to a Russian offensive against #Ukraine.

Colum kindly quoted me, and I wanted to add a few points to the article (mainly for @UN wonks).

A 🧵 [1/12] foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/14/bid…

There have been snarky responses to @columlynch's piece accusing anyone who thinks @UN can help #Ukraine are "clowns" etc.

But as I said "Nobody actually thinks that the Council will have a significant substantive role in negotiating a conclusion to a new war in Ukraine." [2/12]

.@USUN, @RussiaUN and other Council members will use the #UNSC to try to shape political narrative around #Ukraine.

For example, Russia recently held an informal SC meeting on threats to minorities in the #Baltics and #Ukraine.

See @SCRtweets: [3/12] securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/20…

As I have argued elsewhere (and @James_Cockayne has emphasised) in today's fragmented media landscape nobody can "win" a #UNSC debate.

Instead, Russia, #Ukraine and others will spin what happens in the UNSC to their own audiences via social media. [4/12] theatlantic.com/international/…

Thinking ahead to potential #UNSC debates on #Ukraine, a few other points occur to me.

One rather obscure one is whether @USUN and its allies could try to stop Russia using its veto over the crisis thanks to a little-known clause of the @UN Charter. [5/12]

In 2014 during the first fight in Ukraine, @SCRtweets noted that the UN Charter obligates countries to abstain in votes on conflicts to which they are parties.

@USUN and allies didn't use this against @RussiaUN then, but might they do so this time? [6/12]securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-foreca…

Another question is if #UNSC may still have some value as an off-ramp for #Ukraine.

Russia after all insisted that the #UNSC endorse the Minsk Agreements.

It is conceivable that it might eventually turn to the SC to try to formalise any gains it makes in this crisis. [7/12]

Alternatively, @CrisisGroup has pointed out that there may still be (limited) space for @UN observers to help with steps to de-escalate the crisis.

This is *not* on the UNSC agenda now, but is always an outside possibility. [8/12] crisisgroup.org/europe-central…

One extra question is if a @UN showdown over #Ukraine would blow up cooperation with #Russia on other crises.

@USUN dealt pragmatically with Russia over aid to #Syria last year (see @CrisisGroup below). Could that continue alongside war in Ukraine? [9/12]crisisgroup.org/global/learnin…

A meltdown over #Ukraine at the #UNSC could affect not only SC diplomacy on #Syria, but also arguments over other already contentious files, like the role of the Wagner Group in Africa (cf this @CrisisGroup piece by @PaulineBax1) [10/12] crisisgroup.org/africa/central…

The original 2014 #Ukraine crisis did *not* blow up the UNSC.

@AustraliaUN (an elected SC member) challenged @RussiaUN over the downing of MH17, for example, but still made progress on getting aid to #Syria that year, as I noted @LowyInstitute. [11/12] lowyinstitute.org/australia-un-s…

UNSC dynamics are worse than they were in 2014, and there is less space for the P5 to "compartmentalise" a #Ukraine war and keep up business as usual on other files.

The UNSC will be of marginal relevance to war in Ukraine, but war could have a big impact on the UNSC. [12/12]