Thread by @NKobserver

THREAD -1/18 - #Russia and #Azerbaijan sign a 40-point declaration forming a strategic alliance for coop. in economic, military, cultural, political and security fields, among others (1). What could this mean for #NagornoKarabakh?

1.kremlin.ru/supplement/5777
#armenia #ukraine

2/18 - The declaration, based on the 1997 Friendship agreement, 2008 Strategic Partnership and the 2018 economic cooperation agreement, but goes more in detail. It shares many parts of the previous texts, but elaborates further...

3/18 - of the 40 points, 14 are on politico-military cooperation, 16 on bilateral trade/economic coop., 4 on boosting cultural ties, 1 each on parliamentary and health cooperation, the remainder on general international norms (UN, OSCE, etc.) and their importance for both sides.

4/18 - Points 21 to 36 support bilateral coop. for boosting bilateral trade, scientific-technical, atomic assistance, energy security, north-south transit corridor, agriculture, favourable credit-financial policies, and information sharing for developing the mentioned fields.

5/18- Points 26 states that the 2 sides will promote further econ. ties between metal-producing, oil/gas, heavy machinery, aviation, automobile, chemical, pharmaceutical, light industry, agriculture, and construction companies.

6/18 - Seeing that UK, Italy, France, Israel, Turkey and others now have an increased presence and expressed an interest in investing in and around #NagornoKarabakh after the 2020 war, this agreement will provide #Russia companies to do the same, but where they...

7/18 - have an advantage is where the others are absent, in post-war #NagornoKarabakh where Armenians are. #Russia currently maintains a peacekeeping force, now Russian businesses will possibly be able to have a presence in those areas, develop economic ties there.

8/18 - Articles 5-18 are on bilateral politico-military coop. Art. 11 and 18 suggest both sides will help counter groups aimed at subverting the states' sovereignty, a reference to "separatism" is made alongside international criminal groups, arms and narcotrafficking, etc.

9/18 - Art. 15: the sides will host military experts, service centres for technical maintenance of military hardware and joint armament production. (flows mainly go from RU to AZ). This will also provide more intelligence on Azeri military capabilities (e.g. bayraktar)

10/18 - This can see more #Russia military presence in #Azerbaijan, not vice-versa, as arms supplys flow one way (again, Moscow doesn't buy much from Baku), it can also tilt Baku's armament source back to Russia (it had slowly tilted towards Israel and Turkey in recent years)

11/18 - Article 8 highlights that #Azerbaijan highly values #Russia's mediating role for the ceasefire in the region starting November 2020 (no explicit mention of #NagornoKarabakh), something that Baku officially also expressed in 2021. (nothing new, just reiterating)

12/18 - Article 9: #Russia and #Azerbaijan will work together to to fulfil the requirements of the 2020 [#NagornoKarabakh Ceasefire] agreement signed with #Armenia, as well as the subsequent agreements between the 3 (i.e. Jan. 2021 and Nov. 2021)

13/18 - In all, the agreement appears more favourable to #Russia than #Azerbaijan, all the more so because of Baku's reticence to accept a long-term Russian military presence in an area it considers part of its territorial integrity (#NagornoKarabakh)

14/18 - Militarily and economically, it creates a possibility for #Russia to boost its economic presence in #Azerbaijan at a time when it appeared Baku was on an opposite course, forging ties with the West and, at the same time, being courted by Western countries.

15/18 - The alliance was signed on the same day the two self-proclaimed areas of #Lugansk and #Donetsk were officially recognised by Moscow, is this a message to #Azerbaijan hinting a similar fate? The timing is too much of a coincidence, but geopolitical context different.

16/18 - What prompted #Azerbaijan to sign such an alliance at a time when many of it's major trading partners (EU, US, UK) are highly critical of and enacting sanctions against #Russia for policies towards the #Ukraine?

17/18 - Could this be a "keep your friends close, but keep your enemies closer" tactic by Moscow? Is it disenchanted with #Turkey that it needs to balance politics? In recent years Moscow and Baku many disagreements, but maintained good economic and political ties.

18/18 - While the content of the agreement itself is quite clear, what prompted or motivated #Azerbaijan to sign an alliance with #Russia at such a time is another major topic in itself. Too much for a simple Twitter thread. Any experts on the matter?