Thread by @JominiW

1/ Ukrainian Theater of War, Day 22 & 23: The fourth week of the war opened with a series of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the Kyiv, Kharkiv, Donbas, and Mykolaiyv areas. Russian forces remain relatively combat ineffective outside the Donbas region. #UkraineUnderAttack #Ukraine

2/ Humanitarian Impact. Refugees in various European countries approaches 4 million. Humanitarian corridors continue to be interdicted, blocked, or attacked by Russian forces. Civilians increasingly become primary targets of Russian attacks.

https://twitter.com/HannaLiubakova/status/1504568033347571718?s=20&t=_O11gO7SuMrzrUOeukOnKQ

3/ Weather assessment. Visibility and wind speed are favorable for VKS execute aerospace operations. Temperatures generally will remain between 9/-7 C, hampering tactical movement, morale of Russian forces, and vehicle maintenance.

4/ Russian forces struggle with increasing mud, especially in the north and northeast of Ukraine. Vehicle abandonment is steadily increasing in these areas, as Russian maintenance support is unable to recover tactical vehicles in contested areas.

https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/1502311504904863749?s=20&t=_O11gO7SuMrzrUOeukOnKQ

5/ Kyiv AO assessment. Russian forces in the Kyiv area are combat ineffective. The last significant Russian offensive near Kyiv took place on 09 March (5x BTG assault in Irpin). Russian soldiers are increasing unwilling to sacrifice themselves for the Kremlin’s goals. #KyivNow

6/ Ukrainian defensive operations in the Kyiv-Chernihiv & Sumy AOs are a case study in the application of the principal of continuity. The Ukrainians have forced the Russians to seek disengagement from their primary strategic decisive point, Kyiv.

https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/1504909508388311042?s=20&t=_O11gO7SuMrzrUOeukOnKQ

7/ Northeast AO assessment. There are at least four Russian divisions operating in this AO, along with several independent brigades. Even with all this combat power the Russians are incapable of securing their supply routes and reducing pockets of resistance. #Chernihiv #Sumy

8/ By arraying their forces in mutually unsupportive dispositions, the Russians have afforded the numerically & materially weaker Ukrainians to achieve localized superiority of forces, leading to inaction and strategic paralysis of the Russian military.

https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1504223883381166080?s=20&t=_O11gO7SuMrzrUOeukOnKQ

9/ Kharkiv and Donbas AO assessments. The Ukrainians cannot afford to be dislodged from the Donetsk & Luhansk Oblasts. The difficulty in overcoming Ukrainian defenses on the Donets River is still within the operational capability of Russian & Separatist forces. #Mariupol #Kharkiv

10/ Victory Is achieved by gaining relative superiority at the point of contact by maneuvering to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of one’s forces. This is exactly what the Ukrainians achieved in the Izium area with combined operations.

https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1504474719021506573?s=20&t=_O11gO7SuMrzrUOeukOnKQ

11/ The Southern AO assessment. The Ukrainians have completed a successful counteroffensive toward Kherson that has reached the town of Posad-Pokrovske. As in the Kyiv AO, Russian forces in the Mykolaiyv area are more than likely combat ineffective. #Mykolaiv #Odesa #Kherson

12/ A staple of Russian military science has been a well-informed application of correlation of forces to achieve stated objectives. The Russians have failed at this. The southern effort has devolved into a diversion, one the Ukrainians can easily contain.

https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1504920052381933573?s=20&t=_O11gO7SuMrzrUOeukOnKQ

13/ Aerospace Assessment. According to US & Ukrainian intelligence, the Russians have conducted a little over 1,000 PGM missile attacks against targets in Ukraine, and are nearing the end of their available stockpile. Russia is getting better at targeting UAF UAVs.

14/ Russian continues to target Lviv to disrupt the flow of western aid and foreign volunteers into Ukraine. However, VKS forces continue to suffer significant losses to both fixed-wing and rotary-wing airframes, and ADA system at an increasing rate.

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1504700003624927235?s=20&t=_O11gO7SuMrzrUOeukOnKQ

15/ Information War. Ukrainian strategic messaging is increasingly being amplified daily by other major international actors and influences whose opinion hold value for the Russian public, as well as other international actors who remain on the sidelines.

https://twitter.com/Schwarzenegger/status/1504426844199669762?s=20&t=_O11gO7SuMrzrUOeukOnKQ

16/ Messages like these, coupled with images like the one below continues to have a dramatic impact in fostering resistance, compelling western leaders to continue the trend of increasing aid, and potentially causing Russian allies to slow role support.

https://twitter.com/avalaina/status/1504564631620108301?s=20&t=_O11gO7SuMrzrUOeukOnKQ

17/ NATO continues to move in a direction of increasing overt support for Ukraine. Intelligence sharing is increasing along with vital military aid packages that make up of the lack of an organic capability in Ukraine to replace material losses.

https://twitter.com/NATOpress/status/1504486205206933508?s=20&t=_O11gO7SuMrzrUOeukOnKQ

18/ Russian Overall Assessment. The Russian war against Ukraine has not just stalled, it is on the verge of losing the ability to produce any type of outcome the Kremlin can point to as worth the effort.

19/ Russian forces are steadily becoming more consumed with securing areas they already supposedly control, hunting down and arresting both military and civilian resistance fighters, and convincing their own soldiers of the need to fight.

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1504609044773978114?s=20&t=_O11gO7SuMrzrUOeukOnKQ

20/ Strategic initiative and operational momentum is now decidedly with the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Russian military needs to make significant gains, and soon, or risk a major and irreversible defeat as Ukrainian counter offensives increase in magnitude and effectiveness.

21/ These updates have been aggregated from various OSINT sources, official Ukrainian government statements, media reports (i.e., AP News, Reuters), and American think tank reports.

22/ These maps have been created by me based off the most reliable information of activity in the Ukrainian Theater of War from a variety of sources. Errors will be corrected as soon as they are identified.