As someone whose research focuses on the just war traditions, I think it’s worth stating – firmly – that a reasonable argument cannot be made to justify a Russian invasion of #Ukraine. /1
Within the Christian just war tradition, there are 6 principles to consider, not as checkboxes to be ticked, but as concerns to be weighed against one another.

These include legitimate authority, just cause, right intent, proportionality, likelihood of success & last resort. /2
The content of these principles varies somewhat over time and between the Catholic/Orthodox/Protestant traditions, but the commonalities are much more significant than the differences. /3
For the record, very similar principles can be found in many other religious traditions, including in Islam and Hinduism. Today these principles are also found in secular just war thinking, for example in philosophy and law. But my focus now will be on the Christian traditions./4
Historically, the Christian just war analysis began by asking if the war was declared by a legitimate authority. While some contemporary secular just war thinkers have considered pushing this authority up to the level of the UN or limiting it to leaders who meet... /5
...certain standards, classically this authority has been understood as lying with the person who holds sovereign authority in the state, the person who is ultimately responsible for defending the political community against internal & external threats, i.e., the executive. /6
While I think there are reasonable questions to be asked as to whether or not Putin legitimately holds office, given that Russia purports to be a democracy and yet its elections are neither free nor fair... /7
the historical concern with maintaining domestic order means that classical just war theorists would probably give Putin a pass on the question of legitimate authority. /8
Just cause has historically been understood to have two dimensions: self-defense and righting wrongs.

As Aquinas put it in the Summa Theologiae, "those against whom war is to wage must deserve [it] because of some wrongdoing." /9
Drawing on Augustine, Aquinas defines a just cause as "one which avenges injuries, as when a nation or state deserves to be punished because it has neglected either to put right the wrongs done by its people or to restore what it has unjustly seized." /10
Let's consider the #Kremlin's claims in light of this.

The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that Ukraine poses a threat to Russian security, as in this article from state-controlled RT. /11

rt.com/russia/543899-…
But these claims to "self-defense" are highly overstated.

Experts agree that #Ukraine is years (decades!) away from joining NATO, if it ever does.

The US and its allies are not planning for or preparing to carry out a chemical attack on eastern Ukraine. /12
NATO military hardware sent to Ukraine is primarily of a defensive nature, and came in response to the Kremlin's positioning of 190,000 troops on Ukraine's borders (and the earlier 2014 invasion). /13

dw.com/en/russia-ukra…

themoscowtimes.com/2022/01/18/ukr…
The idea that Ukraine's far weaker military force and long-off dream of NATO membership pose a present threat to Russia is laughable.

But what about the justice related just cause claims? /14
After all, the #Kremlin claims (falsely and without evidence) that #Ukraine is committing a genocide against the people in the self-pronounced Luhansk and Donetsk Republics -- territories presently under effective Russian control. /15

nytimes.com/2022/02/19/wor…
While civilians have been killed (on both sides of the line of engagement), this violence cannot be considered a genocide in legal terms. There is no intent to destroy the people of that region, particularly not because of their identity. /16

ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl…
Beyond the potential just causes I've mentioned here, there are of course a litany of others, most of which are equally baseless. /17

But for argument's sake, let's imagine that we can dream up a just cause for Russia to use (additional) force against Ukraine.

We'd still have to weigh the principles of proportionality, last resort, and reasonable chance of success. /18
Direct war against Ukraine -- particularly using elements of air power and artillery as the current Russian force buildup seems to imply -- would result in a huge number of casualties, both civilian & military, on all sides. Urban combat makes this especially likely. /19
Estimates of the scale of casualties vary, but the human costs would be very high. The civilian cost of Russia's wars can be imagined by thinking about the Russian military's behavior in Chechnya or Syria, for example. /20

csis.org/analysis/russi…

france24.com/en/live-news/2…
Given the weakness of Russia's just cause claims, none of them can be understood to be proportionate to the harm a full-scale war would cause. /21
As Vitoria put it in the 16th century, it would be wrong to pursue "trivial offenses" using military means because "all the effects of war are cruel and horrible -- slaughter, fire, devastation." /22
As to last resort, while the #Kremlin claims it is up for negotiations, nothing about its behavior suggests this is sincere.

I have in mind here its list of demands presented to NATO and the US in December... /23

... and its refusal to cooperate more recently with the OSCE Vienna Document procedure aimed at reducing tensions between member states through greater transparency regarding "military exercises"... /24

... and its refusal to cooperate with the Minsk agreements, namely by withdrawing its forces from LPR/DPR territory. /25

When considering whether last resort has been reached, we must also remember that Ukraine and its partners are even now still calling for a diplomatic solution, while responding to increasing threats with significant restraint. /26

npr.org/2022/02/19/108…
Let's imagine last resort were satisfied (which I think is far from the case right now). We'd also have to consider if the the #Kremlin could succeed in its war aims. If it couldn't, the war would be inherently unjust, because lives would have been spent to no avail. /27
Weighing the likelihood of success depends on specifically what the war aims are.

But if they involve anything more than officially, unabashedly occupying LPR/DPR (which are already have Russia forces present), likelihood of success begins to get shakier. /28
A short term victory might be possible, but as Western pundits have pointed out (and as a retired Russian general has warned), it isn't a given. /29

washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/…

slate.com/news-and-polit…

ooc.su/news/obrashhen…
As anyone who's paid attention to the US experience of counter-insurgency in countries smaller & more divided than #Ukraine can attest, even if the #Kremlin did make major territorial gains at first, it wouldn't necessarily be able to control it. In fact, it likely couldn't. /30
So I think reasonable chance of success is tentative at best.

Now, last by not least, what about "right intent"? /31
Right intent is traditionally used to interrogate the "just cause" principle. The central point is that what we state our just cause to be must, in fact, be the real motivating reason behind our action. /32
As Aquinas put it, it's possible for a war "to be rendered unlawful by a wicked intent," for example if its waged because of a "lust for domination" (following Augustine again) or because of greed. Vitoria would add seeking personal glory to the list. /33
Weighing right intent is always difficult, because this principle is really aimed at the decision maker him or herself. It's hard to see into the souls of others. /34
But Putin's rhetoric does tend to show a concern with recalling past glories and with his own legacy, which is worrisome from the perspective of right intent. /35

theguardian.com/commentisfree/…

nytimes.com/2022/02/18/us/…

sciencedirect.com/science/articl…

brookings.edu/blog/order-fro…
Lastly, as others' souls are opaque, measuring people's actions against their claims is an alternate approach to right intent.

Thus, one might be skeptical of those who claim to "love Russian speakers," yet who fight in ways that endanger them. /36

atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainea…

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More from @vmorkevicius

Feb 18
Compare this to the #Kremlin's refusal to even cooperate with the OSCE Vienna Document process.

Transparency is a way of reducing tensions, by making one's intentions clear. /1
#Ukraine's leaders have reiterated that they have no plans to advance into Russian-backed separatist territory, and have ordered their forces to exercise restraint in responding to fire from Russian-controlled territory. /2

wsj.com/articles/ukrai…
#Ukraine's leaders have invoked the #OSCE Vienna Document process as a way to build confidence through increased transparency. But #Russia has refused to cooperate at all. /3
Read 4 tweets
Feb 18
Today as the #Kremlin's #disinformation cycle goes into overdrive, it's worth remembering that while the volume is louder, the pattern is familiar.

The stories don't need to be credible or logical. Their purpose isn't to convince. Their aim is to sow doubt & confusion. /1
Confusion & doubt make it hard for audiences to know what is true, leading to paralysis.

They can make collective action difficult, by sowing dissension & distrust between partners. /2

files.ethz.ch/isn/194545/Bri…

research-management.mq.edu.au/ws/portalfiles…

semperfidelis.ro/e107_files/pub…
Thinking about the two big #disinformation stories swirling about today, we can see that little attempt is being made to make the narratives particularly credible. /3
Read 19 tweets
Feb 15
The #Kremlin signals with one hand that it’s interested in diplomacy — and perhaps it is — but with the other it’s continuing to ratchet up the pressure on #Ukraine, through political maneuvering, #disinformation operations, and #cyber attacks. /1
Today the Duma voted to ask #Putin to recognize the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics as independent states. If Putin does so, the Minsk peace agreements would be effectively made void. /2

english.pravda.ru/news/russia/15…
The language used to describe this action in Pravda is especially telling. Note the claim that this action is “morally justified,” and more important the claim that recognition will “protect” the population from “external threats” and “the policy of genocide.” /4 Image
Read 12 tweets
Feb 15
@peterpomeranzev’s choice of words here is excellent. The old slogan, “For Your Freedom and Ours” is meaningful not just in #Lithuania, but in the region more broadly.

And it captures an important point for today’s situation: freedom, like security, is indivisible. /1
An old thread about the origins of the phrase, and some of its implications… /2
One of the early movements calling for democracy in Poland (in the 1970s) invoked the phrase; counter-protesters demanding a return to a more liberal democracy marched under it in 2017. /3

polishfreedom.pl/en/document/to…

Read 9 tweets
Feb 14
It seems the lower house of the Duma will consider two draft proposals on Tuesday— one calling directly in Putin to recognize Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics and a second one asking Putin to consult with the Defense and Foreign Ministries first. /1

themoscowtimes.com/2022/02/14/rus…
The first proposal was brought forward by the Communist party and the Just Russia party, which together hold under 20% of the seats in the lower Duma.

The second was brought by Putin’s United Russia party, which holds the vast majority of the seats. /2

csis.org/analysis/will-…
Recognizing the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics would eliminate the Kremlin’s need for the pretense that this is an internal Ukrainian problem that the Kremlin is merely concerned about as a neighbor. /3
Read 6 tweets
Feb 13
This is an important question.

#Ukraine is already paying the cost of the #Kremlin’s threatened invasion. /1
As of February 14, reinsurers will no longer cover commercial airlines flying into or over Ukraine, essentially creating a civilian no-fly zone.

The effects on business travel, tourism, and ordinary life are obvious. /2

kyivindependent.com/national/ukrai…
Ukrainian shipping has been affected by Russia’s wide-ranging exercises in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, which effectively blockaded Ukrainian ports. The latter has now been reopened: exercises continue in the former. /3

israelhayom.com/2022/02/13/in-…
Read 7 tweets

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